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When the characteristic of mass violence is primarily intrastate rather than interstate in nature, as 
was the case during the 1994 Rwandan genocide, geographical separation among conflicting 
groups is not always a viable solution. In such cases, reconciliation can present a way to 
recuperate and rebuild broken relationships amongst former adversaries. Reconciliation itself, 
however, is not a general concept or set of rules to be equally applied towards different groups or 
countries. This thesis is centered on a key question: what are the meanings of reconciliation and 
development in post-genocide Rwanda, and how are they related? To examine this relationship, 
three possible connections are conceptualized: social healing and community development, 
reparations and economic development, and shared views on history and political development. 
This research contends that in a post-conflict setting, development without reconciliation is an 
incomplete process. 
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
In March 2008, a bullet travelled from Nairobi to Vancouver. The bullet, more than 20 years old, 
was stuck in the right rib of a Ugandan refugee, who has lived his entire 42 years of life seeking 
refuge in East Africa. The endlessly unfolding story of his refugee life was no different from the 
voices frequently appearing in academic journals or numerous non-governmental organizations' 
(NGOs) reports. While listening to his story, the bizarre bump on his rib gave me mixed feelings 
of shame and anger. Would he ever be healed from the bullet? How could it even be possible that 
he might forgive the person who shot the bullet into his chest?1 
As of April 2011, there are 79 ongoing cases of actual or potential conflicts around the 
world (International Crisis Group [ICG], 2011). Within these cases, the number of armed 
conflicts characterized as being intrastate in nature has been on the rise for some time (World 
Bank, 1998). Since the end of the Cold War era, more than 100 societies experiencing intrastate 
violence have ended their conflicts and transitioned into a post-conflict stage (United Nations 
Development Programme [UNDP], 2008). Emerging from these trends, interest in post-conflict 
reconstruction and rehabilitation, as well as early response and humanitarian relief, grew 
considerably (United Nations Industrial Development Organization [UNIDO], 2003; World 
Bank, 1998). At the same time, the significance of post-conflict settings has also amplified the 
understanding of concepts and debates that make reconciliation plausible. Truly, there has been 
abundant research on what reconciliation means, and how it has been attempted in different 
regions around the globe. These discussions have identified the urgent and pressing need for 
1 This narrative is based on a meeting with a Ugandan refugee who I met through volunteer work, hosting 
newcomers to Canada with the Immigration Service Society of British Columbia (ISS of BC) in Vancouver. The 
family of two parents and six children landed in Canada in March 2008, with assistance from the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The male head of the family had sought refuge in Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Somalia, Sudan, and Tanzania. The conversation occurred on June 8,2008, and was not an official interview. On 
November 21,2008, he underwent successful surgery to have the bullet removed. 
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reconciliation. In practice, various approaches to reconciliation are applied in post-conflict 
societies, and different meanings are attached to reconciliation depending on unique local 
circumstances. 
1.1 Primary Problem: Post-Genocide Rwanda 
In a three-month period between April and July 1994, a genocide primarily targeting the 
minority group of Tutsi living in Rwanda, a small landlocked nation situated in the Great Lakes 
region of East Africa, resulted in an estimated 800,0002 lost lives (African Rights, 1995; Des 
Forges, 1999; International Panel of Eminent Personalities [IPEP], 2000; Lemarchand, 1995; 
Longman, 1997,1998; 1999; 2004a; Mamdani, 2001; C. Newbury, 1995,1998; C. Newbury & 
D. Newbury, 1995; Prunier, 1995; Staub, 2000). The systematic massacre was premeditated by 
Hutu political extremists in order to maintain absolute influence throughout the state 
(Lemarchand, 1995; Reyntjens, 1996). Beyond exterminating all Tutsi, targeted attacks were also 
directed towards members of opposition Hutu political parties and anyone who held a 
sympathetic attitude towards the Tutsi (African Rights, 1995; Des Forges, 1999; IPEP, 2000; C. 
Newbury, 1995; Reyntjens, 1996). The genocide ended on July 18,1994 when the Tutsi-led 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) took control over the country, driving the Hutu extremists into 
exile (Des Forges & Longman, 2004; Hintjens, 2009; IPEP, 2000; Longman, 2004b, 2006a; 
Reyntjens, 1996, 2004; Waldorf, 2006). 
In the wake of government-sponsored mass violence, Rwanda's efforts on the "path of 
resurgence and economic development" (UNDP, 2007, p. 1) are already underway. Indeed, the 
2 No exact statistics for the death toll is available. Broadly speaking, the number is estimated somewhere between 
500,000 and 1 million (Des Forges, 1995; IPEP, 2000; Mamdani, 2001; C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 1995). The 
post-genocide Rwandan government estimates 1 million (Zorbas, 2004), whereas more conservative calculations 
tend to be closer to 500,000 (Des Forges, 1999; Lemarchand, 1995). The figure of 800,000 is commonly found in 
the literature of Rwandan genocide (Adelman & Suhrke, 1999; Clark & Kaufiman, 2009; Dallaire, 2005; Gourevitch, 
1998; Prunier, 1995; Staub, 2000; Zorbas, 2004). 
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physical reconstruction of the country has been impressive (Mgbako, 2005, p. 2). The 
reconciliation process, however, remains sluggish and is still quite a sensitive issue. This 
imbalance brings about concerns: what does reconciliation mean in a society that has been totally 
devastated and traumatized by prolonged ethnic divisionism and malice like Rwanda has? What 
is required for reconciliation in such cases? Who are main bodies to promote the peace process 
and how are they leading the movement? Rwanda presents a unique and challenging opportunity 
to explore these issues in both a historical and contemporary context. 
1.2 Research Question 
This thesis is centered around a critical question: what are the meanings of reconciliation and 
development in post-genocide Rwanda, and how are reconciliation and development related in 
contemporary Rwanda? The question is derived from problems within the discourse and practice 
of reconciliation in post-conflict development. Although the significance of reconciliation is 
often acknowledged, the concept is rarely incorporated into the goals and strategies of post-
conflict development and peace-building. This tendency is particularly evident, amongst 
international development agencies and the donor community. In part, the absence can be 
attributed to the very nature of reconciliation itself, in that meanings and priorities of 
reconciliation vary, and adapt to different peoples and circumstances (Zorbas, 2008). 
Furthermore, the lack of empirical data makes it difficult to narrow the gap between the 
conceptualisation of reconciliation in theory and applications of the discourse in practice 
(Brouneus, 2007). 
In this thesis, I argue that development without reconciliation is an incomplete process in 
a post-conflict setting. The argument is grounded in a hypothesis that reconciliation is an 
extremely critical component of post-conflict development. This research attempts to examine 
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the argument by detailing the meanings of reconciliation in connection with post-conflict 
development. Reconciliation is a process, and depending on how a society defines its priorities 
(e.g., justice, truth, forgiveness, trust, among many others), the process can ultimately heal 
wounds and mend communities. At the same time, the meaning of development in a post-conflict 
society can be found at the local level when the lives of devastated people improve. Rather than 
subsuming reconciliation as one of many topics within the discourse of post-conflict 
development, this thesis examines and identifies key connections that exist between 
reconciliation and development, by using post-development theory as a theoretical lens. 
To conceptualize this connection, three interrelations are put forth: social healing and 
community development; reparation and economic development; and, shared views on history 
and political development. These three relationships will be analyzed to establish whether they 
exist in reconciliation and development policies of the three major participants in post-genocide 
Rwanda: the Government of Rwanda (GoR), Rwandan grassroots organizations, and the 
international community who are players in international aid. Through policy documents and 
other published materials, these actors have collectively articulated their approach and vision for 
post-genocide recovery. As such, these policy documents are the primary gateway to information 
that enabled this research process. This thesis is expected to contribute to groundwork for 
thinking of reconciliation as a critical component within development in post-conflict situations. 
1.3 Research Design and Methods 
Information gathering for this research is based primarily on secondary data analysis gathered 
through policy and research reports, academic journals, books, surveys, interviews, case studies, 
news articles, theses dissertations, and other relevant sources. Data were then filtered and 
examined through the use of qualitative research methods. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) was 
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adopted to identify convergences and divergences of the goals and strategies of the major actors 
involved in reconciliation and development in post-genocide Rwanda. 
While exploration, description, and explanation are all contained within this study, it is 
dominantly based on an explorative purpose. The research does not intend to seek out specific 
knowledge or information about individuals, regions, or programs, but rather to uncover a 
broader understanding about the meanings of, and association between, reconciliation and 
development processes in Rwanda. Thus, the objective is to see how various views, voices, and 
activities reflect on the reconciliation and development process in post-genocide Rwanda as a 
whole. To accomplish this task, a wide spectrum of resources was assessed in order to ensure 
that no single perspective or approach dominated the findings of the research. 
Extensive and comprehensive secondary data collection was necessary and beneficial for 
comparing the goals and perspectives of different stakeholders involved. Babbie (2001) 
emphasizes the importance of using multiple sources to test a hypothesis because "[i]f all the 
tests seem to confirm the hypothesis, then the weight of evidence supports the validity [and 
reliability] of the measure" (p. 318). If a particular issue or subject of Rwanda's reconciliation 
process, for example, is researched using multiple sources, validity can be increased by 
clarifying omissions or by identifying inaccuracies. Simultaneously, if certain data are repeated 
in a consistent manner by a number of sources, reliability can be determined by testing for 
consistency. 
Critical discourse analysis was applied in analyzing the data in order to assess the 
relevancy of obtained information, and to assess the "broader issues of ideology and social 
belief' (Widdowson, 2007, p. 70) that exist within the texts, publications, and policy documents 
chosen here for analysis. There are indeed numerous organizations and individuals, and their 
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programs actively disseminate information about the situation in post-genocide Rwanda, and 
many of their programs and projects do not necessarily indicate their goals and concepts in 
phrases or vocabulary that explicitly promote either reconciliation or development. In this regard, 
using CDA is the most effective approach to strengthening validity and reliability of the 
information, and enables the capture of implicit or tacit meaning behind the various actors and 
their published works. Much like post-development thinking and other interdisciplinary studies, 
CDA "calls into question ideas and assumptions that have been taken for granted as self-
evidently valid" (Widdowson, 2007, p. 71). 
It was necessary to scrutinize how main points and arguments—discourses—in the unit 
of analysis were structured and developed. This process enabled an improved comprehension of 
particular ways of thinking, intrinsic values, hidden attitudes, and perceptions based on 
epistemology and ontology (Bryman, 2008, pp. 499-500; Discourse Analysis, n.d., para. 1; 
Waitt, 2005, pp. 164-171). Critical discourse analysis is utilized to determine whether a 
discussion is treating one concept with greater significance than another, how the debate is being 
framed, and whether alternate terminology is being employed; for example, referring to 
reconstruction, peace-building, reconciliation, and other similar terms as one single concept, or 
as separate entities. By using CDA, a necessary "plurality of theory and methodology" (Weiss & 
Wodak, 2003, p. 6) is used for this research process. 
1.3.1 Treatment of data 
In order to properly treat the data collected for this research, several steps were involved. First, 
arguments, statements, sentiments, or voices were clustered by similarities based on 
epistemological and discipline-based grounds. In analyzing gacaca courts, for instance, 
perspectives were categorized into disciplines such as political science, law, psychology, and 
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human rights. Second, after the data had been clustered in this manner, patterns of accounts and 
arguments were identified and extracted for the purpose of analysis. For each discipline, the most 
prevalent ideas and concerns were collocated to form a discourse. This methodology was used 
when treating information from both academic theorists and practitioners alike. The approach 
was not applicable to the study of every actor: the Rwandan government, for example, presented 
a more unified discourse, but this methodology was necessary in order to consider the widest 
range of perspectives in a systematic manner. 
1.3.2 Definition of actors 
A framework of actors involved in post-genocide Rwanda's reconciliation and development 
process has been designed for this research with three levels: local, national, and international. 
The local level includes Rwandan individuals, communities, and grassroots organizations. The 
GoR was taken into account as the primary actor on the national level. Finally, international 
agencies, NGOs, and important donor countries to Rwanda round out the final grouping of 
actors. A structured categorization of the actors was applied for the puipose of this research in 
order to compare effectively and clearly the convergence and divergence of the actors' concepts, 
perspectives, and goals of reconciliation and development. 
1.3.3 Scope of the sources 
For the analysis of each actor, a unique set of documents and information sources was 
considered. Many of the sources were identified during the preliminary literature review 
conducted in the earliest stages of this research. Awareness and consideration of other key 
documents and sources was an ongoing process that required extensive cross-referencing, 
monitoring of electronic information sources, and a willingness to expand and explore beyond 
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the scope of the initial information gathering process. General source identification and selection 
strategies for each actor are discussed here for greater clarification. 
In light of the numerous post-genocide development activities pursued by the GoR, 
targeted policies and programs analyzed for this research have been strategically selected based 
on the extent of their relevance to the reconciliation process. First of all, the Constitution of 
Rwanda (GoR, 2003) was scrutinized in order to obtain the GoR's vision and principles on 
national unity and identity at the post-genocide stage of the country. The research also paid 
special attention to the domestic judicial system and criminal laws that aim to deal with 
Rwanda's past. As the Government's special agency to promote reconciliation, the National 
Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) was also analyzed in detail. The NURC engages 
in reviewing the GoR's reconciliation and reconstruction approaches by conducting research and 
interviews, and disseminating the GoR's principles on peace and national unity through civic 
education and demobilization programs. Ingando is such a case. For population reintegration, as 
well as land policy, imidugudu was considered for examination. Lastly, Rwanda Vision 2020 
(GoR, 2000) is the GoR's road map for national reconstruction and development strategies, and 
met the research criteria. Analyzing data regarding these programs and activities helped to 
identify specific concepts, goals, and strategies of reconciliation and development that the GoR 
emphasizes and attempts to promote, and its perspective and attitude toward the goals. While 
GoR policy documents were used as direct sources for analysis, secondary sources were equally 
vital to this research, particularly for their insight and critiques of GoR policy. 
All data regarding perceptions and attitudes of Rwandan grassroots towards 
reconciliation were collected from secondary sources. I distinguished the sources into two 
categories by measuring how the data were found. Field studies—grassroots interviews, opinion 
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surveys, as such—comprised one of the categories. This set of sources was considered primary 
indirect data as their main focus is on grassroots views and reactions to specific subjects (e.g., 
psycho-social healing, physical and mental health, government policy, or reconciliation as a 
whole). Meanwhile, sources that do not aim for Rwandan grassroots but reflect on their opinions 
fell under the category of secondary indirect data: for instance, a critique of the GoR's judicial 
institutions that includes direct/indirect quotes from grassroots voices. Both types of sources 
were valuable for analyzing patterns of study results and narratives. The patterns were searched 
by breaking down Rwandan grassroots into smaller cohorts by age, gender, ethnic background, 
experience of the genocide (e.g., victims, survivors, perpetrators, and onlookers), and exposure 
to the conflict—whether present in the country during the genocide or not. Local NGOs and 
community associations were also included in the grassroots analysis. 
Lastly, foreign donors and international agencies that have participated in Rwanda's post-
genocide reconstruction and development landscape are categorized and placed on the 
international level. Key donor states that have played a role in Rwanda in the aftermath of 
genocide include Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US); at the same time, the 
European Union (EU), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and World Bank 
serve as major multilateral channels (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
[OECD], 2008, p. 3).3 The OECD statistics tool was used to measure the volume of aid and aid 
trends of the above donors. In particular, the five most influential donors who have provided the 
highest amount of aid to Rwanda's post-genocide development—EU (more specifically, 
European Commission, EC), World Bank (International Development Association, IDA), UK, 
3 Canada was one of the major donors for Rwanda. Since February 23,2009, however, Rwanda has been omitted 
from Canada's country list of bilateral assistance programs as its strategy of aid effectiveness moved to Central and 
South America (Canadian International Development Agency [CIDA], 2009; CTV News, 2009). 
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US, and the Netherlands—were given a specific focus during this analysis, in an effort to 
identify relationships between these donors and the GoR, and the impact of their roles on 
Rwanda's peace-building strategy. Ample resources from international NGOs were assessed in 
order to recognize their voices and the standpoints of Rwanda's reconciliation and development 
process. Details on the mandates, approaches, and projects of those organizations were excluded, 
however, as they fell outside the aim of this study and did not contribute to a comprehensive 
picture of the role of international community. Within this analysis of the international level, the 
research sought to construct a spectrum of interests and impacts to Rwanda's reconciliation and 
development process by the stakeholders, and to identify if any form of cohesion or consistency 
exists. These dynamics were meaningful in structuring an analysis of the convergence and 
divergence of attitudes on development that the GoR and external forces have had on each other. 
1.3.4 Limitations and delimitations 
While secondary information gathering has proved to be an appropriate method for researching 
the entire dynamic of Rwanda's reconciliation process at the juncture of development, its 
weaknesses along with my own personal limitations must be acknowledged. 
Firstly, in the course of analyzing existing data, a certain level of authenticity tends to be 
missing. While the methodology employed for this research does not call for in-person 
interviews, surveys, or other fieldwork, it is recognized that those activities, or by-products of 
such processes, would have enhanced my understanding of post-conflict societies. Not making 
an in-person visit (either for research or travel purposes) or having any life experiences in 
Rwanda and the Great Lakes region has made my research difficult at times, particularly when 
attempting to grasp a precise understanding of some of the social, political, and cultural 
landscapes which cannot be gleaned through the printed word alone. 
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Secondly, access to reliable and comprehensive information was not easy to obtain for all 
sources, particularly for local Rwandan resources. Although many Rwandan NGOs and 
government departments do have a web presence, pages within their sites were frequently under 
construction or had been moved to an unspecified new location. 
Finally, language has also served as a limitation, at times restricting the data search and 
collection strategy, since some of the sources are written or spoken in languages other than 
English. Prior to the English-speaking RPF-led regime after the genocide, French was the most 
commonly used language after Kinyarwanda, the native tongue of Rwanda. My level of French 
and Kinyarwanda comprehension is insufficient for the interpretation of professional literature or 
technical jargon. Although this language matter has not been a major obstacle as the majority of 
sources published in French and some in Kinyarwanda are also available in English, some 
resources printed exclusively in French and/or Kinyarwanda have had to be excluded from this 
research, including certain local NGO websites that lack English translation options (e.g., 
LIPRODHOR). 
1.4 Outline of Chapters 
Within the six chapters of the thesis, several different subjects and concepts will be 
introduced and discussed at length. To convey the research in a logical and cumulative manner, 
initial chapters introduce the foundation knowledge and history that is central to the debate that 
follows. 
In Chapter II, a detailed account of Rwandan history, spanning numerous centuries and 
cumulating in the onset of the April 1994 genocide, is presented. This chapter aims to capture the 
significant events and individuals from Rwanda's past by following a linear time progression. 
Rwandan history has been penned in many versions and editions. The chapter takes the various 
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accounts and views of history into consideration rather than relying on a single account. 
In Chapter III, the concept of reconciliation is introduced. The intent of the chapter is to 
explore the different meanings and approaches to reconciliation that exist both in theory and in 
practice. A series of case studies from various post-conflict societies is undertaken here to 
demonstrate how different societies have sought reconciliation. 
Chapter IV outlines the conceptual framework of this research process, highlighting the 
separate concepts of reconciliation, development, and their relationship. The concept and 
relevance of post-development thinking is also discussed in this chapter. 
In Chapter V, an in depth analysis of the reconciliation and development process of post-
genocide Rwanda is put forth. An examination of major actors in post-genocide Rwanda is 
conducted, looking closely at the programs, perspectives and vision of each actor, and how these 
actors work with—or against—each other. This analysis is conducted in an attempt to draw out 
any possible associations between reconciliation and development, and to satisfactorily address 
the research question, as presented above. 
Lastly, Chapter VI concludes this research by summarizing the findings and highlighting 
the key implications that have been identified. 
13 
CHAPTER II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF RWANDA UNTIL THE 1994 GENOCIDE 
The rhetoric of the Rwandan genocide is often narrated in comparison with that of the Nazi 
Holocaust (Eltringham, 2004; Gourevitch, 1998; Lemarchand, 2002; Mamdani, 2001). The 
unanimously synchronized reaction to such heinous atrocities from outside spectators was to 
question "[c]an we imagine such an outcome for any of the wars of today?" (Gourevitch, 1998, 
p. 170). What made one group choose to exterminate their long-time cohabitants? Where did the 
destructive ideology come from? How could neighbours, relatives, friends, priests, teachers, 
doctors, and even one's own families turn out to be perpetrators all of a sudden? How could such 
mass participation and buy-in be possible? Why did the international community not make 
serious efforts to stop the tragedy, instead of standing on the sidelines, watching while it all 
unfolded? The answers to these and many other questions are still yet to be fully and properly 
explained. In pursuit of such answers, unravelling the thread of history can help shed light on the 
proper path of examination. An exploration of Rwanda's history, therefore, is covered here in 
order to trace the underlying causes and events leading to the genocide of 1994. 
The ability to enact genocide on such a scale can only be made possible through 
meticulously premeditated and prepared political manoeuvring (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 
1994; Jefremovas, 1995; Melvem, 2009; C. Newbury, 1995) and instigated extermination of one 
group by another. If the political instability and economic crisis—the former manifesting itself in 
a monopoly on power and corruption by the president and his inner circle, and the latter resulting 
from plummeting international coffee prices and natural disasters in the 1980s and early 1990s— 
provided a specific motive to plan the genocide, a deeper cause also lies in years prior. More 
than a-century-old ethnic and socio-economic distinction among Rwandans, and its rigidification 
by the colonial rule was the other, more entrenched condition which led to the atrocity. 
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regard, it is not surprising to see the genocide as an extension of previous ethnic violence, such 
as the Hutu revolution in 1959-62 (Lemarchand, 1995). This chapter, therefore, intends to draw 
attention to the country's political, social, economic, and cultural milieus in a historical context, 
for the purpose of comprehending possible roots of the Rwandan genocide. 
Although awareness and international attention to the Rwandan genocide and other 
violent conflicts in East Africa have only recently, since the early 1990s, received a great deal of 
media coverage and spotlight, scholarly efforts on Rwanda and the Great Lakes region have been 
conducted on a consistent basis by outsiders from different regions for many decades. Some of 
the key authors who frequently appear in the literature include Alexis Kagame4 (Rwanda), 
Mahmood Mamdani (Africa); Jean-Pierre Chretien, Rene Lemarchand, Johan Pottier, Gerard 
Prunier, Filip Reyntjens (Europe, particularly Belgium and France); Alison Des Forges, Timothy 
Longman, Catharine and David Newbury, and Peter Uvin (North America). 
The history of Rwanda is usually divided and studied through four major periods (Des 
Forges, 1999; IPEP, 2000; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995; Uvin, 1998), which will be followed 
in this chapter as well: the precolonial period of Rwanda; the colonial period between the end of 
the nineteenth century and 1962; the 1959 'social revolution' followed by independence and two 
Hutu-led regimes in the latter half of the twentieth century; and lastly, the 1990 RPF invasion 
and the genocide. Comprehensive exploration of each period will begin with a look at the first 
period. 
4 Abbe Alexis Kagame (1912-1981) was a Rwandan priest, poet, and historian (Mamdani, 2001; C. Newbury, 1988; 
Prunier, 1995). He is recognized as one of the foremost and earliest 'Westernized' intellectuals (C. Newbury, 1988; 
Prunier, 1995). His work on Rwanda's precolonial and colonial political development is of considerable importance 
and is often found in today's discourse by many non-Rwandan scholars (C. Newbury, 1998; Prunier 1995). The 
controversy, however, in his work lies in his defensive tone toward Tutsi monarchy and power (Des Forges, 1995; 
C. Newbury, 1998). 
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2.1 Precolonial Rwanda: Identity of the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa 
An understanding of the precolonial history of Rwanda is of great use when attempting to 
understand who the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa are, although attempting this feat can often result in 
errors and frustrations as these distinctions are rather vague and contentious (Mamdani, 2001; 
Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996; Uvin, 1998). In essence, there are two major accounts of 
Rwandan history prevalent in Rwandan society, the Hutu and Tutsi versions of history 
(Gourevitch, 1998; Mamdani, 2001). At the same time, there has been considerable academic 
research and effort made to search for more truth and evidence in those accounts on the origin of 
Rwanda and Rwandans. Clarification and settlement on this matter is imperative (IPEP, 2000). 
The intensity of such disagreements on the origin of the Hutu/Tutsi/Twa has prevented Rwandan 
schools from teaching history to this day in post-genocide Rwandan society (Breed, 2008, p. 39; 
Freedman et al., 2004, p. 248; Zorbas, 2004, p. 41), and has acted as a roadblock to social unity 
and understanding. The scarcity of written records is largely due to the prevalence of oral 
tradition and the non-existence of an alphabet makes it difficult to search for reliable proof prior 
to the mid-nineteenth century (Gourevitch, 1998; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996). More 
importantly, since the society is extremely hierarchical and its people tend to conform to 
authority (Des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995; Uvin, 1998), the truth of their past 
lies with whoever holds power (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 48; Longman & Rutagengwa, 2004, p. 
170). Mark Twain once said: "[t]he very ink with which all history is written is merely fluid 
prejudice" (Ayres, 1998, p. 22). 
The two main attempts to explain the formulation of the country, as it exists today, hinge 
on the relationship between the Hutu and Tutsi (Buckley-Zistel, 2006a; IPEP, 2000; Longman & 
Rutagengwa, 2004; Mamdani, 2001; C. Newbury, 1998). In the so-called 'pro-Hutu' account, 
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distinct difference on origin among the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa is underlined whereas the 'pro-
Tutsi' explanation takes a 'no identity difference' view but suggests that the only differences lie 
in economic and political distinction (Mamdani, 2001, pp. 41-42). The main point of the former 
account is that the Twa were the first group of pottery makers and hunters who arrived in the 
region which is now Rwanda and Burundi around 4,000 years ago (Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 
1996, chap. 2, para. 2), agriculturalist Hutu arrived later from Central Africa and animal-herding 
Tutsi were the last to settle down, between the fifteenth and sixteenth century (Des Forges, 1999; 
IPEP, 2000; Mamdani, 2001). The latter explanation, in contrast, claims that all three of these 
groups settled and cohabited in the Great Lakes region for more than 2,000 years (Des Forges, 
1999; IPEP, 2000; Spottiswoode, 2007). The pro-Hutu point of view was particularly dominant 
before 1994 and the pro-Tutsi account was undertaken by the current Tutsi-led regime and has 
now become widespread in post-genocide Rwanda (Longman & Rutagengwa, 2004, pp. 162-
166, 168-170; C. Newbury, 1998, p. 10).5 
Although both accounts contain a certain level of mythical rhetoric and political 
propaganda, some points led experts and scholars to excavate empirical evidence beneath the 
ostensible statements. Physical difference, for example, amongst Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa led 
scholars to hypothesize that each group might have originated from different places (Des Forges, 
1999; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995; Uvin, 1998), which is derived in part from what the first 
European travellers and colonial scholars saw during African expeditions throughout the 
nineteenth century (Louis, 1963; Mamdani, 2001; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996). In general, 
the Twa were the shortest of all; Hutu were medium height and stocky; and Tutsi were the tallest 
5 Catharine Newbury (1998) observes that those two accounts "reflect political positions more than valid historical 
reconstruction," (p. 10) and fail to provide any suitable evidence for understanding ethnic dynamics. The danger is 
that this existing fundamental difference on the view of ethnicity in Rwandan history hinders the sustainability of a 
reconcilable atmosphere and national unity (Buckley-Zistel, 2006a; Longman & Rutagengwa, 2004). 
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and slimmest (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 50; Mamdani, 2001, p. 44-45; Prunier, 1995, pp. 4-5). The 
comparison between the Hutu and Tutsi is particularly extensive: Hutu had a wide nose, thick 
lips, and dark complexion, which were opposite to Tutsi features (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 50; 
Mamdani, 2001, p. 44-45; Prunier, 1995, pp. 4-5). Their average difference of height was at the 
very least between 10 and 12 centimetres (Mamdani, 2001; pp. 44-45).6 
What is unanimously understood is that these physically distinguished Hutu, Tutsi, and 
Twa became the major components of Rwanda's population and that their long-time cohabitation 
and intermarriage7 led to a shared language (Kinyarwanda), religion, lifestyle, customs, and even 
physical appearance (Des Forges, 1999; Gourevitch, 1998; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995; Uvin, 
1998). It has become increasingly challenging to know for certain a person's group affiliation 
through mere observation of their physical appearance and traits (African Rights, 1995, p. 5; Des 
Forges, 1999, History, para. 8). It is, therefore, not an easy matter to categorize Hutus, Tutsis, 
and Twas either by race, ethnicity, class, caste, or rank and no formal agreement on that 
classification exists (African Rights, 1995, p. 5; Gourevitch, 1998, p. 48; Mamdani, 2001; pp. 41, 
73; C. Newbury, 1995, p. 12).8 
6 Additionally, the difference embodies genetic traits as well, such as the existence of sickle cells and the ability to 
digest lactose based on a different diet (Mamdani, 2001, pp. 43-46). 
7 The custom of intermarriage certainly played a significant role in obscuring physical distinction of the Hutu and 
Tutsi but not in integrating for social cohesion, since the ethnicity of children followed that of the father's (Des 
Forges, 1999, History, para. 8; Uvin, 1998, pp. 29-30). Later on, intermarriage became in effect "a cornerstone of 
the racist discourse" (Uvin, 1998, p. 30). 
8 Mamdani (2001) interprets the Hutu/Tutsi/Twa identity through a political lens. Political identity comes about 
through the formation and enforcement of legal definitions and concepts (Mamdani, 2001, pp. 22-27). Essentially, if 
the law defines someone as 'Hutu,' that—regardless of their cultural, ethnic, or biological identity—is their political 
identity (Mamdani, 2001, pp. 22-27). Political identity rallies around a common project for the future, instead of 
focusing on a shared past (Mamdani, 2001, pp. 22-27). While cultural and economic realities certainly did exist to 
define the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa in many ways, it was how these realities dovetailed with the perception that the 
Hutu was the 'native' and the Tutsi was the 'settler' (both political identities) that fuelled genocidal sentiments to 
their boiling point (Mamdani, 2001, p. 14). It is interesting to note, also, that outside of Rwandan borders, the 
political identity of both Hutu and Tutsi was simply Banyarwanda, the people of Rwanda in Kinyarwanda 
(Mamdani, 2001, pp. 36-37). The legal distinction of Hutu or Tutsi which was strictly enforced in Rwanda by the 
issuance and adherence to identity cards was all but ignored in neighbouring Uganda and Congo (Mamdani, 2001, 
pp. 36-37). 
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The political geography and physical boundaries of Rwanda also contributed to the 
formation of Rwandan society. Myriad small chiefdoms of the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa composed 
the Great Lakes region through expansion and/or control over neighbours between the eleventh 
and fifteenth century (Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996). Over the next several hundred years 
these chiefdoms of many clans eventually integrated under one powerful clan, Abanyiginya 
(Tutsi), which was politically predominant in eastern Rwanda, by conquering the others in the 
west (Mamdani, 2001, p. 62; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996, chap. 2, paras. 8,12). Throughout, 
the king (mwami in Kinyarwanda) remained at the centre and absolute divine of the realm 
(Gourevitch, 1998, p. 49; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995, pp. 9-11). In particular, the reign of 
mwami Kigeri Rwabugiri (1860-95) was a critical period of precolonial Rwanda in that the 
region was shaped as one state through expansion, and its power became centralized and 
hierarchical through patron-client relationship (African Rights, 1995; Huband, 2001; Mamdani, 
2001; C. Newbury, 1988; D. Newbury, 2001; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996). 
There existed various forms of clientship which all rested on unequal and reciprocal 
relationships between the ruler (patron) and the ruled (client) (Mamdani, 2001, p. 65; Prunier, 
1995, p. 13). The early days of clientship (umuheto) focused mainly on the giving of cattle as a 
regular offering by a kin group in return for protection from the patron (African Rights, 1995, p. 
4; Mamdani, 2001, p. 65). Ownership of cattle meant not only the symbol of wealth and 
prosperity but also social mobility (Des Forges, 1999; Prunier, 1995, p. 13), which has remained 
rigid even in today's Rwandan society: "[c]ows are status symbols in Rwandan culture and 
extremely valuable—selling one was extravagant; selling two was an invitation to financial ruin" 
(Ilibagiza, 2006, p. 19). The later clientship (ubuhake), however, moved away from voluntary 
giving and instead allowed a patron to impose cattle collection from a client, or other forms of 
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giving when the intended clients, many of them Hutu, possessed no cattle of their own 
(Mamdani, 2001, p. 65). Although there was never clear divisions such as Tutsi cattle-herders 
and Hutu farmers, a forced labour (ubureetwa), introduced during the Rwabugiri era, was applied 
exclusively to the Hutu whose social and political status further deteriorated (Mamdani, 2001, 
pp. 65-66). 
The institutionalized identification of Tutsi and Hutu was generalized and became 
distinguishable with "Tutsi pastoralists as power-holders and Hutu cultivators as subjects" (Des 
Forges, 1999, History, para. 6). What is clear, however, is that the Hutu-Tutsi stratification and 
polarization was not yet rigidified until the establishment of colonial rule (Des Forges, 1999; 
Huband, 2001; Mamdani, 2001; C. Newbury, 1988; Prunier, 1995; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 
1996). 
2.2 Colonial Period: The Racial Polarization of Ethnic Distinction 
The Great Lakes of East Africa was an area of great importance to European colonial powers as 
part of their 'scramble for Africa' in the early colonial era between approximately 1880 and 1900 
(Louis, 1963; Manning, 1988). During these years Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, and other 
Western European powers ventured blindly into regions they described as the 'heart of darkness,' 
in attempts to claim territory that they ascribed with current or future strategic value for trade, 
settlement, or empire expansion (Chamberlain, 1999, p. 84). While each colonial power had 
different reasons and public justifications for their presence in Africa, it was often the efforts of 
individuals or special interests that motivated the nations to press on. In the case of Germany, it 
was the efforts of one explorer, Karl Peters, who in 1884 negotiated a series of treaties for a vast 
area of land in East Africa, which encouraged Germany to enter the scramble and eventually lay 
claim to much of the area around what became known as Tanganyika (Chamberlain, 1999, p. 
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60). There was little resistance to German claims (Calvert, 1917, p. vi), and in October 1886 an 
agreement was reached between Germany and Britain whereby Kenya and Uganda were to 
remain under British administration and Tanganyika (including modern day Rwanda) under 
German (Chamberlain, 1999, p. 61). While this agreement was not the final act by the parties 
involved in the scramble for Africa which would continue on until the turn of the century, 
German administration would remain constant in the Central African region for many years to 
come. 
In particular, the current area of Rwanda and Burundi (Ruanda-Urundi, as traditional 
European names for the two countries) was "a strategic junction" (Louis, 1963, p. xv) to 
Germany, Belgium, and Britain. According to historian William Roger Louis (1963), the area 
was: 
seen by German colonial jingoes as part of a German central African empire, by 
[Belgian] King Leopold II as a stepping stone toward Lake Victoria and the Indian 
Ocean, and by the Cape to [British] Cairo enthusiasts as the link between the British 
possessions in the north and south, (p. xv) 
With a series of diplomatic negotiations and treaties among those European imperialists (Louis, 
1963; Pottier, 2002),9 Germany started taking control over Rwanda between 1895 and 1899 
(IPEP, 2000; C. Newbury, 1988; Prunier, 1995; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996).10 
German administration, however, did not last long. In 1916 Belgium occupied the 
Rwanda and Burundi domain as the result of the offensives launched from Belgian Congo Free 
State (the current Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC) against German East Africa 
9 Miscalculating the geography of the region led to a huge controversy which drew out the negotiations for more 
than two decades, beginning in 1884-5 (Louis, 1963, pp. 3-51). Germany's effort to colonize was under way with its 
contact with the Rwandan royal court in 1894 (C. Newbury, 1988, p. 53), the first military post in Usumbura 
(Bujumbura, Burundi's capital) in 1896 (Louis, 1963, p. 114) and in Rwanda in 1898 (C. Newbury, 1988, pp. 56-
57). Finally, in 1910, the three colonial powers agreed to adopt natural boundaries rather than arbitrary partitions of 
the Ruanda-Urundi region based on Germany's main position (Louis, 1963, pp. 92-97; C. Newbury, 1988, pp. 56-
57). 
10 The first year of the German colonial rule in Rwanda is not clear as sources indicate different years: 1895 by IPEP 
(2000); 1897 by Prunier (1995); 1898 by C. Newbury (1988); and 1899 by Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth (1996). 
21 
(Tanzania region) during the East African Campaign of World War I (African Rights, 1995, p. 5; 
IPEP, 2000, chap. 2, para. 8; Louis, 1963, pp. 207-231; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996, para. 3). 
Later in the peace settlement of 1919 after Germany was defeated in World War I, Rwanda and 
Burundi were recognized under Belgian governance (Louis, 1963, pp. 232-254; C. Newbury, 
1988, p. 61). 
Although the 'divide-and-rule' strategy was commonly practiced in African colonies 
(African Rights, 1995; Des Forges, 1999; Louis, 1963; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996), the 
approach did not seem to be necessary to the first colonizer in Rwanda where the already well-
maintained hierarchical power structure could deliver authority efficiently from the top to bottom 
(Des Forges, 1999, History, para. 16; Louis, 1963, p. 200; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996, chap. 
3, para. 1). They, instead, implemented indirect rule, "using existing traditional authorities to 
govern the country for them, supposedly without altering existing patterns of authority" (C. 
Newbury, 1988, p. 59, emphasis in the original) in order to compensate for the disadvantage of 
having to control with only a small German presence as well as to strengthen their authority in 
the colony (IPEP, 2000, chap. 2 paras. 8-9; Prunier, 1995, pp. 24-26; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 
1996, chap. 3, para, 1). The clear, but not exclusive, division of power as Tutsi being the ruler 
and Hutu/Twa the ruled made the colonizers believe that they were "three distinct, long-existent 
and internally coherent blocks of people, [...] the Ethiopid, Bantu and Pygmoid" (Des Forges, 
1999, History, para. 16). This particular situation—the outsider's misinterpretation of indigenous 
identity and adoption of racist convictions—in the case of Rwanda made the racialization of the 
Hutu/Tutsi divide possible (African Rights, 1995, p. 7). 
The Hamitic hypothesis was the central tenet of the controversy which fuelled the 
colonizers' understanding of who were Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa (African Rights, 1995; Gourevitch, 
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1998; IPEP, 2000; Mamdani, 2001; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996). The crux of the theory was 
that '"white Africans' from the northeast had brought civilization to the rest of the benighted 
continent" (Des Forges, 1995, p. 44). John Hanning Speke, the missionary and explorer of the 
present-Great Lakes region in 1863, championed the development and reinforcement of the 
Hamitic myth (African Rights, 1995, p. 7; Gourevitch, 1998, pp. 50-51; Sanders, 1969, p. 528). 
Speke (1863) argued in his journal as follows: 
My theory is founded on the traditions of the several nations, as checked by my own 
observation of what I saw when passing through them. It appears impossible to believe, 
judging from the physical appearance of the Wahuma,11 that they can be of any other race 
than the semi-Shem-Hamitic of Ethiopia. The traditions of the imperial government of 
Abyssinia go as far back as the scriptural age of King David [...] Believing [...] that 
Africa formerly belonged to Europeans, from whom it was taken by negroes with whom 
they had allied themselves, the Wahuma make themselves a small residue of the original 
European stock driven from the land—an idea which seems natural enough when we 
consider that the Wahuma are, in numbers, quite insignificant compared with the natives. 
[...] We are thus left only the one very distinguishing mark, the physical appearance of 
this remarkable race, partaking even more of the phlegmatic nature of the Shemitic father 
than the nervous boisterous temperament of the Hamitic mother, as a certain clue to their 
Shem-Hamitic origin, (pp. 246-251, emphasis in the original) 
The essential point to be taken here is that the Wahuma—that is, the Hamite—were 
regarded as having a European ancestry. The myth played a convenient role for the colonizers to 
justify the European rule over Africa, as Sanders (1969) interprets, creating the nuance of the 
indigenous Bantu as an inferior race to be developed by a superior being, which ultimately 
developed the notion of "the white man's burden" (pp. 528-529). Tutsis were regarded as more 
similar to Europeans themselves in characteristic qualities—faithful, diligent, and intelligent—as 
well as in physical appearance (Des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995; Uvin, 1998). 
As a consequence of this belief, Germans and Belgians found it natural that the 'non-indigenous' 
Hamite Tutsi was ruling the 'indigenous' Bantu Hutu (Mamdani, 2001, p. 100). 
11 Wahflma (or Wahuma) was later changed to what Speke believed to be Tutsi (Watutsi) (Mamdani, 2001, p. 300; 
Speke, 1863, pp. 250-251). 
23 
Belgians continued applying the first colonizer's approach to Rwanda, and therefore, 
ethnic stratification was deepened as Belgium's presence remained (Prunier, 1995, pp. 25-26; 
Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996, chap. 3, para. 2). Belgian colonizers strongly preferred to give 
positions and privileges of power on matters such as politics, economy, and education to the 
Tutsi rather than to Hutu/Twa (Des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995; Uvin, 1998). 
During the 1920s through to the 1930s, the administrative system was regrouped as uniformed 
chiefdoms and sub-chiefdoms, and authority was given solely to local Tutsi chiefs and sub-
chiefs; consequently, power was shifted from the mwami to the local authority (Des Forges, 
1999, History, para. 13; Mamdani, 2001, pp. 90-92). The 1933-4 census indicated that the 
majority of the population (roughly 84-85%) was Hutu, 14-15% Tutsi, and less than 1% Twa12 
among the entire population of 1.8 million (Des Forges, 1999, History, para. 19; Mamdani, 2001, 
p. 98). 
At the same time, as a part of the census, identification cards were issued to all 
Rwandans, stating ethnicity, physical description, and the number of owned cattle (IPEP, 2000, 
chap. 2, paras. 11-12; Mamdani, 2001, pp. 98-99).13 Prior to their issuance, some Hutus and 
Tutsis were occasionally able to enjoy advantages by changing their ethnicity from Hutu to Tutsi 
or vice versa. Rwandans now saw their ethnic affiliation as fixed and rigidified (Des Forges, 
1999, History, paras. 19-20; C. Newbury, 1998, p. 11). The Catholic Church was another useful 
facilitator for the colonial government to collect data on the Rwandan population as the colonial 
12 According to Willis (2005), a current representation of the Twa in post-genocide Rwanda is 0.3-0.4% of the whole 
population (p. 130). 
The criterion of ethnic affiliation during the population census is rather debatable. For instance, African Rights 
(1995) notes that a person who owned more than 10 cows was categorized as Tutsi (pp. 8-9). Mamdani (2001), 
however, points out that the 10-cow rale could not be applied after considering the number of cattle vis-a-vis that of 
Tutsi population (pp. 98-99). Nevertheless, the Belgian authority did adopt the rule, which implied that not all Tutsi 
owned 10 cows, or any cows at all, but this categorization was "neither the only nor even always the main basis for 
identification of Tutsi" (Mamdani, 2001, p. 99). Another explanation made by Des Forges (1999) is that Rwandans 
were asked to register their identity for themselves (History, para. 19). 
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churches were closely tied to local communities (Mamdani, 2001, p. 99). 
More significantly, the Catholic Church played a crucial role in the education and 
conversion of Rwandans to Christianity. First, the opportunity for post-secondary education was 
restricted to Tutsis, the "natural-born chiefs" except in the case of a Hutu/Twa wanting to study 
for seminary (Prunier, 1995, p. 33). Often times the Hutu and Tutsi were educated separately and 
different measures and methods were adopted; for instance, Kiswahili for the Hutu and French 
for Tutsi was exercised as the medium of education (Mamdani, 2001, pp. 89-90). Second, 
Rwandans were obliged to convert to Christianity, including the mwami himself (IPEP, 2000; 
Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995). During this process Rwandans were reminded that "[p]olygamy 
was evil and adultery was a sin, thrift and hard work were encouraged, and social displays of 
conventional piety were required of all" (Prunier, 1995, pp. 32-33). The impact of the church in 
its dissemination of religion became fundamentally embedded in the Rwandan society. 
Ironically, and unknown at that point, the church would later go on to be one of the major actors 
of mass killings in the genocide of 1994 (African Rights, 1995; Des Forges, 1999; Gourevitch, 
1998, Prunier, 1995). 
As a result, systematic discrimination and exploitation of Hutu led the Hutu peasants to 
seek "a sense of solidarity" (African Rights, 1995, pp. 6-7; Des Forges, 1999, History, para. 20). 
Indeed, the racialization of the Hutu and Tutsi—Hutu as native, Tutsi as foreign—preceded the 
Hutu/Tutsi violent conflict. 
2.3 The Social Revolution and Development Ideology After Independence 
Following decades of divisive colonial rule, an inevitable outburst of anger and friction between 
those two major groups finally erupted. The 1959 'Social Revolution,' or Hutu revolution, was a 
very notable stage that helped to reinforce the power of a small number of Hutu elites, managed 
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by manipulating ethnic division (Des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995; Uvin, 1998). 
The path to the Social Revolution was spurred on externally by the Belgian authority's final 
actions and internally by the aspiration of Hutu power and anti-Tutsi sentiment in the sweeping 
wind of African decolonization (C. Newbury, 1988). 
In the wake of the Second World War, Rwanda, together with Burundi, was still under 
the Belgian government; though, at this time in 1946, it was under the name of Administering 
Authority for Ruanda-Urundi designated by the International Trusteeship System of the United 
Nations (UN) (Mamdani, 2001; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996; United Nations General 
Assembly [UNGA], 1946). In fact, Belgium was under pressure by the international atmosphere 
of decolonization, to reduce its influence and presence in Rwanda and its other colonies (Prunier, 
1995, pp. 41-44; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996, chap. 3, paras. 17-20). Beyond the 
international pressure, Belgium itself was undergoing its own 'social revolution' in that power 
was shifting from the upper-class Francophone Walloonians to the working class Flemish 
majority (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 52; Prunier, 1995, p. 44). As a result of these changes, the clergy 
in Rwanda were becoming increasingly Flemish, and these new members sympathized more 
with the mass Hutu peasants and supported efforts towards political change (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 
52; Mamdani, 2001, p. 113; Prunier, 1995, p. 44). Within Rwanda, anti-Tutsi sentiment was 
growing among the Hutu and interpretations of democracy as 'majority rule' were widely 
spreading (IPEP, 2000; Prunier, 1995; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996). A small frustrated group 
of Hutu intellectuals, fuelled by their unemployed and unsatisfactory situation, published a 
statement called the Bahutu Manifesto in 1957, asserting that "[i]f Tutsis were foreign invaders, 
[...] Rwanda was by rights a nation of the Hutu majority" (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 58). The 
Hamitic hypothesis was now being exploited by the Hutu (Gourevitch, 1998; Mamdani, 2001). 
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It was during this anti-Tutsi atmosphere that another incident of critical importance 
occurred, when an assault was committed against a Hutu sub-chief by a few Tutsi political 
activists in November 1959. The assault resulted in Hutu counterattacks on Tutsi officials and 
vice versa, causing the deaths of several hundred and a mass exodus of Tutsi who fled to 
neighbouring countries (Des Forges, 1999; Gourevitch, 1998; Prunier, 1995; Uvin, 1998). The 
Belgian administration declared a state of emergency and sent military troops from the 
neighbouring Belgian Congo led by Colonel Guy Logiest, who instigated the colonial power's 
partial support for the Hutu (Mamdani, 2001; C. Newbury, 1998; Prunier, 1995). Fearing the 
intensifying revolts and the Tutsi court's preparation for eliminating Hutu political opponents (C. 
Newbury, 1998, p. 13), Colonel Logiest announced: "because of the force of circumstances, we 
have to take sides" (Prunier, 1995, p. 51). The colonial authority replaced more than 300 Tutsi 
chiefs and sub-chiefs with Hutu ones, allowing Hutu to hold almost half of the local official 
positions (Des Forges, 1999, History, paras. 21-23; Mamdani, 2001, p. 124), and also organizing 
650 guards into a Hutu-dominated armed force in May 1960 (Mamdani, 2001, p. 124). 
Hutu majority rule was thus confirmed in the administrative and legislative elections of 
1960 and 1961 (Des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; C. Newbury, 1988,1998; Prunier, 1995). 
The communal election which was organized by the colonial power resulted in the victory of the 
MDR-PARMEHUTU (Mouvement Democratique Rwandais-Parti du Mouvement et de 
l'Emancipation Hutu), the radical pro-Hutu party, routing Tutsi monarchist party UNAR (Union 
Nationale Rwandaise) and causing the abolition of the monarchy (Des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 
2001; C. Newbury, 1988,1998; Prunier, 1995). Gregoire Kayibanda, the leader of 
PARMEHUTU, was inaugurated as the president of the First Republic (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 61; 
Prunier, 1995, pp. 48, 52-54). In the following year, on July 1, 1962, Belgium granted 
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independence to Rwanda (Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996, chap. 3, para. 21). 
Nevertheless, the fundamental problem remained: under the Hutu majority democracy, 
the only real change was that now it was the Tutsi who became the target of oppression by the 
regime and ruling clique. First, physically violent acts against the Tutsi prevailed as scattered 
incursions of Tutsi refugee guerrillas (inyenzi14) attempting to return to their home country 
continued throughout the 1960s (Des Forges, 1999; IPEP, 2000; Mamdani, 2001; C. Newbury & 
D. Newbury, 1995; Prunier, 1995; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996). The raids made by these 
small armed bands of Tutsi refugees numbered as many as 10 attempts between 1961 and 1966 
(Reed, 1996, p. 481). The outcome, however, was revenge killings and massacres of the Tutsi 
within the country and an increased influx of refugees, rather than undermining the Kayibanda 
government (Des Forges, 1999; IPEP, 2000; Mamdani, 2001; C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 1995; 
Prunier, 1995; Reed, 1996; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996). Until 1967 the result of the series 
of violent acts resulted in approximately 20,000 Tutsi murders and again produced a massive 
number of refugees—this time over 300,000 (Des Forges, 1999, History, para. 25).15 
Second, observers (IPEP, 2000; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995) note that the Kayibanda 
regime tended to be authoritarian, elitist, and secretive, a style of leadership quite reminiscent of 
the old Tutsi monarchy. The identity card system remained fixed, this time however, as a means 
of excluding the Tutsi from education, government employment, and the armed forces (African 
Rights, 1995; IPEP, 2000; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996). African Rights (1995) notes that 
"the ethnic hierarchy was simply reversed" (p. 12). Yet, the Tutsi were not the sole scapegoats: 
14 Inyenzi means 'cockroaches' in Kinyarwanda (African Rights, 1995; Des Forges, 1999; IPEP, 2000; Mamdani, 
2001; C. Newbury, 1998; C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 1995; Prunier, 1995; Reed, 1996; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 
1996). 
15 The total number of Tutsi refugees and their descendents residing outside of Rwanda were an estimated 600,000 
(Buckley-Zistel, 2006a; C. Newbury, 1995,1998; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996), which equates to roughly 9% of 
the entire Rwandan population (Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996, chap. 3, para. 25) or 40-70% of all Tutsi (Reed, 
1996, p. 481). 
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despite Kayibanda's self-proclaimed Hutu democracy being based on a demographic majority 
(IPEP, 2000, chap. 3, para. 17), the Hutu ideology did not reach to the Hutu peasants whose 
status remained poor and rural (African Rights, 1995, p. 11). The real beneficiaries were the 
President and his cadre from Kayibanda's home base of Gitarama, in southern Rwanda (C. 
Newbury, 1998, p. 14; C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 1995, pp. 7-8). The concentration of power 
was fulfilled with various measures—threats, physical violence, arrests, assassinations, and 
negotiations—in order to eliminate all opposition parties other than MDR-PARMEHUTU 
(Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996, chap. 3, para. 30). Among diverging Hutu factions with 
different regional and political backgrounds, northern and north-western Hutus were enraged by 
the Hutu southerners' monopoly of power (IPEP, 2000, chap. 3, para. 18; Prunier, 1995; p. 61). 
Finally, rivalry between the Hutu from the south, including those who were in power, and Hutu 
northerners increased tensions, and eventually led to confrontation, which gave Major-General 
Juvenal Habyarimana, who was from the north (Gisenyi), an opportunity to seize power through 
a military coup and to become the second president in 1973 (Des Forges, 1999; IPEP, 2000; 
Lemarchand, 1995; C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 1995; Prunier, 1995; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 
1996).'6 
One of the biggest differences between the Kayibanda regime and Habyarimana's Second 
Republic was the redefinition of Tutsi identity. Whereas "Rwanda is the country of the Bahutus 
(Bantu)" (Chretien, 1995, as cited in Buckley-Zistel, 2006a, p. 105) and the Tutsi had been 
designated 'foreigners' during the Kayibanda government, under Habyarimana Tutsis were 
recognized as an ethnic minority from a foreign race (Buckley-Zistel, 2006a, p. 106; Mamdani, 
16 International Panel of Eminent Personalities (2000) states that "[t]he atmosphere of the country was so oppressive 
at that point that the coup was met with widespread popular relief, even by most Tutsi" (chap. 3, para. 20). 
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2001, p. 140).17 This meant that the Tutsi, again as citizens of Rwanda, could participate in the 
political arena (Buckley-Zistel, 2006a; IPEP, 2000; Mamdani, 2001). For instance, every 
Rwandan, including the Tutsi, was obligated to become a member of the Mouvement 
Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement (MRND), created in 1975, as a single ruling 
party (Des Forges, 1999; IPEP, 2000; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 
1996). The intention of the MRND was to "mobilize all the people of Rwanda under the banner 
of peace and national harmony by restoring a climate of confidence among the sons and 
daughters of the Nation" (MRND, 1985, as cited in Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996, chap. 3, 
para. 34). For the first 17 years of the Habyarimana regime, physical violence and pogroms did 
in fact occur, this time not targeting the Tutsi but among different Hutu factions (IPEP, 2000, 
chap. 4, para. 3; C. Newbury, 1998, p. 13). Restrictions, however, were still outlined in a quota 
system that limited the number of seats in all political sectors that were allocated to the Tutsi, 
which was how the Hutu rule attempted to keep Tutsi influence to a minimum (Buckley-Zistel, 
2006a; Mamdani, 2001; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996). Indeed, the real intention of "a 
carefully-controlled machinery of hypocrisy" (Prunier, 1995, p. 82) was that ethnic prejudice and 
discrimination was reinforced with the dissemination of ethnic propaganda put forth under the 
Habyarimana regime (Des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995). 
Another remarkable aspect of the Second Republic was the regime's focus on economic 
development and rapid modernization (Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996). The government's 
well-planned development ideology was "the pursuit of economic development for the 
underdeveloped (Hutu) masses" (Uvin, 1998, p. 23). The administrative system of the state was 
17 Mamdani's point on political identity, which was discussed in Footnote 6, is again quite central to understanding 
this concept. Mamdani (2001) analyzes that: "Habyarimana defined the prospects and limits of the Second Republic. 
The prospect was to rehabilitate the Tutsi back to being Rwandans, alongside the Hutu. The limit, however, was that 
Tutsi and Hutu would remain alive as political identities" (p. 142, emphasis in the original). 
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reorganized so as to maximize the government's control and mobilization over the bottom rungs 
(Des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; Uvin, 1998).18 Such an impeccable organization, to the eyes 
of outsiders, contributed to the positive impression that Rwanda was "stable, hardworking and 
reliable" (IPEP, 2000, chap. 4, para. 6). In effect, the government's control under the guise of 
practicing the development ideology was prevalent in every arena of the society, allowing for 
greater centralization of power (Uvin, 1998, pp. 23-26). The church remained paramount, but 
this time, to support the Hutu in power (IPEP, 2000, chap. 4, paras. 14-15; Prunier, 1995, p. 81). 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Rwanda's development was seen as remarkable, sound 
and well-managed among the international community (Longman, 1997; Uvin, 1998). Yet, the 
critical fact to be pointed out here is that this image was formed mainly by consensus among 
outsiders (Uvin, 1998, p. 26), which will be explored more below. The reputation succeeded in 
attracting a massive amount of foreign aid, at least US$200 million every year (African Right, 
1995; Des Forges, 1999; Prunier, 1995; Uvin, 1998). The major donor countries at the time were 
Belgium, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and US among 20 other nations (Prunier, 1995, p. 81; 
Uvin, 1998, p. 41). Other donors included about 30 international agencies and 150 international 
and local NGOs (Uvin, 1998, p. 41). Rwanda was ranked as one of the most financially assisted 
countries in the world: between 1989 and 1990, for example, 11.4% of its gross national product 
(GNP) was foreign aid (Uvin, 1998, pp. 40-41). 
Until the first half of the 1980s, Rwanda's physical record of development was very 
impressive, especially in infrastructure, agriculture, and reforestation (Des Forges, 1999, History, 
18 The administrative reform was composed of 10 prefectures across the country, each headed by a prefect, then 
divided into 143-145 communes, each managed by a burgomaster (IPEP, 2000, chap. 4, para. 9; Mamdani, 2001, p. 
144). Communes were further divided into eight collines, or hills, each one of which was composed of secteurs and 
each secteur contained cellules (Des Forges, 1999, History, para. 32; Mamdani, 2001, p. 144). Communes contained 
about 30,000 to 50,000 residents and they were further divided into 5,000 in each secteur and 1,000 in cellule (Des 
Forges, 1999, History, paras. 31-32; IPEP, 2000, chap. 4, para. 9; Mamdani, 2001, p. 144). The burgomasters were 
"the ultimate authority at the local level" and their appointment and dismissal was in the President's sole charge 
(Des Forges, 1999, History, para. 31; IPEP, 2000, chap. 4, para. 9). 
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para. 42; Mamdani, 2001, p. 145). Such brisk and vigorous economic growth, however, changed 
dramatically in the late 1980s. No more land was available for farming (Mamdani, 2001, p. 146), 
and food production began to decline after 1985 (Uvin, 1998, pp. 53-55). Drought, heavy rain, 
and plant disease were all factors contributing to this unfortunate situation, as was the decrease in 
the international price of coffee, a crop which, together with tea, comprised between 75% and 
80% of Rwandan agriculture and was an important cash crop for foreign exchange (Des Forges, 
1999; C. Newbury, 1998; C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 1995; Uvin, 1998). The result of these 
problems was a cataclysmic ripple effect on the government's revenue and foreign debt (Uvin, 
1998, p. 54).19 The World Bank (1994) reported that the poverty rate of Rwanda in 1985 was 
40%, but by 1992 this number had risen to 52% (as cited in Uvin, 1998, p. 54). 
The constant and colossal level of assistance from international donors and agencies was 
not by itself enough to overcome Rwanda's economic crisis. The structural adjustment programs 
(SAPs) spearheaded by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1990, for 
instance, failed to help revive the country's eroded economy but instead increased poverty and 
insecurity (Mamdani, 2001; C. Newbury, 1995; C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 1995; Uvin, 1998). 
An initially promised disbursement of US$90 million was later decreased to US$60 million; the 
program contained the usual conditions and strategies that were applied similarly to other 
African countries, but were not considerate of Rwanda's internal factors—such as ethnic 
prejudice and racism; and the Rwandan government did not install most of the SAPs (Uvin, 
1998, pp. 57-59). In addition, even though between 1990 and 1993 human rights violations and 
social instability were repeatedly reported, few aid agencies changed their project approaches or 
19 Data indicate that the aggregate gross domestic product (GDP) per capita decreased from US$355 in 1983 to 
US$260 in 1990—a startling decline of 7% per year. Rwandan foreign debt, which until the 1980s was relatively 
low by African standards, began to increase, rising from 16% of the GNP in 1980 to 32% in 1990 (Uvin, 1998, p. 
54). 
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strategies and no restraint or positive/negative conditionality tied to aid was added in order to 
intervene with the problems (Adelman & Suhrke, 1996; Des Forges, 1999; IPEP, 2000; 
Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996; Uvin, 1998). Aid was largely given "toward greater [Rwandan] 
government ownership and control" of the money (Uvin, 1998, p. 88, emphasis in the original). 
The key question remains: why did donors and NGOs maintain such a positive attitude 
towards aid and humanitarian assistance, in light of the Habyarimana regime's racist ideology? 
Peter Uvin (1998) argues that "false and reductionist" (p. 158) views were the reason for such a 
situation. In his book Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda, Uvin points to 
widespread 'blindness' and 'ignorance' as the attitude of the donors and aid community (1998). 
Development plans are usually addressed with apolitical terms: much of the focus is paid to 
economic and technical outcomes whereas social circumstances and political conditions of the 
recipient country are often neglected (Uvin, 1998, pp. 154-156). Even if the donors and aid 
workers do recognize the problems of the country, in many cases they decide not to redress the 
issues that are out of the mandate of assistance programs (Uvin, 1998, pp. 94,156-157) because 
"[t]he development enterprise shares two fundamental assumptions that are so basic [...] first, 
that they are underdeveloped and we are not; and second, that we have the stuff that will help 
them become more developed" (Uvin, 1998, p. 157, emphasis in the original). Uvin (1998) 
warns that these assumptions make it easier to ignore local people's perspective and their social, 
historical, and cultural dynamics, instead implanting the outsider's approach and methodology, 
which creates a top-down and authoritarian characteristic of development assistance (pp. 156-
159, 224-238). 
Notwithstanding these issues, severe poverty and economic crisis worsened as refugees 
and peoples displaced during the civil war of the 1990s increased the demand for temporary 
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shelter and food. Equally ironic was that ethnic divisionism and extremist movement against 
Tutsi, which was merely a prelude to the genocide, became exceedingly problematic in Rwandan 
society during these challenging times. 
2.4 The Civil War and Deepening Polarization of the Hutu/Tutsi 
In the later 1980s, along with the economic downturn, Habyarimana's development ideology and 
dictatorship based on one-party rule gradually came to be challenged within the Rwandan Hutu 
elite (IPEP, 2000, chap. 5, paras. 16-21; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996, chap. 4, paras. 9, 26). 
Freedom of speech, particularly criticism toward the government, was oppressed and the price of 
opposition was often elimination through political assassinations (C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 
1995, p. 8). It is important to note that those in the centre of political rivalry and conflict were 
Hutu factions from different backgrounds rather than Hutu-led violence against Tutsi: the latter 
was not of much significance until the Tutsi-dominated RPF invaded the Rwandan border with 
Uganda in 1990 (IPEP, 2000, chap. 5, paras. 16-21; C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 1995, p. 8). 
The formation of the RPF and its invasion is closely related to, and therefore necessary to 
be understood in, Uganda's political dynamics. The majority of the RPF was comprised of 
descendents of the Tutsi refugees who fled the earlier violence of the Hutu revolution and its 
subsequent episodes in the late 1950s, early 1960s and 1973 to neighbouring Uganda (Des 
Forges, 1999; IPEP, 2000; Kuperman, 2004; Mamdani, 2001; Melvern, 2009; C. Newbury, 
1995; Otunnu, 1999a, 1999b; Reed, 1995).20 For more than three decades, many of the refugees 
and their descendents were deeply involved in Ugandan politics and military, and the Ugandan 
20 In the whole period of their stay, the Rwandan refugees in Uganda had been denied naturalization; furthermore, 
their political and social standing as refugees was inherited by their children, despite being bom and growing up in 
Uganda, (Kuperman, 2004, p. 64; Mamdani, 2001, pp. 164-165) including one who would become the RPF leader, 
and the current President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame (Kuperman, 2004; Mamdani, 2001; Otunnu, 1999b; Reed, 1995, 
1996). Within Rwanda, on the other hand, the Habyarimana government was adherent to the policy of denying 
return entry of the refugees to their home country (Kuperman, 2004, p. 64; C. Newbury, 1995, p. 13). 
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political leaders exploited the refugee population by supporting or threatening to repatriate them 
in order to seize power (Kuperman, 2004; Mamdani, 2001). One of the most momentous 
occasions among those strategic movements was the refugee group's significant contribution to 
the cause for Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Army (NRA) that ousted the Obote 
regime in 1986 (C. Newbury, 1995, p. 13; Otunnu, 1999b, p. 31; Reed, 1995, p. 49). With the 
refugee warriors from the NRA affiliating, the RPF was created and renamed after the 
intellectual-based political refugee organization, the Rwandese Alliance for National Unity 
(RANU) in 1987 (Kuperman, 2004; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995; Otunnu, 1999b: Reed, 
1995). 
The RPF's main purpose of establishing a new government to share political power with 
the Hutu regime as well as their long-time aspiration to return home convinced the Front that 
armed attack on Rwanda was inevitable (Kuperman, 2004, p. 68; Otunnu, 1999b, p. 39). The 
timing of the invasion (IPEP, 2000; Otunnu, 1999b) was affected by the developing push and 
pull factors in both Uganda and Rwanda. Within Uganda, the push was on as growing anti-
refugee sentiment in 1990 among the host population, who were opposed to granting refugees 
land, imposed heavy burdens on the NRA, and thus, Museveni wanted the refugees to repatriate 
to Rwanda peacefully (IPEP, 2000; Kuperman, 2004; Mamdani, 2001). Meanwhile, within 
Rwanda, the political liberalization process of the Habyarimana government was moving very 
slowly. These delays combined with economic stagnation, corruption, and the power monopoly 
of the president with his cadre served as the 'pull factors' (IPEP, 2000; Mamdani, 2001; Otunnu, 
1999b). On October 1,1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the military wing of the RPF, 
crossed the border when both Museveni and Habyarimana were attending a UN conference in 
New York (IPEP, 2000; Kuperman, 2004; Reed, 1996; Otunnu, 1999b). The civil war broke out. 
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The RPF invasion had a far-reaching impact on Rwanda's political and social landscape 
(Des Forges, 1999; IPEP, 2000; C. Newbury, 1995; Uvin, 1998). As a response to the invasion, 
the Habyarimana government initiated massacres on Tutsi and Hutu civilians, accusing them of 
being RPF accomplices, as well as counter-offensives toward the RPF (Kuperman, 2004, p. 71). 
Fake attacks were frequently created by the government to disguise and vindicate its assaults and 
reprisal attacks of the Tutsi opposition and to gain sympathy from the international community 
(Des Forges, 1999, History, para. 52; Mamdani, 2001, pp. 191-192) Many innocent Hutus were 
killed by the RPF as well (IPEP, 2000, chap. 6, para. 21; Kuperman, 2004, p. 73). Additionally, 
the invasion and subsequent civil war consequently produced a number of casualties and 
displaced: between 1990 and 1993, an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 people were killed (Mamdani, 
2001, p. 192; C. Newbury, 1995, p. 14) and in total 950,000 to 1 million were internally 
displaced or fled the country (Mamdani, 2001, p. 187, 204; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996, 
chap. 4, paras. 38, 72, 75). Massive displacement also contributed to reductions in agricultural 
production, worsening an already weakened economy and making ordinary Rwandans, 
particularly rural peasants, more vulnerable (Sellstrom & Wohlegmuth, 1996, chap. 4, para. 75). 
The initial view on the RPF was quite negative among both the Hutu and Tutsi populace as the 
invasion caused widespread social disruption (Kuperman, 2004, pp. 71-72). 
The Habyarimana regime was faced with a dilemma both from inside and outside of 
Rwanda: inside, the invasion brought the justification of the regime's legitimacy and support 
against its enemy; outside, the donor community pressured the government to democratize and 
share its power with the RPF (Dallaire, 2005; Des Forges, 1999; Uvin, 1998). With 
Habyarimana's reluctant acceptance of a multi-party system in November 1990, the multi-party 
system was legalized in July 1991 (Lemarchand, 1995; C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 1995; 
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Sellstrom & Wohlegmuth, 1996). New opposition parties were being launched to compete 
against the ruling MRND, including the MDR led by the successor of the MDR-PARMEHUTU 
during Kayibanda's First Republic, Tutsi-based Parti Democrate Chretien (PDC), Parti Liberal 
(PL), popular among urban and business people, and Parti Social Democrate (PSD), which 
gained support from intellectuals, professionals, and some from south (Prunier, 1995, pp. 123-
126; Sellstrom & Wohlegmuth, 1996, chap. 4, para. 29). 
As the power-sharing process accelerated, Habyarimana and his party found less power 
to exercise and "saw the chance to exploit the invasion to consolidate [his] power base" (Des 
Forges, 1995, p. 45). The regime considered any political opposition as an enemy and an RPF 
accomplice (Adelman & Suhrke, 1996; Des Forges, 1995, 1999; IPEP, 2000; Lemarchand, 1995; 
Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995). The crux of the ideology was that the Tutsi were a foreign 'race' 
who were trying to bring the colonial legacy back to the Hutu Nation by invading and 
subjugating the Hutu, which strategically instilled 'fear' into Hutu peasants for collective 
participation in Hutu Power, and later on, the genocide (IPEP, 2000, chap. 6, para. 21; Mamdani, 
2001, pp. 189-191). Racist hate propaganda against all Tutsis was constantly disseminated 
through media such as the newspaper Kangura and Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines 
(RTLM), funded by the small number of relatives and close friends of the President who sought 
to maintain the power and privilege of his inner circle (akazu) (Chalk, 1999; Des Forges, 1999; 
IPEP, 2000; Mamdani, 2001; Sellstrom & Wohlegmuth, 1996). The MRND created and trained 
its own youth militia interahamwe ('those who work together') and the Coalition pour la Defense 
de la Republique (CDR), a Hutu extremist party formed by the MRND hardliners, organized 
impuzamugambi ('those with the single purpose'). These Hutu extremist wings easily attracted 
many frustrated unemployed and unmarried youth (Des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; Sellstrom 
37 
& Wohlegmuth, 1996; Uvin, 1998).21 At the centre of Hutu Power lay the akazu, exacerbating 
tensions and contributing to the ongoing militarization and radicalization of Rwandan society 
(Uvin, 1998, pp. 64-65). 
In light of such conditions, the path to peace was lengthy and sluggish. A series of peace 
negotiations started between the Rwandan government and the RPF in 1991 and they did not 
reach a conclusion until the final Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of 
Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, or shortly, Arusha Accords, was signed on August 3, 
1993 in Arusha, Tanzania (Peace Agreement, 1993; IPEP, 2000; Jones, 1999; Kuperman, 2004; 
Sellstrom & Wohlegmuth, 1996). With Tanzania as a major facilitator, delegations from regional 
countries—Burundi, Senegal, Uganda, and the former Zaire (DRC)—and donor countries— 
Belgium, France, Germany, and the US participated as observers (Adelman & Suhrke, 1996; Des 
Forges, 1999; IPEP, 2000). The UN, UNHCR, and Organization of African Unity (OAU) were 
involved as well (Adelman & Suhrke, 1996; Des Forges, 1999; IPEP, 2000). The Accords 
proposed: first, the integration of all refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs); second, 
establishment of a Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG) and power-sharing between 
the Habyarimana government and RPF; third, creation of a unified army by integrating the 
government army and the RPA; and fourth, promotion of national unity and rule of law (Peace 
Agreement, 1993). The Accords also requested the UN to provide security and assistance for the 
BBTG setup within 37 days of the agreement coming into effect (Adelman & Suhrke, 1996; 
Jones 1999; Laegreid, 1999). 
None of these acts, however, were able to occur due to dissatisfaction and delays on the 
part of the Habyarimana regime and disagreement among the opposition parties (C. Newbury & 
21 Traditionally, in Rwanda a man could not have a wife without land (Des Forges, 1999, History, para. 43; C. 
Newbury, 1995, pp. 14-15). Due to rapid population growth and lingering poverty from the economic crisis, many 
young people remained single (Des Forges, 1999, History, para. 43; C. Newbury, 1995, pp. 14-15). 
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D. Newbury, 1995, p. 13). The Agreement was seen to create more RPF gains than gains for the 
existing government (Des Forges, 1995, p. 46), and Habyarimana called it nothing more than 'a 
piece of paper' (Adelman & Suhrke, 1996; Gourevitch, 1998; Ilibagiza, 2006; IPEP, 2000). 
Habyarimana, at this time, was fast losing his political support and was being blamed by the 
hardliners in his party for having given up too much ground to the RPF (Lemarchand, 1995, p. 
10; C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 1995, p. 13). Moreover, the UN peacekeeping force dispatch 
was delayed until October 5 when the Security Council established the United Nations 
Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) mandated by the Resolution 872 (Adelman & 
Suhrke, 1996; Jones, 1999; Laegreid, 1999; UN, 2001). Led by Canadian Major-General Romeo 
Dallaire, 2,548 troops arrived in Kigali on October 21,1993 (Adelman & Suhrke, 1996, Dallaire, 
2005; Des Forges, 1999; UN, 2001). 
On the day of the UN's arrival, the assassination of the President in neighbouring 
Burundi brought with it a deeply aggravating impact on the fragile political situation in Rwanda 
(Fujii, 2004; IPEP, 2000; Lemarchand, 1995; Mamdani, 2001; C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 
1995). The President of Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye, who became the first democratically 
elected president at the free and fair election held in June and was a Hutu, was murdered by the 
Tutsi-dominated government army, which was followed by a mass slaughter of up to 100,000 
people and saw an estimated 200,000 to 400,000 refugee influx to Rwanda by April 1994 (Des 
Forges, 1999; IPEP, 2000; Lemarchand, 1995; C. Newbury, 1995; C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 
1995). Violence and targeted attacks on Tutsi by the Hutu were prevalent throughout Rwanda 
soon after Ndadaye's death (Des Forges, 1999, Choosing war, para. 99). Once again, fear-
mongering was rampant within the regime and antagonists of the Arusha Accords claimed that 
that too was what would likely happen if they were to share power with the RPF, and the idea 
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that all Tutsi could not be trusted was again being claimed (Des Forges, 1995,1999; Fujii, 2004; 
IPEP, 2000; Lemarchand, 1995; Linden, 1995, as cited in Sellstrom & Wohlegmuth, 1996; 
Mamdani, 2001; C. Newbury, 1995; C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 1995). To the MRND 
politicians and Hutu extremists, genocide seemed to be the only option to prevent the Tutsi 
hegemony (Fujii, 2004, p. 112; Lemarchand, 1995, p. 10). 
The peace agreement did not last long. On April 6,1994, President Habyarimana was 
assassinated as his plane was shot down by surface-to-air missiles at the Kigali airport while 
returning from peace negotiations in Tanzania, and on that same night, the targeted killing 
against political opponents of the regime took place, including 10 Belgian peacekeepers who 
were protecting Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and her family (African Rights, 1995; 
Des Forges, 1999; IPEP, 2000; Kuperman, 2004; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995). On April 12 
violence spread over the country, particularly focused on the planned extermination of the Tutsi 
and all political opponents, Hutus included (IPEP, 2000, chap. 14, para. 3). 
2.5 Conclusion 
The history of ethnic division and distinction is long and storied in Rwanda, certainly predating 
colonial rule. While colonial rule did exacerbate ethnic tension and polarize the two major sides, 
to declare foreign influence as the sole reason behind the Hutu/Tutsi divide would be an 
insufficient explanation. The colonizers built on a preexisting power structure and took it to an 
extreme level in a short period of time, and they did it in such an indirect way that their Tutsi 
beneficiaries were the only possible target of the eventual Hutu uprising. Ethnic tension, 
however, did not end when power at the top shifted from Tutsi to Hutu; rather, it lingered for 
decades, eventually boiling over after years of the pot being stirred. With so many factors 
contributing to ethnic hatred over so many decades, and no real concerted effort to curb the 
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tensions, the tragic history of Rwanda did enter its darkest days. 
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CHAPTER III. RECONCILIATION IN THE AFTERMATH OF VIOENT CONFLICT 
"[T]hat something is the truth. It is incumbent upon us lawyers not to just talk 
about the truth, but to actually seek it, to find it, to live it. What is it in us that 
seeks the truth? Is it our minds, or is it our hearts? I set out to prove a black man 
can receive a fair trial in the South, that we are all equal in the eyes of the law. 
But that's not the truth because the eyes of the law are human eyes, yours and 
mine, and until we can see each other as equals, justice is never going to be even-
handed. It will remain nothing more than a reflection of our own prejudices." 
- Jake Tyler Brigance, A Time to Kill (Schumacher, 1996) 
Without doubt, reconciliation is an extremely critical and fundamental matter in many societies 
dealing with the aftermath of violent conflict and/or massive human rights violations (Pankhurst, 
1999). At the same time, it is an overwhelmingly broad and long 'process,' rather than an end 
'result' that follows violence (Bloomfield, Barnes, & Huyse, 2003; Borneman, 2002; Brouneus, 
2008a; Hamber & Kelly, 2009; Opotow, 2001). 
3.1 Conceptualizing Reconciliation 
Attempts on how to understand reconciliation are truly divergent (Bloomfield et al., 2003; 
Pankhurst, 1999), hinged upon disciplines and even the individual belief and values of authors. 
Given such diverse perspectives, the conceptualization of reconciliation has not only blossomed 
in traditional disciplines of social science but has also established a presence in many of the more 
interdisciplinary fields of study, including international relations, geopolitics, human rights and 
international law, political anthropology, psychotherapy, genocide studies,22 and comparative 
studies, to name just a few (Kritz, 2002, p. 22). Theorizing reconciliation tends to take place 
primarily within the contexts of transitional justice, conflict transformation, and post-conflict 
22 See, for instance, the academic journal Holocaust and Genocide Studies. 
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peace-building and reconstruction, notwithstanding a difference on structuring the concept.23 In 
theory and practice, furthermore, there is very little consensus on how to define reconciliation 
(Bloomfield et al., 2003; Brouneus, 2008a; Hamber & Kelly, 2009; Nesiah, 2005; Pankhurst, 
1999): reconciliation can mean quite different things depending on the combinations of political, 
historical, cultural, economic, and social factors of a post-conflict setting. 
The term reconciliation can be found in theological roots (Fletcher & Weinstein, 2002; 
Hamber & Kelly, 2009; Minow, 1998; O'Neill, 2005; Ross, 2006; Skaar, Gloppen, & Suhrke, 
2005), referencing a Christian point of view, for instance, to restoration between God and a 
person, or between individuals, often in association with forgiveness and confession (Boraine, 
2000, as cited in Hamber & Kelly, 2009, p. 287; Minow, 1998, p. 15; Petersen, 2001, pp. 3-25). 
In the vast majority of the post-conflict reconciliation literature, recuperating a relationship— 
mutual understanding and acknowledgement, and sharing common goals for the future—are 
commonly captured phrases (Fletcher & Weinstein, 2002; Hamber & Kelly, 2009; Kubai, 2007; 
Lederach, 1997; Staub, 2006; Staub, Pearlman, Gubin, & Hagengimana, 2005). Ervin Staub 
(2006) emphasizes that reconciliation represents a common future between perpetrators and 
victims or members of hostile groups not as a "continuation of the past" but as the "possibility of 
a constructive relationship" seeking humanity and acceptance (p. 868). Anne Kubai (2007) 
explains that the entity of reconciliation: 
must include a change in psychological orientation towards one another, whereby victims 
and perpetrators see themselves as members of the community and nation; accept and see 
the humane side of 'the other'; and endorse the possibility of a constructive human 
relationship or engagement with each other, (p. 64) 
23 The difference becomes clearer when it comes to other concepts, particularly justice. Some authors (e.g., 
Bloomfield et al., 2003; Hamber & Kelly, 2009; Lederach, 1997) attempt to theorize reconciliation as a theme which 
includes justice as a sub-concept whereas for others (e.g., Fletcher & Weinstein, 2002; Kritz, 2002; McEvoy & 
McGregor, 2008; Othman, 2005; Pankhurst, 1999; Roht-Arriaza & Mariezcurrena, 2006), more commonly in the 
literature of transitional justice, reconciliation and justice are compared and contrasted when seeking their 
relationships. According to Bloomfield et al. (2003), the intrinsic nature of reconciliation as both a goal and strategy 
accounts for the diverging approaches to the matter (p. 12). 
43 
The definition of reconciliation attempted by Hamber and Kelly (2009) defines five well-
structured stages: "(1) developing a shared vision of an interdependent and fair society [...]; (2) 
acknowledging and dealing with the past [...]; (3) building positive relationships [...]; (4) 
significant cultural and attitudinal change [...]; and (5) substantial social, economic, and political 
change" (pp. 291-292). 
If, then, the central purpose of reconciliation is: "mutual acceptance by groups of each 
other" (Staub, 2006, p. 868), what would need to be agreed upon for mutual acceptance? 
Different modus operandi of reconciliation could be possible depending on the type of 
reconciliation that a post-conflict society chooses: from nonviolent, peaceful coexistence and/or 
political tolerance (a 'thinner' form of reconciliation) to socio-emotional political reunification (a 
'thicker' form) (Crocker, 1999, pp. 60-61; Gloppen, 2005, pp. 20-21; Mukashema & Mullet, 
2010, pp. 26-27; Skaar et al., 2005, p. 4).24 In societies where former adversaries share the same 
geographic space and together compose a political constituency, the thicker notion of 
reconciliation is essential, resting on top of the thinner form as its foundation (Mukashema & 
Mullet, 2010, pp. 26-27).25 In societies with "conflicting understandings of history, and 
diverging views of the meaning and political relevance of the past" (Gloppen, 2005, p. 21), 
settling on a shared vision of the past is one of the most critical aspects of the reconciliation 
process. Fundamentally, healing is absolutely imperative in the process of seeking mutuality and 
24 Sluzki (2003) additionally assigns a continuum of collaboration, cooperation, interdependence, and integration to 
show the gradual stages of the reconciliation process that exists between the thinner and thicker forms (pp. 22-27). 
25 The need for a shared political vision and future as the necessary final goal of reconciliation is rather debatable. 
John Borneman (2002) argues that in the theoretical and temporal sense, coexistence could be sufficient for 
reconciliation as a departure from a violent past. On the contrary, Steven Sampson (2003) avers that coexistence is 
"only being oblivious to the Other" (p. 182). Simple coexistence means "a Catholic mother in Belfast can take her 
child to a Protestant school without being stoned, a Kosovo Serb can have a coffee in downtown Prishtina without 
being knifed, and an Israeli family can drive from Hebron to Jerusalem without being shot at" (Sampson, 2003, p. 
182). For more detail on this particular discussion, see correspondence between Borneman (2002, 2003) and others 
(Falk, 2003; Nader, 2003; Sampson, 2003; Wilson, 2003). 
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in taking further steps towards reconciliation (Brouneus, 2008a; Fletcher & Weinstein, 2002; 
Gasana, 2009; Minow, 1998; Skaar et ai., 2005; Staub, 2006). 
Equally puzzling is the next question: how can groups that have been violently divided 
begin to rebuild their relationships? What measures, principles, social norms, and values—or 
instruments (Bloomfield et al., 2003)—do post-conflict societies adopt to their reconciliation 
process? Some choose to forget or forgive the past and move on; others place emphasis on 
asking accountability for wrongdoings and/or finding out the truth itself. Indeed, societies have 
applied various strategies to different extents—at the individual, interpersonal, or collective 
(community, national) level—in dealing with their pasts (Gloppen, 2005, p. 20; McGregor, 2001, 
p. 32; Skaar et al., 2005, p. 5; van der Merwe, 1999, pp. 80-82). 
There also have been vigorous endeavours to delineate such practices in the field by 
instituting a conceptual framework in the reconciliation discourse. John Paul Lederach (1997, pp. 
23-35), for example, identifies truth (acknowledgement, transparency), mercy (acceptance, 
forgiveness, healing), justice (accountability, correction, restitution), and peace (harmony, unity) 
as mechanisms of the reconciliation process. Embracing Lederach's (1997) approach, 
Bloomfield et al. (2003, pp. 23-25,77-162) analyze the effects and limitations of healing, justice 
(both retributive and restorative), truth-telling about past and history, and reparation, whereas 
van der Merwe (1999, pp. 47-51) considers security over reparation. Despite slight variations 
amongst explanations, dominant components of reconciliation centre around the debate of justice 
versus truth (Brouneus, 2007; Gloppen, 2005; Hayner, 2001; Kritz, 2002; Minow, 1998; Rigby, 
2001; Rotberg & Thompson, 2000). To provide additional context and understanding on the 
elements of justice and truth that reconciliation often entails, the next section will explore both 
topics in greater detail. Reparations, a third major component, will also be considered. 
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3.1.1 Justice 
In the transitional period of post-conflict societies, justice lies at the epicentre, able to make 
reconciliation possible. Stover and Weinstein (2004) contend that justice and reconciliation now 
share an intimate connection as "[t]his inferred relationship has come to occupy centre stage in 
post-conflict societies" (Stover & Weinstein, 2004, p. 4). Justice is the most common theme that 
is emphasized in order to redress wrongdoings in the aftermath of mass atrocity, and is pursued 
through the use of formal trials and prosecutions of perpetrators (Clark & Kaufman, 2009; 
Gloppen, 2005; Stover & Weinstein, 2004). 
The two major forms of justice that post-conflict societies pursue are retributive justice 
and restorative justice. Retributive justice takes the views that perpetrators should be punished 
for their crimes, formal legal structures are necessary to preserve the rule of law, and that 
individuals should be punished, rather than larger groups (Huyse, 2003, pp. 97-98). This form of 
justice is particularly emphasized amongst Western democracies,26 but has not proven to be 
entirely appropriate or realistic in all post-conflict societies (Kubai, 2007, p. 57). As Martha 
Minow (1998) explains, there is both a necessity and danger that surrounds retribution. 
Vengeance, she explains, is the more basic and implicit response to mass violence. It is an 
"impulse to retaliate when wrongs are done," a means to express self-respect, and "the 
wellspring of a notion of equivalence that animates justice" (Minow, 1998, p. 10). The danger of 
seeking vengeance, however, lies in its emotional nature, and tendency to be excessive (Minow, 
1998, p. 10). To match the severity and pain caused by a crime with an equally severe 
punishment for the perpetrator is a difficult task indeed. 
26 Some scholars (Fletcher & Weinstein, 2002; Huyse, 2003; Minow, 1998; Sampson, 2003) observe that seeking 
justice and reconciliation through a (retributive) judicial system is a view dominantly based on the Western 
perspective. 
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Restorative justice, on the other hand, does not place the punishment of perpetrators as 
the ideal outcome. Restorative justice stems from more traditional approaches to conflict 
resolution (Huyse, 2003; Kubai, 2007), and is a more victim-centric approach to justice, often 
involving their full participation during the process (Huyse, 2003, p. 111). In defining the roles 
of both retributive and restorative justice in a post-conflict society, Kubai (2007) contends that: 
"While restorative justice may be helpful, whereas retributive justice may be counterproductive, 
it is also likely to be perceived as injustice to victims who see reparation and even punishment as 
vital ingredients of justice" (p. 57). This challenge indicates the ongoing demands of balancing 
the needs and wants of victims with the realities and restrictions of a post-conflict society. 
Trials based on the rule of law are one of the most common forms of justice delivery in 
many, but not all, post-conflict societies. The establishment of the International Criminal 
Tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY/R) is a perfect example of how the 
international community has sought to deliver legal accountability against atrocious crimes by 
embracing the legitimate methods of the court system (Akhavan, 2001, p. 9). Ad hoc 
international tribunals such as these tribunals are ideally intended to complement national court 
systems by removing elements of victor's justice that might otherwise pervade the domestic 
courts (Huyse, 2003, p. 100). 
Whether retributive or restorative, justice can serve many important roles in a post-
conflict society. For many situations, the most vital role of justice is that it can work to end a 
long-standing culture of impunity (Kubai, 2007; Ngoga, 2009). The legal detention of accused 
criminals can also help to calm certain situations by preventing private revenge by victims, 
detaining dangerous individuals or by "fulfilling an obligation to the victims" (Huyse, 2003, p. 
98). 
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Whether for national security, international order or simply as a symbolic gesture, 
courts—both formal and informal—and the justice they seek to dispense, play a critical role in 
the reconciliation efforts of many post-conflict societies. 
3.1.2 Truth 
Post-conflict societies such as South Africa and some of the countries in Latin America, 
meanwhile, have focused on discovering truth from the past violence in pursuit of reconciliation. 
Proponents of the truth-seeking principle to finding justice share the belief that forgiveness can 
only be discernable when the facts of the grim past and acknowledgement of the deeds has 
occurred (Sampson, 2003). The significance of truth, indeed, lies in that the victim should know 
what happened to whom in order to forgive wrongdoers. At an interview with an NGO staff 
member, a Serb resident of Sarajevo speaks: 
There cannot be lasting peace and true reconciliation until all sides put their cards on the 
table and tell the truth about crimes that were committed by members of their ethnic 
groups. We need to know where our loved ones are buried, where their bones are and we 
are all entitled to that—Serbs, Muslims and Croats alike. Only then can we talk about 
reconciliation. (Institute for War and Peace Reporting [IWPR], 2006) 
Through a truth-seeking process, advocates of this perspective unanimously argue 
(Borneman, 2002; du Toit, 2000; Fletcher & Weinstein, 2002; Hayner, 1996; Minow, 1998, 
2000; Sampson, 2003; Staub, 2006) that victims' painful experiences are recognized, and 
through acknowledging their losses and agony, healing of past wounds can occur. 
About 20 countries have already established truth commissions as official institutions 
dedicated to searching for the facts of past violent conflict and human rights violations (Hayner, 
1996; Ross, 2006). Amy Ross (2006) defines a truth commission as "a body whose purpose is to 
investigate human rights violations in a particular conflict" (p. 70) with a specific mandate and 
time period of investigation (Hayner, 1994, as cited in Ross, 2006, p. 70). As a temporary 
48 
mechanism, according to Priscilla Hayner (2001), a truth commission is in charge of 
investigating and reporting human rights violations, and making recommendations for preventing 
future abuses and conflict. Forms, mandates, goals, and official titles of these organizations vary 
within the circumstances and backgrounds of societies. Ross (2006) suggests that how 'the truth' 
is found and formulated should be contemplated "within the context of the specific political and 
social conditions shaping the establishment and function of such commissions" (p. 70). One of 
the most well-known truth commissions, for example, is South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) (Cole, 2007; Hayner, 1996; Ross, 2006). 
Ross (2006) also explains that truth commissions are "creatures of compromises" as a 
result of their "negotiating resolutions to internal armed conflict, leading to transitions from a 
state of war to a state of formal peace [...] as the mechanism of choice to address the violations 
of the past" (p. 70). This point of a truth commission distinguishes its entity from retribution in 
the wake of conflict situations, and at the same time, shows a weakness that is often criticized by 
antagonists of truth commissions. 
Concerns over truth commissions also persist. Minow (1998,2000) expresses that justice 
cannot be delivered properly since often times many of those commissions, if not all, have no 
rights to punish perpetrators under the rule of law, and thereby fail to address the issue of 
impunity by letting the perpetrators get away from egregious crimes they have committed. As a 
consequence, victims suffer from witnessing the wrongdoers walk on the streets freely and living 
side by side as their neighbours, adding to a great deal of agony that has already been imposed 
on the victims from the past harms and losses committed by the perpetrators (Minow, 1998). The 
unfair treatment of the victims can, eventually, create more animosity and hostility toward the 
wrongdoers rather than forgiveness and acceptance, which makes reconciliation elusive and 
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might even generate a possibility of further violence (Gloppen, 2005; Minow, 1998). 
3.1.3 Reparation 
Can a debt caused by mass atrocity ever be repaid? How much should a victim of rape expect to 
be compensated for their suffering, and who should be held accountable for compensating these 
victims? These are a few of the vexing questions that have continued to surround the inclusion of 
reparations in the dialogue of reconciliation. Offering a further explanation for the "paradox" 
(Roht-Arriaza, 2004, p. 122) of reparations, Naomi Roht-Arriaza suggests that: "[t]hey are 
intended to return victims to the state they would have been in had the violations not occurred— 
something that is impossible to do" (2004, p. 122). Others, meanwhile, have extolled the virtue 
of reparations, identifying that the process of seeking reparations can be a valuable experience, 
as survivors and victims are given the chance to "obtain a renewed sense of dignity" (Minow, 
1998, p. 93) by being given the opportunity to share experiences. Reparations take many forms, 
and are not always financial in nature. In addition to monetary compensation, community service 
has also been employed in post-conflict situations such as East Timor and Rwanda (Roht-
Arriaza, 2004, pp. 133-135). Preferential access, meanwhile, where past victims receive 
accelerated access to goods, services, or employment, has also been tried as an alternative form 
of reparation (Roht-Arriaza, 2004, p. 135). In some situations, where stolen property, money, or 
valuables have been identified, restitution can be attempted. Restitution takes place when 
specific stolen items are returned to their original owners (victims), but as Minow (1998) points 
out, "securing the return especially after many intervening years can be extremely difficult" (p. 
107). Still, when available and appropriate, restitution can be an efficient and measurable way to 
pursue reparations. 
Economic and ongoing political realities have been a factor in determining what 
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reparations, if any, are made available. In comparing Jewish holocaust survivors and African 
reparation claims, Howard-Hassmann and Lombardo (2010) note that: "the amounts must not be 
so large as to seem unreasonable to the governments and publics of the states from whom the 
reparations are claimed" (p. 44). Other claims for reparations, such as those made by the 
Chinese, Filipino, and Korean 'comfort women' victims have been met by political denial and 
indifference on the part of the accused Japanese government (Minow, 1998; Park, 2010). 
Despite these challenges, many victims and survivor groups continue to pursue 
reparations as a necessary component of reconciliation, yet reparations alone should not be 
expected to heal all wounds. Minow (1998) argues that reparation "at best ends the inaction and 
silence after the violation" (pp. 102-103). Given this statement and its implications, reparations 
might instead be viewed as a catalyst for reconciliation, rather than its final ingredient. 
How, then, are the discussions about these concepts being implemented in practice? What 
makes different post-conflict societies seek out different philosophies and measures to bring 
about peace and reconciliation? The chapter now turns its attention to three post-conflict 
countries—South Africa, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Guatemala—to explore: how the 
concepts and debates discussed above have been applied; who and what are the major instigators; 
and, why particular concepts and perspectives have been chosen in certain cases. 
3.2 Major Reconciliation Processes in Other Cases: South Africa, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and Guatemala 
3.2.1 South Africa 
One of the most well-known cases introduced here is the apartheid era of South Africa. Initiated 
in 1948, a little less than a half century of the rigidly official segregation against non-Caucasians 
known as apartheid resulted in gross human rights violations and internal resistance as well as 
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severe economic, political, and social gaps between the privileged Caucasian minority and the 
disenfranchised remainder of the population (Rigby, 2001, p. 123; Rotberg, 2000, p. 5). 
Throughout its existence, internal opposition to apartheid had always presented a vocal—and 
often times violent—resistance, but it was only after the reduction of Cold War tensions in the 
region that an end to apartheid became a realistic scenario (Colvin, 2007, p. 325). In 1994 
apartheid was abolished.27 The following year, the Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act stipulated the organization of the TRC to discover and report on the truths of 
the dark past (Government of South Africa, 1995; McGregor, 2001; Rotberg, 2000). 
The Commission consisted of three committees: the Amnesty Committee, Reparation and 
Rehabilitation Committee, and Human Rights Violations Committee (Government of South 
Africa, 1995, Act, para. 1). Beginning in late 1995, the Commission published a total of seven 
volumes of reports, the last volume being published a full eight years later, in 2003 (Cole, 2007). 
The publication of these volumes served the dual purpose of disseminating the findings of the 
commission in the present, as well as preserving a written record for historical posterity. The 
outcomes of TRC, however, were both tangible and intangible, with the process of investigation, 
notably the public hearings conducted during investigations, standing alongside or even 
overshadowing the impact of the eventual printed reports (Quinn & Freeman, 2003, p. 1143). 
What makes South African TRC unique and distinctive from other commissions, as 
Hayner (2001) emphasizes, is its power to grant amnesty to individual perpetrators. The amnesty, 
however, was performed under the principles of rooting out a blanket amnesty (Mamdani, 2002). 
At the same time, the Commission tried to pursue an "exchange" of "amnesty for perpetrators, 
truth for the society and reparations for victims" (Mamdani, 2002, p. 54, emphasis in the 
27 The first non-racial elections were held in April 1994, following a prolonged period of political conflict where 
over 15,000 South Africans died during the four years leading up to the election (Cawthra, 1999, p. 296). 
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original). Mamdani (2002) explains that since the TRC was the official mechanism for both 
perpetrators and victims, not just for one or the other, justice was sought not through vengeance 
or impunity but through forgiveness and acknowledgement; that is, restorative justice. To 
complement this approach, South Africa also engaged in various memorialization practices such 
as national holidays, exhumations and reburials, and small memorials at the community level 
(Colvin, 2007, p. 328). 
To understand why South Africa chose to focus on the path of amnesty for reconciliation, 
rather than legal prosecution, it is important to bear in mind that the establishment of the South 
African TRC was the result of political compromise between the apartheid regime and the new 
government (Mamdani, 2002; Wilson, 2001; Wilson, et al., 2002). Richard Wilson's (2001) 
analysis is: 
[l]ack of faith in the courts was therefore one of the strongest arguments in favour of a 
truth commission in South Africa; it was widely perceived that apartheid crimes could 
not be handed over to the old criminal justice system. The whole edifice of a culture of 
human rights and equal citizenship rests upon the existence of a 'state of right', which 
involves an end to the arbitrariness and irrationality of a repressive juridical apparatus 
and the establishment of due process and fairness, (p. 201) 
Andrew Rigby (2001), meanwhile, accounts for political compromise in transitional 
circumstances: 
South Africa [...] faced the dilemma of how an emerging democracy could deal with the 
legacy of the gross human rights violations committed under the previous regime, when 
many of those responsible for such abuses remained a powerful force in the land and 
continued to occupy some of the key positions in the transitional coalition government 
and in the state security forces, (p. 124) 
In spite of the circumstances and limitations that necessitated its creation, TRC has 
undoubtedly served a meaningful purpose, and has in part facilitated the reconciliation process 
that South Africa has since undergone. One of the successes of TRC, as identified by Rina 
Kashyap (2009) has been its role as a "trailblazer" (p. 450) for emphasizing gender sensitivity in 
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truth commissions, a model that has been followed in subsequent post-conflict societies (p. 450). 
Although the work of South African TRC to pursue restorative justice through public 
acknowledgement and amnesty is deserving of recognition without a comprehensive scheme of 
reparation and solutions for gross economic inequality Rigby (2001) remains concerned that "the 
gap between the rhetoric of reconciliation and the practice is painfully apparent" (p. 135). 
Highlighting this gap was the failure of the Committee on Reparations and Rehabilitation to 
implement an extensive reparations program that would have directly compensated past victims 
of apartheid, as it had initially recommended (Colvin, 2007, p. 326). The inability to institute 
such an important program serves to demonstrate the limited effectiveness of TRC enforcement. 
Finally, as recent incidents of mobs and xenophobic violence against foreign migrants (Dixon, 
2008; Mail and Guardian Online, 2008) show, it is concerning that such acts could be viewed as 
a legacy of past violence and further jeopardize sustainable reconciliation. 
3.2.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
In the wake of the dismantlement of the former Soviet Union following the Cold War, long-time 
ethnic tensions among Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks), Croats, and Serbs erupted into internal war 
in the Bosnia region of the former Yugoslavia in 1992 (Freeman, 2004; UNHCR, 2000). Until 
the peace agreement—Dayton Peace Accords—was signed at the end of 1995, an estimated 
250,000 people died, more than 2 million were displaced and some 500,000 fled to neighbouring 
countries (Freeman, 2004; UNHCR, 2000). In 1993, the UN Security Council adopted 
Resolution 827 for the establishment of the ICTY (United Nations Security Council [UNSC], 
1993) for the formal trial of war criminals.28 
28 The full title of the ICTY is the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 
1991 (UNSC, 1993). 
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Indeed, the efforts of the international community have served to facilitate the 
construction of a transitional justice system in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Agreements and 
provisions from the Dayton Agreement were implemented in accordance with various 
international organizations such as the Office of the High Representative (OHR), Organisation 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(UNMIBH), and UNHCR, naming just a few (Freeman, 2004, pp. 1-2). Since its inception in 
1993, the ICTY has had a profound effect on Bosnia and Herzegovina through its efforts to bring 
war criminals and other human rights violators to trial, and to promote justice within the region 
(Freeman, 2004, p. 2). Like ICTR, the ICTY is an ad hoc institution. Completion of all first 
instance trials was scheduled for completion by 2008 and appeals by 2010 (Freeman, 2004, pp. 
3-4).29 
It is not clearly identified, however, whether the Tribunal was able to contribute to social 
reconstruction and reconciliation since there are so few studies or attempts to measure it 
(Fletcher & Weinstein, 2002, p. 585). One study, conducted by James Meernik (2005), found 
little evidence to prove the belief that the ICTY exercises an effect on societal peace. According 
to his research which measured the degree of cooperation among Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, 
the ethnic groups tended to be more hostile toward one another after an arrest or trial of the 
suspects (Meemik, 2005). In fact, the view toward the Tribunal is quite polarized amongst those 
ethnic groups. Human rights lawyer Mark Freeman (2004) identifies the tendency that people in 
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly Bosniaks, have more concrete trust in the 
ICTY; in contrast, the Tribunal is viewed as a "biased, anti-Serb body" (Meernik, 2005) by 
Bosnian Serbs in the Republika Srpska where some of the most infamous perpetrators are 
29 As of March 28,2011, there are 15 cases involving 36 accused persons that remain open (ICTY, 2011). 
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suspected to be harbouring.30 In part, such opposition to the Tribunal can be attributed to the 
complex nature of the conflict itself. As Minow (1998) contends: 
[p]articular individuals may be viewed as victims, perpetrators, and bystanders. A student 
watches his parents being harassed by secret police; the student joins protest or freedom-
fighting groups and then is arrested; the student emerges willing to use terrorist tactics 
against the secret police, and sets off bombs that kill civilians, (p. 63) 
This polarization and dissatisfaction with the reconciliation process may be a natural 
reaction to perceived unfairness, yet mutual acceptance, as defined earlier in this chapter, is a key 
element to reconciliation and must be strived for by the leaders of the processes. Nevertheless, in 
a country where many schools still remain divided along ethnic lines, employment 
discrimination continues in both private and public workplaces, and "[s]ocial repair is also 
lagging" (Haider, 2009, p. 100), the question lingers: how effective is international justice at 
delivering national reconciliation? 
3.2.3 Guatemala 
Beginning in 1960, 36 years of internal armed conflict between the Guatemalan government and 
the left-wing rebel armies of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (Unidad 
Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca, URNG) has cost an estimated 200,000 lives and 50,000 
'disappearances', and the destruction of 626 Mayan villages, literally wiped out by so-called 
'scorched earth operations' (Amnesty International [AI], 2002a; Godoy, 2002; Nolin Hanlon & 
Shankar, 2000; Sieder, 2001). After decades of fighting, the armed conflict officially ended with 
the signing of the Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace on December 29,1996 (Costello, 
1997). In June 1994, the establishment of a truth commission was conceived of and accorded by 
the Guatemalan government and the rebel group (Ross, 2006; Wilson, 1997). 
30 Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of two recognized national borders. The east part of the country is the Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina where ethnic Croats and Bosniaks (Muslims) reside, and the west side is the Republika 
Srpska, dominant by Serbs (Meernik, 2005). 
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In essence, Guatemala's efforts towards peace construction in its transitional period 
focused on the Historical Clarification Commission (Comision para el Esclarecimiento Historico, 
CEH) and the Guatemalan Catholic Church's project for the Recuperation of Historical Memory 
(Recuperacion de la Memoria Historica, REMHI) rather than formal justice (CEH, 1999; Nolin 
Hanlon & Shankar, 2000; Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado de Guatemala 
[ODHAG], 1998). Vigorous pursuit of the truth and high levels of participation by various 
grassroots organizations and civil society was the influential energy that stimulated much of the 
work of the Commission and the REMHI project. 
Guatemala's truth commission was conceived after lengthy negotiations in Oslo, Norway, 
with the signing of the accord to establish a Commission for the Historical Clarification of the 
Human Rights Violations and Other Acts of Violence That Have Caused the Suffering of the 
Guatemalan People (Ross, 2006, p. 74). The UN, and European and US bilateral donors 
supported the commission financially (Ross, 2006, p. 77). The Commission's final report, 
Guatemala: Memory of Silence, was published in 1999 based on 8,000 to 9,000 individual 
testimonies and 35 submissions from civil society organizations (CEH, 1999; Nolin Hanlon & 
Shankar, 2000, pp. 265-266; Ross, 2006, p. 78; Sieder, 2001, p. 176). Rachael Sieder (2001) 
analyzes that the Commission's recommendations in the report to the Guatemalan government 
were remarkably firm, in light of its relatively weak mandate. Those recommendations included: 
development of a comprehensive reparation project for the victims, not only as the means of 
recuperation from the past human rights violations, but also as economic assistance through a 
National Reparations Programme; investigation of the whereabouts of the disappeared and the 
locations of mass graves; building monuments and memorials for the victims and survivors; 
establishment of a commission for looking for missing, forcefully separated or illegally adopted 
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children during the violence; and exemption of victims and their descendents from military 
conscription (Sieder, 2001, p. 177). The recommendations initially received criticism by right-
wing organizations as being prejudiced, but the Guatemalan government made no official 
opposition (Sieder, 2001, pp. 177-178). Among the public, the report became a national 
bestseller (Ross, 2006). 
More significantly, Guatemalan civil society's aspiration to find the truth is a 
distinguished move toward peace and reconciliation. Sieder (2001) emphasizes that "the 
widespread involvement of civil society in memory work is perhaps the most distinguishing 
feature of the Guatemalan truth-telling process" (p. 175). One characteristic, for instance, is 
active participation in the truth-seeking process based on a religious point of view (O'Neill, 
2005; Ross, 2006; Sieder, 2001). The REMHI, which was involved in collecting testimonies 
throughout the countryside, characterized its project as "the first organized effort to elicit wide­
spread discussion concerning the reality and impact of the violence" (Ross, 2006, p. 75). The 
outcome of the REMHI project was Guatemala: Nunca Mas (ODHAG, 1998). In addition, 
Sieder (2001) highlights that cultural practice has empowered collective memory: 
Culture has also been a factor in the politics of memory. Particularly for indigenous 
[Mayan] communities, local ritual practices to commemorate the dead have constituted a 
central feature of collective attempts to deal with trauma and loss. These initiatives have 
been promoted by many organizations within the heterogeneous Mayan movement that 
emerged in the wake of the armed conflict, (p. 175) 
Yet, the attempt to pursue justice through the legal procedure is largely missing in 
situations where public insecurity jeopardizes ordinary Guatemalans and where the national 
judicial system failed conclusively due to a lack of resources, capacity, and political will (Godoy, 
2002; Ross, 2006; Sieder, 2001). Thus, Angelina Godoy (2002) points out that citizens are 
overall "understandably cynical" (p. 644) toward legal enforcement, considering the persistent 
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impunity enjoyed by war criminals who have been brought to neither trial nor conviction. The 
lack and discredit of the rule of law resulted in subsequent public lynchings in many local 
communities, creating a vicious cycle of violent history (Godoy, 2002). 
3.3 Conclusion 
As these cases demonstrate, approaches to reconciliation can be as unique and complex as the 
conflicts that they aim to overcome. While these post-conflict situations may still be far from a 
final resolution, there are still many lessons to be learned from these processes and their initial 
outcomes. While recent years have seen much attention being devoted to the study of 
reconciliation and development in post-conflict situations, as indicated by the growing body of 
literature on the subject, a crucial gap between theory and practice still remains to be addressed 
(Brouneus, 2008a; Fletcher & Weinstein, 2002). As the discourse reveals, reconciliation remains 
a vast and encompassing concept, with "no single superior strategy or institutional model for 
addressing the problem of past human rights violations" (Gloppen, 2005, p. 45). 
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CHAPTER IV. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
This research aims to explore the association between reconciliation and development in post-
genocide Rwanda through an examination of some of the major reconciliation and development 
processes. In so doing, I attempt to discover the value and need for reconciliation as a 
fundamental process for development in a post-conflict society. The research starts from the 
presupposition that an important connection tends to be missing between reconciliation processes 
and development programs. Rather than receiving treatment as an equal and associated process, 
reconciliation tends to be subsumed as a single aspect of development in a post-conflict peace-
building stage. This is particularly the case for intervention by the international community. The 
design of this research is structured around the principal elements and concepts of Rwanda's 
reconciliatory efforts and the definition of development from different perspectives. 
The conceptual framework of the thesis is broken down into three areas of focus: 
development, reconciliation, and finally, the relationship between reconciliation and 
development. This format is used in order to first define, emphasize, and explain the unique 
properties and themes central to development and reconciliation separately, and then to bridge 
these two overarching notions together. The first section will discuss key concepts of 
development, how these concepts have evolved over time, and shortcomings of the concepts and 
their application in practice. The post-development theory will be also introduced in this section 
as an alternative perspective, used to circumvent and find solutions to many of the problems of 
conventional developmental tactics. In the next section, discussing reconciliation, Rwanda's 
major reconciliation processes will be described based on the general concepts that have been 
explored in the previous chapter. Based on the implications of these sections, the third section 
will contemplate the connection between reconciliation and development. 
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In attempting to understand Rwandan reconstruction efforts and to bring focus upon the 
real and potential accomplishments of the various development initiatives, the discourse of post-
development is an invaluable resource to draw on, in order to properly situate the analysis of the 
Rwandan context. This section, therefore, compares the conventional views of development and 
the discourse of post-development theory as a different way of thinking about development, and 
then ponders how this theory can play a role in contemplating development and reconciliation in 
post-genocide Rwanda. 
4.1 Conventional Perspectives of Development 
Although development carries various meanings and significance in different contexts, and is a 
normative and value-laden entity, most of the time it is associated with "something that is 
possible," "more," or "good change" (Power, 2003, pp. 1-2). Particularly in the traditional sense, 
development essentially focuses on economic growth (A1 Mamun, 2008). Neoliberalism is 
rooted in development thinking in this regard. As the dominant ideology and practice within 
development (Power, 2003, pp. 8-9), the World Bank and IMF have exercised numerous 
neoliberal approaches in order to address development concerns. Yet, within such an approach, 
problems such as poverty, unemployment, unequal income distribution, environmental 
degradation, and social exclusion, among others are considered inevitable side effects of the 
process of development and are often neglected (Todaro & Smith, 2003, p. 16). 
In the 1970s, meanwhile, observers started paying closer attention to those dire 
consequences of development solely emphasizing economic growth. Dudley Seers (1972), for 
instance, argues that economic growth would be meaningless unless the problems of poverty, 
unemployment, and inequality are improved, and thus, national income does not reflect 
appropriately on development as an indicator (pp. 22-25). He suggests, instead, that development 
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is "creating the conditions for the realization of human personality" (Seers, 1972, p. 21). 
Amartya Sen (1998), in addition, emphasizes that development should be "the process of 
expanding human freedoms" as the "primary end [and] principal means," (p. 36) which include 
freedom from malnutrition, illiteracy, premature morality, and freedom of speech and 
participation. 
Sustainable development, meanwhile, was recognized by the World Commission on 
Environment and Development (WCED, or Brundtland Commission) in 1987 in the aftermath of 
a series of environmental movements from earlier years (Shah, 2005). In light of the view that 
development should proceed to the extent that future generations are able to perpetuate their 
needs, sustainable development is concerned with environmental degradation and natural 
resource destruction (WCED, 1987). 
In this respect, international institutions have attempted numerous approaches to 
development. In the 1990 Human Development Report, the UNDP values people as the centre of 
wealth and delineates that a capability to widen people's choices and achieve well-being is the 
key parameter of human development (pp. 9-11). In the Human Development Index (HDI), the 
UNDP has tried to reflect on aggregated data of not only the conventionally quantifiable terms of 
economic growth but also more diverse aspects of human life by adding the qualitative measures 
of life expectancy, literacy, equity, participation, governance, and other indicators into their 
analysis (UNDP, 1990, pp. 11-16). These goals, as first outlined by Seers (1972), UNDP (1990), 
and later expanded on by Sen (1998), saw new light through the much celebrated UN 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The seven MDGs outlined by the UN are a prime 
example of what needs to be achieved in order to realize the principles of human development. 
Furthering this movement, in the 2000 World Bank publication Voices of the Poor, the 
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institution attempted to capture perspectives on development not held by people of industrialized 
countries but by poor people residing in developing countries themselves (Power, 2003, p. 4). 
This redirected focus on grassroots initiatives, local empowerment, and civil society participation 
has been a trend that can be observed amongst many donors and international institutions. 
Notwithstanding those attempts at different approaches, the goals of development still 
remains profoundly economic and focused on physical growth, especially when it comes to 
development aid for developing countries. The strategies followed by many governments and 
NGOs alike strive primarily for tangible short-term results, often at the expense of long-term 
sustainability. As was the case in Rwanda, explored in Chapter II, Uvin (1998) argues that 
development assistance could be used to fuel negative conditions leading to dire consequences 
such as political turmoil or civil conflict in a recipient country if inadequate consideration of 
social, political, and cultural landscapes are ignored. The failure of SAPs by the international 
financial institutions (IFIs) in most developing countries is another reason to question aid 
effectiveness.31 
It is thus generally agreed that post-development fundamentally rejects the entire 
paradigm of development (Escobar, 1992,2000; Nederveen Pieterse, 2000; Nustad, 2001; Sachs, 
1992; Ziai, 2004). Why then, does post-development reject the ideology of conventional 
development? A closer examination of post-development and its utility within this research will 
now be presented. 
4.2 The Discourse of Post-Development as an Analytical Tool 
The movement towards post-development, or a "post-structuralist critique of development" 
(Nustad, 2001, p. 480), was rooted in "a radical reaction to the dilemmas of development" 
31 For more detail, see Stiglitz (2002). 
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(Nederveen Pieterse, 2000, p. 175).32 Although its historical background goes deeper into 
discussions of modernity and capitalism (Escobar, 2007, p. 19), some post-developmentalists 
(Esteva, 1992, p. 6; Kiely, 1999, p. 31; Sachs, 1992, p. 2) point to a particular period being the 
birth of the development era, when American President Harry S. Truman spoke of the Southern 
hemisphere as 'underdeveloped' in his inauguration speech on January 20,1949. In The 
Development Dictionary, Wolfgang Sachs (1992) argues that "[t]he label [underdeveloped areas] 
stuck and subsequently provided the cognitive base for both arrogance and interventionism from 
the North and pathetic self-pity in the South" (p. 2). Indeed, post-development shares similar 
views with critical theory, post-structuralism and ecological movements (Nederveen Pieterse, 
2000, p. 176). 
4.2.1 Defining post-development 
Post-development specifically takes a critical stance on Western points of view toward questions 
and problems of development—economic growth, science and technological innovations, 
poverty, among others (Escobar, 1995; Ziai, 2004). For example, Aram Ziai (2007) elaborates as 
follows: 
The concept of labelling Western Europe and North America as 'developed' and Africa, 
Asia and Latin America as 'underdeveloped' is a Eurocentric construct in which the own 
society is perceived as constituting an ideal norm and other societies are perceived as 
imperfect deviations from this norm, as inferior versions of the self, which are, however, 
in the process of approaching the norm—although they will never reach it. (p. 8) 
Using an analogy about how religion and nature were constructed and became embedded in 
society as beliefs, Gilbert Rist (1990) attempts to demonstrate development as a Western 
32 Many arguments of post-development theorists are rooted in Michel Foucault's post-structuralism and power of 
discourse. For further discussion, see additional works from some of the major post-development authors (Escobar, 
1992,1995,2000; Esteva, 1987; Kothari, 1987,1989; Rahnema & Bawtree, 1997; Sachs, 1992; Saunders, 2002). 
'myth'33 which is neither acknowledged nor accepted in Third World societies. He explains that 
in human history certain forms of myth have always existed as ideology though they do not 
necessarily reflect truth or reality. These myths were religion (Christianity) and nature; now the 
myth lies in development (Rist, 1990). 
Another major critique of the traditional concept of development by post-development 
authors is about "authoritarian and technocratic" (Ziai, 2007, pp. 8-9) connotations. Post-
development questions, as Ziai (2007) explains, who is in the position to define development and 
design a development scheme for the common good considering the fact that some methods for 
development often bring about detrimental consequences to people who are supposed to benefit 
(p. 9). Furthermore is the concern that the universal knowledge—particularly the Westernized 
view—of development would put various regions, cultures, values, and mindsets in jeopardy. 
Ziai warns that "[s]uch a position becomes extremely dangerous when it is linked to the political 
power to transform societies according to these supposedly universal standards" (2007, p. 9). 
Instead, post-development is interested in local knowledge and culture, and promotes 
people-centric approaches and pluralistic grassroots movements (Escobar, 1995; Ziai, 2004). 
Post-development is rooted in the belief that it is impossible to attain a middle-class lifestyle and 
wealth for the whole population on the earth (Dasgupta, 1985, as cited in Nederveen Pieterse, 
2000, p. 175). Diversity is thus considered to be one of the features of post-development writers, 
and it is rooted in various fields and disciplines. However, it is also the most vulnerable aspect of 
post-development, as many of its critics point out. The focus of the discussion now turns to 
major criticisms of post-development. In order to properly evaluate the appropriateness of post-
33 Rist's (1990) hypothesis is based on French historian Marcel Gauchet's view that "the modem social order is 
founded on a myth, which secures its basic consensus, inspires its conduct and functions as a self-fulfilling truth and 
speech act" (p. 13, emphasis in the original). Thus, the myth is "shared by all, never challenged, and a ready-made 
plan of action which is available in any circumstances" (p. 13). 
65 
development theory to this research, a thorough description of its shortcomings must be 
presented. 
4.2.2 Critiques of post-development 
First of all, the most universal critique of post-development revolves around the binary position 
of the West/Rest, developed/underdeveloped, and North/South—that the West is bad, the non-
West is good (Corbridge, 1998; Kiely, 1999; Nederveen Pieterse, 2000; Schuurman, 2000; Ziai, 
2004). To the proponents of post-development theory, as Stuart Corbridge (1998) argues, the 
West is "inauthentic, urban, consumerist, monstrous, utilitarian" (p. 144) but the Rest is not. 
Corbridge continues, however, to point out that they tend to neglect that many people in the 
Third World follow Westernized lifestyles (1998, p. 144). This critique is due, in part, to the fact 
that post-development primarily concerns itself with the negative implications of development, 
rather than weighing both positive and negative consequences. 
Secondly, critics of post-development also point out that post-development completely 
rejects Western science and technology (Corbridge, 1998; Kiely, 1999; Nederveen Pieterse, 
2000; Ziai, 2004). In this sense, critics argue that proponents of post-development ignore the 
numerous benefits and positive aspects of scientific innovations and technological development 
(Corbridge, 1998 p. 145; Ziai, 2004, pp. 1049-1050). Kiely (1999) questions, with respect to the 
"local-good, foreign-bad" (p. 40) position of technology, whether this viewpoint would change if 
"western pharmaceutical companies successfully develop a cure for the HIV/AIDS virus in the 
next few years" (p. 40). Critics also point out that the success of development in East Asian 
regions is greatly neglected by post-development writers (Kiely, 1999, p. 38; Nederveen Pieterse, 
2000, p. 183). 
The first and second accounts connect to the third critique of post-development regarding 
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the 'romanticism' of local cultures and indigenous knowledge but a rejecting, exclusionary tone 
towards Western science and lifestyle (Corbridge, 1998; Kiely, 1999; Nederveen Pieterse, 2000; 
Ziai, 2004). The use of discourse analysis34 amongst post-development thinkers is frequently 
pointed out as the cause of this criticism (Kiely, 1999; Nederveen Pieterse, 2000). Kiely (1999) 
asserts that the 'novelty' of post-development comes from discourse analysis, but its 
methodology is inconsistent (p. 35). In response to the First World's exploitation, accumulation 
of capital, and subsequent marginalization of the Third World, he suggests that more convincing 
analysis should be "the unevenness of [...] implementation [of development]" (Kiely, 1999, p. 
36), not development itself as a tool for exploiting the Third World countries. 
4.2.3 Significance of the theory and application to the research 
In light of numerous arguments and perspectives toward post-development as examined above, it 
is too soon, and inappropriate, to conclude that post-development is either useless or ideal. There 
are certain critiques that post-development takes an excessively binary stance on development, 
that its methodology is inconsistent, or that its attitude is still authoritative. Nonetheless, the 
post-development theory is worth discussing in the sense that it suggests a broad and different 
way of looking at the North-South relations in development (Ziai, 2007). In this respect, it is 
believed that post-development is an invaluable theory in order to contemplate efforts and 
processes for reconciliation and development in post-genocide Rwanda. At the same time, its 
conceptualization should be further clarified and refined, for as much as the theory shows 
constructive and creative potential (Ziai, 2007, p. 9), it is still developing and evolving. Also, as 
34 It is assumed that discourse analysis can assist in searching for assumptions or hidden motivations by questioning 
interpreting texts (Discourse Analysis, n.d.). As an example, Escobar (1996) postulates that "development can best 
be described as an apparatus that links forms of knowledge about the Third World with the deployment of forms of 
power and intervention, resulting in the mapping and production of Third World societies" (p. 213, as cited in 
Nederveen Pieterse, 2000, p. 180). 
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Ziai (2004) emphasizes, taking a close look at the 'ambivalence of post-development' is a crucial 
procedure to undertake prior to the assessment of post-development as a plausible and feasible 
theory. 
The exploration of reconciliation in the previous chapter clearly shows that, like post-
development theory, reconciliation itself is not a single concept or set of rules to be equally 
applied towards different groups or countries, rather it is case-specific and must be treated as 
such. Rwanda is faced with two major assignments: the achievement of economic growth and 
physical reconstruction after the genocide; and, equally significant, reconciliation between the 
ethnic groups whose malice and prejudice have been rooted deeply in almost every part of their 
political, socio-economic, and historical background. In order to understand the reconciliation 
processes for Rwandans under these challenging circumstances, it is necessary to look to any 
interrelations between development projects and the reconciliation process. Furthermore, 
Rwandan leadership, including President Kagame, espouses the view that the application of 
'non-western' and uniquely African solutions to questions and problems of development is the 
necessary next step (Kagame, 2004, as cited in Zorbas, 2008, p. 96). His views, among others, 
point towards a recognition and willingness on the part of Rwandan policymakers to seek out 
their own, localized path towards development. 
During this process, particular focus will be placed on the comparison between 'local' 
and 'non-local,' or more commonly, 'Western.' The careful utilization of post-development 
perspective in this procedure of examination will serve as a guide to grasp the influence of 
diverse development philosophies on Rwanda's reconciliation process. Given the fact that 
development, in its conventional sense, has often been stigmatized as a contributing factor to the 
violence of 1994 (Ginty & Williams, 2009; Uvin, 1998), questioning the efficacy and value of 
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conventional development in Rwanda is a necessary component of this research. 
4.3 Reconciliation 
In a post-conflict society where former enemies maintain close proximity with each other, 
"coexistence is necessary" and "the need for reconciliation is profound" (Brouneus, 2007, p. 5). 
In a nation or society where reconciliation is pursued, the specific goals and expected outcomes 
from these efforts are driven by strategy. As seen earlier, Lederach (1997) expounded upon 
general theories of reconciliation by proposing that there are four dominant approaches to 
achieve reconciliation: truth, mercy, justice, and peace (pp. 23-35). Each concept might then be 
applied, either by itself or in conjunction with a secondary or tertiary approach, to formulate a 
strategy for reconciliation. Indeed, there is "no magic formula for reconciliation" (Brouneus, 
2007, p. 14). Instead, particularly when spread over many years or decades, the formula may call 
for continual refinement and adjustment in order to account for changing priorities and 
practicalities. In Chapter III, coverage was devoted to the exploration of theoretical concepts and 
components of reconciliation. These topics were then examined in a series of selected case 
studies. 
The three case studies in Chapter III signified that viewpoints and approaches to 
reconciliation—justice, truth, forgiveness, and reparation, among others—vary by society. In the 
former Yugoslavia, on one hand, justice through formal legal proceedings was heavily utilized 
and relied upon to promote reconciliation. In South Africa and Guatemala, on the other, seeking 
out truth was the driving force through the use of the TRC in South Africa and Guatemala's 
emphasis on historical clarity. Each case is unique and contains its own set of conditions and 
challenges. Looking into the often exhaustive and complicated political, socio-economic, 
cultural, and historical background involved in each specific circumstance is imperative to 
understanding how and why conflict occurred, and how post-conflict scenarios have unfolded. 
An exploration, therefore, can be conducted around some of the differing factors that 
existed both during and after these conflicts formally ended, and interpretations can be drawn 
from certain successes and shortcomings that may also be applicable to the Rwandan case. The 
underlying questions become: how have the concepts of reconciliation used in those exemplified 
cases been applied to Rwanda? What concepts have been particularly dominant in the post-
genocide Rwandan society? Do certain demographic sectors hold priorities for particular 
concepts of reconciliation? In a case as complex and sensitive as Rwanda's, an understanding of 
how these different elements of reconciliation are operating helps clarify the main research 
question in this thesis: what are the meanings of reconciliation and development in Rwanda, 
where society has been deeply fragmented by ethnic prejudice and misconception? 
Up until this point, the concepts of reconciliation and development have been presented 
and discussed as separate entities. The final section of the conceptual framework that this thesis 
is based on, explores how reconciliation and development in a post-genocide nation can form a 
working relationship to enable recovery. This theoretical exercise draws on a growing body of 
literature that explores the potential for these two vast fields to coexist and work in tandem. 
4.4 Reconciliation and Development 
At the core of this study is the notion that in post-conflict settings that have undergone mass 
violence and social disruption and are transitioning to peace, reconciliation is an imperative 
device, needed to end the vicious cycle of violence and to establish a long-term blueprint for 
development (Brouneus, 2007; Hamber & Kelly, 2009). I argue that reconciliation is an 
extremely crucial factor in a post-conflict setting, particularly when the origin of violent conflict 
is intrastate in its nature, yet the relevant connections between reconciliation and development 
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are often ignored or understated. In relating development to conflict studies, Ginty and Williams 
(2009) attempt to "recognise the potential of development to contribute to post-war 
reconstruction and reconciliation" (p. 6) and the prevention of further conflict. Ginty and 
Williams (2009) contend that: 
[development can be targeted in ways that aid post-war reconstruction and 
reconciliation. [...] In an ideal situation a mutually reinforcing relationship can be 
established between development and reconstruction. Formerly divided peoples can come 
together for the joint pursuit of economic growth and social progress, (pp. 5-7) 
This research makes an attempt not to perceive reconciliation as a unique and unrelated entity, 
but rather to use a looking glass that finds meaningful connections between the reconciliation 
and post-genocide development process in Rwanda. In order to test the relationship of 
reconciliation and development, possible interrelations and interactions are conceptualized in 
three different aspects: social healing and community development, reparations and economic 
development, and shared views on history and political development. 
4.4.1 Social healing and community development 
One of the most evident connections in both the fields of reconciliation and development is 
grassroots empowerment and participation. If healing is the essential departure point for 
reconciliation, as discussed in Chapter III, it is critical to strategize how to start and stimulate the 
healing process. Solomon Gasana (2009), a counsellor for World Vision who has worked with 
Rwandan genocide survivors and is himself a survivor of conflict in the Great Lakes region, 
emphasizes the importance of emotional and psychological healing and reconciliation and how 
this process is important to post-conflict development. Gasana (2009) observes that genocide 
survivors lack a great deal of energy and eagerness to rebuild their life and community, and 
analyzes that this deficiency is due to their "inner struggles to suppress regular explosions of 
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anger, vengefulness and guilt, [which] require immense supplies of energy" (p. 157). 
The contact hypothesis, as Jeong (2005) and Ryan (1995) explain, suggests that positive 
social contact between individuals belonging to different groups can reduce inter-group conflict, 
and can be a valuable component of the healing process. In addition, Robert Putnam's well-
known social capital theory (2000) suggests that a potentially benevolent effect is caused by 
relationships and community ties. The main group of individuals to which energy recovery and 
social contact should be directed is die party who were most involved in past violent conflicts— 
victims, survivors, perpetrators, and witnesses alike. In this sense, empowering local 
communities to directly and actively participate in energy recovery and social contact is 
fundamental to bringing post-conflict reconciliation and development activities to success. 
Both the literature of reconciliation and development in post-conflict peace-building 
circumstances share a vision of grassroots empowerment and participation, as illustrated in 
Figure 4.1. Focusing on the common aspect is a key step towards achieving reconciliation and 
development as positive contact can assist with overcoming past differences, and prevents a 
return to violence or recurring underdevelopment.35 It is also significant that any program be 
conducted at the grassroots level, to promote local empowerment and civil society. 
35 One example that clearly demonstrates the danger of ignoring this relationship can be found from the case of 
Somalia. In analyzing the UN, World Bank, the US, and other international efforts to restore peace and democratic 
normalcy to Somalia in the early 1990s, Ameen Jan (2001) highlights the unintentional and highly detrimental effect 
that international assistance had on Somali national unity and reconciliation. Jan looks at reconciliation primarily on 
a faction/group level, and not on an individual-to-individual level. By ignoring the concept of "Somali ownership" 
(Jan, 2001, p. 73) for the various initiatives they undertook, the international community acted in a way that would 








Figure 4.1 Interrelation between social healing as reconciliation and community development 
4.4.2 Reparation and economic development 
The second association between reconciliation and development that this research seeks to 
establish is the intersection where reparation and economic reconstruction meet. Eugenia Zorbas 
(2004) expresses an observation on this matter, arguing that reconciliation would not be 
thinkable unless basic needs are met for poor Rwandans who have been affected by the genocide 
and its related violence. As a Rwandan woman questions: "how can I forgive, when my 
livelihood was destroyed and I cannot even pay for the schooling of my children?" (p. 37). Her 
sentiments can be placed within Maslow's (1943) hierarchy of needs, where certain human 
desires, such as esteem and self-actualization, are considered high-level needs. The pursuit of 
such high-level needs, however, is only realized when lower (basic) priorities such as 
physiological and safety needs are satisfied. The capacity for forgiveness and reconciliation 
could be conceivable only after one's basic physical and psychological well-being—health, food, 
housing, education, and security—is attained. 
In the immediate aftermath of mass violence where almost every aspect of life has been 
shattered and few resources are available to manage the functioning of essential systems, 
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economic development in the form of reparation must be thought of as a key element of 
reconciliation (Bloomfield et al., 2003; Brouneus, 2007; Institute for Justice and Reconciliation 
[IJR], 2005; Minow, 1998; Roht-Arriaza, 2004; Zorbas, 2004). Beyond the symbolic, atonable, 
and healing function of reparations, financial and material forms of reparation serve to improve 
living conditions and alleviate abject poverty, thereby satisfying lower-level personal needs. 
4.4.3 Shared views on history and political development 
The third and last association bridging reconciliation and development is hinged on truth-seeking 
and a shared understanding of the past. In a society where vast discrepancies exist amongst 
perceptions and ideas about the past, and where these rifts were a major contributor to the origins 
of mass violence, establishing a concrete understanding of collective memory is a necessary 
precursor to reconciliation, as elucidated extensively in the literature of transitional justice. An 
analysis and better understanding of the divergence is critical as different perspectives on history 
shape different conceptions of what reconciliation is and ought to be. Lessons learned from the 
cases of South Africa and Guatemala imply that finding truth—either through truth-telling at a 
truth and reconciliation commission or recording truth as history to be remembered, is an 
important process to healing and reconciliation. 
Rectification of a collective memory is a significant step towards political development. 
Efforts to remember what had happened correctly give a transitional government in recovery 
from mass violence the opportunity to search for possible answers to prevent a potential 
reoccurrence of violence or conflict in the future (De Brito, Gonzalez-Enriquez, & Aguilar, 
2001). 
When the groups share a living space, cultural, social, and historical traditions, a simple 
geographical separation is not a viable solution. Instead, looking for ways to settle accounts on 
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politics of memory is a more appropriate approach to building eclectic, embraceable, and 
democratic cultures, and to foster political development. Such a case is Rwanda. Trust among the 
Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa is critical, and to foster trust there needs to be a constructive attempt to 
understand what constituted their identities and perceptions towards one another, as these 
perceptions are what shapes political and national identity. 
4.5 Conclusion 
These interrelating concepts between reconciliation and development appear to paint a 
clear and optimistic picture, but before drawing such conclusions, a brief look at other situations 
where reconciliation and development have been exercised in practice is warranted. Looking at 
the examples of Northern Ireland and Sub-Saharan Africa demonstrates that the absence of a 
mutually supportive relationship can be detrimental to both goals, and that even if a relationship 
between reconciliation and development is promoted, successful outcomes are not guaranteed. 
Government programs in Northern Ireland have focused on drawing divided rural 
communities into the development process. One of the explicit goals of such initiatives was to 
embrace and promote community development through social contact, in order to create a shared 
identity and, as a long-term goal, to increase confidence amongst investors. This form of 
strategic planning motivated the government to decentralize and to shift responsibility to the 
local communities themselves (Murray & Greer, 1998, p. 30). This approach, however, as human 
rights activist Robbie McVeigh (2002) has written, allowed the true issue to be side-stepped, in 
that government, while actively encouraging communities to work together in development and 
reconciliation, have shown little willingness to improve upon its own deficiencies (p. 57). 
All too often, however, reconciliation and development are not thought of or acted upon 
in a cooperative joint venture. This is particularly the case in Sub-Saharan Africa where NGOs 
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and other external aid agencies are often left to manage post-conflict efforts based on their own 
individually constructed programs, and lack an "integrated framework needed for realistic 
sustainable macroeconomic and household livelihood rehabilitation" (Green & Ahmed, 1999, p. 
193), or appropriate government partnership and direction. Accordingly, many programs are 
short-term in nature and have left a legacy of unfulfilled promises, mismanagement, and minimal 
real sustainable development or reconciliation achievements (Green & Ahmed, 1999, p. 193). 
To this end, the relevancy and application of the strategies presented here will now be 
placed within the context of the Rwandan case in Chapter V. In so doing, it is expected that the 
relationship between reconciliation and development in Rwanda can be observed and analyzed. 
A series of questions, therefore, will be posed for consideration: What types of programs are 
designed to promote reconciliation and/or development? Could any evidence of increased 
grassroots empowerment and social contact be found as a result of these programs? Is there a 
trend towards different actors putting more weight specifically on either reconciliation or 
development? Finally, what do reconciliation and development mean to Rwanda and how are 
they related? Answers for these questions and further analysis from them will be discussed in the 
case of Rwanda in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER V. RECONCILIATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
IN POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA 
"Rwanda is clinically dead as a nation." 
-Nigerian Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka, 1994 (as cited in Boddy-Evans, 2007) 
If a single word could be used to describe the landscape of post-genocide Rwanda, that word 
would be absence. Millions of Rwandans had fled the country; judges, doctors, teachers, and 
other professionals were either dead or missing; buildings and other physical infrastructure had 
been reduced to rubbles; cows had been needlessly slaughtered; even the corrugated metal 
roofing had been stripped from buildings and carried out of the country by fleeing refugees 
(Gourevitch, 1998, p. 162; Melvern, 2000, p. 223). Highlighting this situation, "[according to a 
Human Rights Watch report issued 1 year after the genocide, the country had 36 remaining 
judges, 14 prosecutors (only three of whom had formal legal training), and 26 police inspectors" 
(Boctor, 2009, p. 101). The destruction caused in just over 100 days of genocidal conflict was 
devastating to say the least, and in many ways still remains evident to this day. 
In light of these overwhelming challenges, the subsequent growth and revitalization of 
Rwanda is observed as being nothing less than 'remarkable' (Clark, 2010; OECD, 2010; 
Vandeginste, 2001). The speed of this physical recovery, particularly considering the need for a 
full start-over has once again amazed the international community (Clark, 2010; OECD, 2010; 
Vandeginste, 2001), just as Rwanda's economic achievements of the 1980s had done before. 
These successes, however, only tell an incomplete version of the entire story. In a country still 
divided by the memories of ethnic violence, achieving reconciliation must be thought of as a key 
component of recovery and development. 
To assess what reconciliation looks like and how it is defined in post-genocide Rwanda, 
the GoR, Rwandan grassroots, and the international community are selected here as the major 
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actors for analysis. The discussion is divided into two parts: the first section identifies the actors' 
standpoints on post-genocide reconciliation and reconstruction and their major policies and 
programs. The second part of the chapter focuses on the convergences and divergences between 
the stakeholders by comparing and contrasting their major reconciliation and development goals 
and strategies, then analyzes how the dynamics of their rationales shape the entirety of Rwanda's 
reconciliation and development. The discussion begins by examining each actor individually, 
building towards a collective analysis in the second part. This exercise also offers an opportunity 
to examine any associations between reconciliation and development amongst the actors' 
policies and approaches based on the three aspects of a reconciliation-development relationship 
as outlined in Chapter IV. Attention will first be directed towards the post-genocide activities of 
the Rwandan government. 
5.1 Post-Genocide Reconciliation and Development Approach by Actors 
5.1.1 Government of Rwanda 
On July 19,1994, the Rwandan genocide officially ended after the RPF, occupying almost the 
entire country, drove the remnants of the former government into neighbouring Zaire and 
Tanzania (Des Forges & Longman, 2004; Hintjens, 2009; Longman, 2004b, 2006a; Reyntjens, 
2004; Waldorf, 2006). Following these events, the RPF proclaimed the commencement of a five-
year transitional period where the basis of a new government was to be established for Rwanda 
(Vandeginste, 2001, p. 227). In June 1999, the government extended this initial transitional term 
to include four more years (Vandeginste, 2001, p. 247). During these initial post-genocide years 
the RPF and its leaders were able to firmly establish themselves as the basis of the Rwandan 
government, eventually leading to the election in 2003 of RPF General and Vice-President Paul 
Kagame as President (Mgbako, 2005; Reyntjens, 2004). The rapid and extraordinary post-
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conflict development efforts of the GoR during this first decade of power drew the attention and 
recognition of the international community, an experience similar to the 1980s economic boom 
(Clark, 2009; OECD, 2010; Vandeginste, 2001). Within the context of reconciliation and 
development endeavours, the GoR stresses the need to eliminate ethnic distinction and to pursue 
justice under the national motto of "unity, work and patriotism" (GoR, 2003, p. 3). Four areas— 
eliminating ethnic distinction, justice, land policy and economic development—are central 
themes in the GoR's approach to post-genocide reconciliation. 
5.1.1.1 The official abolishment of ethnic distinction 
The task, deemed essential by the post-genocide Government of National Unity, was to rebuild 
the Rwandan society in a united manner that would prevent any further conflict. First, in order to 
generate an environment conducive to national unity and peace, the Kagame regime deemed it 
necessary to deal with and eradicate its most persistent obstacle: the legacy of ethnic division. 
This view held by the GoR is clearly stated in the revised Constitution of the Republic of 
Rwanda, adopted on May 26, 2003 (Reyntjens, 2004, p. 185). In Article 9, for instance, 
fundamental principles are stipulated to "[fight] the ideology of genocide and all its 
manifestations; eradicat[e] ethnic, regional and other divisions and promotion of national unity; 
[and share the] equitable [...] power" (GoR, 2003, p. 4). More significantly, the Government 
banned any attempt to disrupt national unity or exacerbate ethnic distinction as expressed in 
Article 11 and 13: 
Article 11 
All Rwandans are born and remain free and equal in rights and duties. 
Discrimination of whatever kind based on, inter alia, ethnic origin, tribe, clan, colour, 
sex, region, social origin, religion or faith, opinion, economic status, culture, language, 
social status, physical or mental disability or any other form of discrimination is 
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prohibited and punishable by law. 
Article 13 
The crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes do not have a period of 
limitation. 
Revisionism, negationism and trivialisation of genocide are punishable by the law. (GoR, 
2003, p. 5) 
Since any discussions or activities that can lead to the impediment of national unity are 
strictly outlawed, officially no ethnic distinction exists among the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa anymore 
(Lambourne, 2001; Reyntjens & Vandeginste, 2005; Waters, 1997). Hutus, Tutsis, and Twas are 
indicated only as Rwandans, or Banyarwanda (Buckley-Zistel, 2006a, 2006b; Hilhorst & van 
Leeuwen, 2000; Hilker, 2009; Waldorf, 2009; Zorbas, 2004). Anyone, regardless of individual, 
organization or nationality, who attempts to challenge the idea of unity or mention the ethnic 
categories in public is considered a 'divisionist' and is subject to legal prosecution (Buckley-
Zistel, 2006a, 2009; Hilker, 2009; Waldorf, 2009; Zorbas, 2004). 
Such robust sentiments on national unity and reconciliation are also apparent in the 
governments attempt to reestablish the view of ethnic integration and disintegration through 
Rwandan history. The 'new' position taken by the post-genocide government (NURC, 2005a) on 
the historical background of ethnic groups—Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa—is that "there exists one 
unique ethnic group in Rwanda: the ethnic group of Banyarwanda" and that "such a difference 
has never existed" (p. 4) until "negative ideologies [were] inherited from colonial times" (p. 18). 
The GoR has also attempted to reinforce the historical merit of its stance through a 'We-Are-All-
Rwandans' policy, which states that Rwandan identity existed long before colonialism (Veale, 
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2000, p. 238). As of this writing, history has not been taught in schools since the genocide.36 
Instead, the NURC has vigorously disseminated its discourse to the Rwandan population through 
civic education programs such as ingando. 
The NURC was launched in 1999 as a specialized governmental organization to facilitate 
national unity and reconciliation; its existence having been stipulated in the Constitution, Article 
178 under Title III Special Commissions and Organs [sic], (GoR, 2003; IJR, 2005; Kubai, 2007; 
Zorbas, 2004). The NURC is mandated to do research for plausible approaches that might 
accelerate reconciliation and peace, coordinate demobilization and reintegration programs in 
order to educate the general population and to prevent "any kind of discrimination, intolerance or 
xenophobia" (GoR, 2003, p. 48). 
Additionally, the Commission is expected to produce documents on the situation of the 
reconciliation process and report its findings to the President of Rwanda and the Senate (GoR, 
2003; IJR, 2005; NURC, n.d.). By placing such weight on the importance of educating 
Rwandans about the dangers of ethnic divisionism (Cook, 2006, p. 296), the government deemed 
it necessary to modify the NURC over the years to better serve its purpose. The NURC has 
already been restructured three times since its inception (IJR, 2005, p. 2). 
The NURC has also been instrumental in the creation and implementation of several 
major civic education programs, notable among them is the solidarity camp called ingando?1 
Ingando is a reintegration and rehabilitation program for various groups including ex-
combatants, genocide survivors, students, returnees, politicians, judges, church and community 
36 Yet, ample research and attempts to develop history curriculum are underway. For example, the Human Right 
Center of University of California, Berkeley, in partnership with National University of Rwanda (NUR) and 
National Curriculum Development Centre (NCDC) conducted a research project on developing a history curriculum 
for instruction at primary and secondary schools (Freedman et al., 2004; Freedman, Weinstein, & Longman, n.d.). 
37 The name ingando stems from the Kinyarwanda verb Kuganda, meaning to halt everyday activities to find 
solutions to national problems (Nantulya, 2006, p. 47). 
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leaders, among others, and offers different content, program duration, and procedures for the 
divergent groups that participate (Nantulya, 2006, p. 48). In the case of ex-combatants and ex-
armed groups, demobilization is prioritized as the key outcome of the education and they are 
given US$100 worth of supplies in a Basic Needs Kit.38 Ingando for students, meanwhile, is the 
most common program. The student participants study the GoR's programs and achievements, 
history, ethnicity, unity, and reconciliation and other subjects through the use of open debates 
and discussions focused on the challenges of Rwanda's reconciliation. 
5.1.1.2 The pursuit of justice 
Just as eradicating ethnic distinction and division remains a top priority of the GoR, a strong 
push for justice and an end to the culture of impunity that has plagued the country for decades 
has also occurred. The quest for justice has in many ways become the cornerstone of the 
reconciliation and development policy pursued by the Kagame regime (Lambourne, 2001; 
Longman, 2006a; Sarkin, 2001; Uvin, 2001; Uvin & Mironko, 2003; Vandeginste, 2001). 
The statements and actions of the post-genocidal government confirm the priority that has 
been placed on justice. During a visit to New York in December of 1994, only months after 
conflicts ended, Paul Kagame made his stance clear on the need for justice, stating: "there can be 
no durable reconciliation as long as those who are responsible for the massacres are not properly 
tried" (Daly, 2002, p. 375). The GoR followed with a statement of their own, claiming "only 
when the guilty had been punished, would it be possible for the victims, as well as the non-
guilty, to create a joint future together" (Uvin, 2001, p. 181). The GoR regularly states its firm 
belief in the need to eradicate all semblances of the culture of impunity. One of the ways they 
38 The Kit includes transport home from the ingando camp, a food stipend for three months and basic home supplies 
(Mgbako, 2005, p. 224). The World Bank provides 47% of total program funding and the GoR is responsible for the 
rest (Mgbako, 2005, pp. 210-211). 
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have taken action is through support for the domestic judicial system (Vandeginste, 2001). 
Demonstration of this support is often shown through spending and budgeting for the legal 
system. Exemplifying this, in 2005, the Government set an ambitious goal of spending 3% of its 
total budget on the domestic justice system (Kirkby, 2006, p. 117). 
Rwanda's domestic justice system is unique in two ways: its structure and guilty plea-
bargaining mechanism. First of all, the structure of Rwanda's domestic justice system is 
comprised of two levels: formal national judicial institutions, for which the first trial started in 
December 1996 (Sarkin, 2001, p. 157; Schabas, 2009, p. 215); and, local "popular justice" 
(Apuuli, 2009, p. 18) gacaca courts. Such an extraordinary structure is influenced by the GoR's 
estimation that in the aftermath of mass violence, a formal legal system alone would not be 
capable of bringing a massive number of genocide perpetrators and suspects to trials promptly, 
particularly when adequate judicial facilities and human resources were extremely lacking 
(Apuuli, 2009, p. 12; Boctor, 2009, p. 104). By 1999, approximately 100,000 to 125,000 
detainees were being held in jails designed for only 30,000 persons, living in squalid and 
unsanitary conditions while they awaited trials (Boctor, 2009; Clark, 2009,2010; Daly, 2002; 
Kirkby, 2006; Longman, 2006a; Megwalu & Loizides, 2010; National Service of Gacaca 
Jurisdictions [NSGJ], n.d.a; Sarkin, 2001; Steward, 2009; Uvin & Mironko, 2003; Vandeginste, 
2001; Waldorf, 2006,2009; Zorbas, 2004). In order to accelerate the legal proceedings to meet 
the GoR's ambitious goal of prosecuting all genocide suspects, the establishment of gacaca 
courts, a concept that reflected traditional conflict resolution mechanisms used by local 
communities was conceived, and instituted by the Organic Law in 2001 (Apuuli, 2009; Sosnov, 
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2008).39 As this section specifically aims to outline the structure and functioning of the judicial 
system led by the GoR, a full discussion of the processes and impacts of gacaca courts will 
instead be covered later under the focus of Rwandan grassroots. 
In order to bring consistency and clear goals to the domestic justice system, national 
prosecution occurs according to the Organic Law (No, 08/96) of August 30,1996 on the 
Organization of Prosecutions for Offences constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes against 
Humanity Committed Since October 1,1990 (Apuuli, 2009, p. 25; Boctor, 2009, p. 105). The 
first trials began in December 1996 (Vandeginste, 2001, p. 234). In accordance with the 1996 
Organic Law, four specific categories of suspects are tried, for crimes of varying severity (GoR, 
1996). The punishment of those found guilty is determined according to these same categories 
(Boctor, 2009; Daly, 2002; Eltrigham, 2004; Sosnov, 2008; Vandeginste, 2001). From Article 2 
of the Organic Law: 
Category 1 
a) persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation place them among 
the planners, organizers, instigators, supervisors and leaders of the crime of genocide or 
of a crime against humanity; 
b) persons who acted in positions of authority at the national, prefectoral, communal, 
sector or cell level, or in a political party, or fostered such crimes; 
c) notorious murderers who by virtue of the zeal or excessive malice with which they 
committed atrocities, distinguished themselves in their areas of residence or where they 
passed; 
d) persons who committed acts of sexual torture; 
Category 2 
persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation place them among 
perpetrators, conspirators of accomplices of intentional homicide or of serious assault 
against the person causing death; 
Category 3 
39 Organic Law No. 40/2000 of 26/01/2001, Setting Up Gacaca Jurisdictions and Organising Prosecutions for 
Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes against Humanity Committed Between 1 October 1990 and 
31 December 1994 (Clark, 2009, p. 298; Schabas, 2009, pp. 223-224). 
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persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation make them guilty of 
other serious assaults against the person; 
Category 4 
persons who committed offences against property. (GoR, 1996, Article 2) 
As punishment, the death penalty40 or life imprisonment is the sentence ordered to 
Category One offenders. Those convicted of Category Two crimes face between 25 years to a 
maximum of life in prison while five to seven years is the penalty for Category Three offenders. 
Finally, for the least serious crimes matching Category Four, physical and financial return of 
stolen or damaged properties is the prescribed sentence (NSGJ, n.d.a). Cases for persons accused 
of Category One are subject to trial at the State Court or are transferred to the ICTR (Boctor, 
2009). Aside from these major offenders, the rest of the categories are under gacaca jurisdictions 
(Boctor, 2009; Clark, 2009; Vandeginste, 2001).41 For many years these categories were closely 
adhered to, until finally in 2004, a major amendment was made to merge Category Two and 
Three, leaving just three distinct categories for all remaining offenders to be classified under 
(Clark, 2009, p. 303; Sosnov, 2008, p. 135). This two-tiered approach to national justice assists 
in facilitating the massive number of trials, and helps to reduce the burden of overpopulated 
prisons. 
Secondly, another unique and critical feature of the post-genocide judicial system lies in 
its guilty plea-bargaining mechanism, as also stipulated in the 1996 Organic Law (Apuuli, 2009; 
Clark, 2009, 2010; Reyntjens & Vandeginste, 2005; Schabas, 2009). Under this mechanism, if a 
40 Stemming from recent developments, a repeal of the death penalty was officially put into effect on July 25,2007 
by Organic Law No. 31/2007 of July 25, 2007 (Boctor, 2009; Schabas, 2009). 
41 The GoR carried out administrative reform in 2001, replacing 12 prefects with 11 provinces and the City of 
Kigali, 106 districts (previously known as communes), 1,545 sectors, and 9,201 cells, by descending order of 
administrative units, on which the gacaca jurisdictions are based (Vandeginste, 2001, p. 252; Waldorf, 2006, p. 
434). Suspects under Category Two are tried in the district-level gacaca, and Category Three in the sector-level, 
whereas pre-trial information gathering and investigative procedures are allocated to the cell-level courts 
(Vandeginste, 2001, pp. 241-242; Waldorf, 2006, pp. 425-426). 
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defendant gives a confession, the penalty is typically reduced, allowing for half of the sentence 
to be served in prison and the other half as community service under probation (NURC 2003, p. 
5; Sosnov, 2008, pp. 136-137). Between 1997 and early 2000, the number of confessors grew 
from about 500 to 20,000 (Schabas, 2009, p. 217). These confessions came into play again 
during the gacaca trials that later emerged. Following the nationwide elections of 260,000 
gacaca judges in October 2001, initial pilot trials of the courts eventually began in June 2002. By 
2006, gacaca courts were gradually implemented throughout the country (Daly, 2002; Longman, 
2006a; Megwalu & Loizides, 2010; Reyntjens & Vandeginste, 2005). According to the latest 
calculation (Clark, 2010), approximately 400,000 genocide suspects have been brought to trial 
through gacaca courts since 2001 (para. 1). 
As crucial as the overhaul of genocidal norms and the establishment of transitional justice 
were, the post-genocide government was also tasked with handling an ongoing population crisis. 
A massive number of refugees had fled the country, while at the same time many returnees from 
neighbouring states decided to come back to Rwanda. Due to these sudden influxes and 
outflows, policies on redistributing and restructuring land property and ownership had to be 
implemented. The next section explores the GoR's population reintegration program for more 
effective land usage and resettlement called imidugudu. 
5.1.1.3 For effective land use and reintegration: Imidugudu, a villagization program 
In many ways land remains significant in Rwanda, a country with a primarily subsistence 
economy where agriculture and animal husbandry are the major industry for most ordinary 
Rwandans' livelihood (Pottier, 2002; Van Hoyweghen, 1999). Beyond its economic purposes, 
land also represents a social and family value to its holders (NURC, 2005b). In today's Rwanda 
land belongs to the state, with few exceptions, and purchasing land means obtaining ownership 
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of land use, not the land itself (Pottier, 2002, pp. 180,229; Van Hoyweghen, 1999, p. 368). 
Post-genocide Rwanda saw an estimated influx of 2.5 million refugees and returnees, a 
number that more than replaced the population loss of between 800,000 to 1 million persons 
from the genocide (Hilhorst & van Leeuwen, 2000; Van Hoyweghen, 1999; van Leeuwen, 
2001). Two waves accounted for this population movement. The first wave of mass returns 
mostly included those labelled 'old case' refugees, many of them Tutsi descendents whose 
predecessor generation fled earlier violence during the period 1959 to 1963 and again in 1973. 
Many of these refugees repatriated immediately after the genocide concluded and the RPF took 
control (Hilhorst & van Leeuwen, 2000, pp. 265-266; Van Hoyweghen, 1999, p. 354; van 
Leeuwen, 2001, pp. 630-631). The second wave, on the other hand, was primarily comprised of 
'new case' refugees who had vacated their homes and land during the civil war and the genocide 
ordeal (Hilhorst & van Leeuwen, 2000, pp. 265-266; Van Hoyweghen, 1999, pp. 354, 363, van 
Leeuwen, 2001, pp. 630-631). The majority of their returns occurred in 1996 and an estimated 
1.3 million people were repatriated to Rwanda (Van Hoyweghen, 1999, p. 354). 
Originally, imidugudu was conceived of in the Arusha Accords as an emergency relief 
effort intended to better accommodate returnees—mostly old case refugees—in certain locations 
through resettlement (Hilhorst & van Leeuwen, 2000; van Leeuwen, 2001). In early 1997, the 
program expanded its mandate to encompass the entire country. As part of this change, the focus 
of the program shifted to regrouping the scattered rural population into designated areas, and its 
overall objective moved from emergency to long-term development in nature (Hilhorst & van 
Leeuwen, 2000; van Leeuwen, 2001). 
The expansion of the policy was induced by the GoR's rationale that with effective 
control over land, Rwanda could improve agricultural productivity and mitigate the problems of 
population density, in addition to dealing with the original goal of resettlement and security of 
the populace (Hilhorst & van Leeuwen, 2000; NURC, 2005b; Van Hoyweghen, 1999). 
Furthermore, the GoR's strategy of reconciliation was implicated in its claim that "the country 
had enough resources to sustain all Rwandans, and that every Rwandan living abroad was 
welcome to repatriate" (Hilhorst & van Leeuwen, 2000, p. 267). This disposition is in stark 
contrast to the stances taken by the former Habyarimana government, as highlighted in Chapter 
II (Hilhorst & van Leeuwen, 2000, p. 266). 
As a result of imidugudu implementation, about 85,000 dwellings were built in 250 
communities by 2000 (Hilhorst & van Leeuwen, 2000, p. 264) with the intent of moving 
residents living in existing dispersedly located dwellings into the new communities (Zorbas, 
2008, p. 267). While such numbers are by themselves quite promising, these achievements vary 
considerably, largely depending on the interactions amongst local authorities, supporting donor 
agencies and NGOs, and beneficiaries (Hilhorst & van Leeuwen, 2000; Obura, 2003; van 
Leeuwen, 2001). Indeed, the blueprint of imidugudu brought many different scenarios on the 
ground because it was entirely up to the local administrations' interpretation and decision­
making on how to implement the national scheme to their communes (Hilhorst & van Leeuwen, 
2000; van Leeuwen, 2001). According to the case studies researched by Hilhorst and van 
Leeuwen (2000), the program was a success in some communes but actually caused problems in 
many others (pp. 272-273). Often times the move was enforced rather than voluntary, even for 
those who already had homes; newly built villages were worse off, often lacking adequate 
security and facilities such as access to water and income-generating opportunities; the sites 
selected were fertile level ground and were distanced from traditional dwelling areas, 
consequently forcing families to commute to their farms and fields in order to make a living or to 
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cultivate new but less fertile land; therefore, the practice did not necessarily lead to increased 
agricultural productivity but rather soil erosion and other environmental degradation (Daly, 
2002, p. 379; Hilhorst & van Leeuwen, 2000, pp. 272-273; Integrated Regional Information 
Networks [IRIN], 2004, para. 31; Longman, 2004a, p. 80; Obura, 2003, p. 38; Sarkin, 2001, pp. 
152-153). Although redistribution of land was part of the imidugudu policy, the question of how 
many lots were actually redistributed in the stage of implementation remained unanswered in 
many communities (Hilhorst & van Leeuwen, 2000, pp. 267, 274). Defending the program, the 
Minister for Infrastructure Jean Damascene Ntawukuliryayo mentioned that "[djespite some 
shortcomings in implementing this policy, the government still firmly believes that [imidugudu] 
represents the only feasible alternative to Rwanda's land population equation for the foreseeable 
future" (IRIN, 2004, para. 39). 
5.1.1.4 Goals and strategies of economic development 
In 2000, the GoR announced a national reconstruction and development plan called Rwanda 
Vision 2020. Within this policy document, the primary goal of transforming Rwanda from an 
agriculture-based economy into a middle-income country, with an annual economic growth rate 
in excess of 7% per year, and to become the economic and communication hub of East and 
Central Africa by the year 2020, is expressed (GoR, 2000). The transformation is structured 
specifically into three phases: first, reducing foreign aid dependency is the short-term blueprint; 
second, replacing current subsistence agriculture practices with a knowledge-based society is the 
mid-term phase; and finally, raising Rwanda's economic status to a middle-income country is the 
overarching long-term goal (GoR, 2000, pp. 9-11). Such a blueprint intends to overcome the 
country's disadvantages and obstacles that have long hampered development, namely its lack of 
natural resources, landlocked geographic location, rapid population growth, and lingering 
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poverty. The GoR professes sound economic growth by imploring all Rwandan individuals to 
have economic opportunities to poverty reduction (2000, p. 3). 
In order to achieve these goals, Vision 2020 outlines a set of strategies for the above 
development goals that places particular emphasis on six pillars: good governance; human 
resource development; private sector-led development; infrastructure development; productive 
high value and market-oriented agriculture; and regional and international integration (GoR, 
2000, pp. 11-19). In addition to these pillars, Vision 2020 highlights gender equality, natural 
resources and the environment, and science and information technology as three cross-cutting 
issues relevant to achieving its development goals (GoR, 2000, pp. 19-20). 
Prior to Vision 2020, the GoR established the Fonds d'Assistance aux Rescapes du 
Genocide (FARG, Genocide Survivors Fund) in 1998 (Buckley-Zistel, 2006b; Waldorf, 2006). 
The FARG is indicated as a part of the social protection sector under the auspices of the Ministry 
of Local Government, Community Development and Social Affairs (MINALOC) in the GoR's 
poverty reduction scheme (GoR, 2002, p. 83; MINALOC, 2011, p. 60). About 5% of the national 
tax revenues every year (approximately US$3.5 million) are allocated to the program, earmarked 
for spending on assisting genocide survivors with medical care, housing, and education (AI, 
2004, p. 17; Buckley-Zistel, 2006b, p. 139; HRW, 2004, p. 42; Waldorf, 2006, p. 430). 
The descriptions provided in this section are intended to serve as an introduction to the 
reconciliation and development activities and efforts of the GoR, with further analysis yet to 
come. Next, the focus of this chapter will turn to the Rwandan grassroots. 
5.1.2 Rwandan grassroots 
In the aftermath of genocide, the demographic composition of Rwanda is far more complex and 
intricate than it was in the pre-genocide period. The genocide ordeal drastically altered most 
contemporary post-genocide Rwandan communities: among the Rwandans who remained in the 
country before and during the genocide are survivors/victims, genocide perpetrators, suspects, 
detainees/the accused, and their families, including an estimated 400,000 widows and 500,000 
orphans (Tiemessen, 2004, p. 58). By 1997, some 4 million of these people were internally 
displaced (Steward, 2009, p. 173). Many of the widows and female survivors are particularly 
susceptible to traumatization, often suffering from HIV/AIDS due to the massive number of 
rapes that occurred during the genocide (Longman, Pham, & Weinstein, 2004a; Roht-Arriaza, 
2004; Stearns, 2006). Close to 60,000 Rwandan households are now headed by children under 
the age of 18 (Steward, 2009, p. 173), as a result of parents lost during the genocide, and due to 
genocide suspects and the accused remaining detained in prisons. Meanwhile, refugees—both 
old and new cases—have returned to the country, more than filling in the huge population 
vacuum left by the 800,000 victims killed during the genocide. In some of these groups, many, if 
not all, share a similar ethnic identity. 
5.1.2.1 Grassroots activities 
Numerous efforts, aimed at coping with the painful past, have been explored at different levels— 
individual, community—and through different methods. At the individual level, many of the 
persons who experienced the violence and aftermath of the genocide, particularly genocide 
victims and survivors, have gone on record and are having their stories reported through research 
and media interviews or personal biographies.42 One approach to personal healing often sought 
42 Interviews with Rwandans who provide vivid accounts of personal experiences of the genocide are well 
documented in Gourevitch (1998), Neuffer (2001), Nolen (2005), to name a few. See also Ilibagiza (2006), 
Kayigamba (2009), Rusesabagina (2006), and Umutesi (2004) for Rwandans' direct accounts of their own stories 
and insightful perspectives of how to overcome their past. 
has been to look towards religious principles (Brouneus, 2008b; Clark, 2009).43 Commonly 
found among personal accounts is a belief in God to get through the extraordinary ordeal of the 
genocide. A rape victim, for example, states in an interview with Globe and Mail reporter 
Stephanie Nolen (2005) that '"I doubted your [God's] existence [...] Grant me this thing [...] the 
courage to end this.' And I heard a voice, saying, 'Patience, patience'" (p. 117). In her personal 
biography, Immaculee Ilibagiza (2006) recalls how she managed to survive the ordeal, and now 
attempts to forgive the perpetrators who killed her family and friends through her strong 
religious beliefs. Such accounts demonstrate the pivotal place that faith, which fundamentally 
adheres to religious beliefs, has occupied in the individual lives of those affected by the 
genocide. 
At the community level, a burgeoning number of local grassroots organizations and 
associations have been developed to foster social healing and mental health, most notably among 
women and survivors (Mukashema & Mullet, 2010, p. 37). The number of women's 
organizations alone reached more than 15,000 in 1999, 50 of which were national in scope 
(United States Agency for International Development [USAID], 2000, p. 4). In representing 
genocide survivors, one well-known organization is IBUKA ('remember' in Kinyarwanda) 
(Cook, 2006; IBUKA, n.d.; Kirkby, 2006). IBUKA embraces smaller local NGOs which serve 
survivors and other genocide-affected populations as its members and focuses on promoting 
justice, memorialization of the victims, assistance to genocide survivors, and peace-building 
(IBUKA, n.d.). Of similar prominence is the local human rights association Ligue Rwandaise 
pour la Promotion et la Defense des Droits de l'Homme (LIPRODHOR) (Buckley-Zistel, 
43 Christianity, in particular, has had a long and deep influence on the formation of Rwandans' mindset, and its 
significance is entrenched in almost every aspect of Rwandans' socio-cultural and political life (Betts, 2005, p. 748; 
Clark, 2009, pp. 306-307). Longman (2010) analyzes how Christianity has been incorporated into the political 
identity of Rwanda in a historical context. Also see Cantrell (2009) for further insight on how Rwandan churches' 
post-genocide development has maintained close relations with the Kagame administration and American donors. 
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2006a). Many women's organizations, often with the support of both the GoR and donors, have 
been set up to assist female victims, widows, and household heads, focusing on civic education, 
women's rights, and income-generating programs (USAID, 2000). One of the most active 
organizations in this category is Association des Veuves du Genocide (AVEGA, or AVEGA-
AGAHOZO) Association for Widows of the April Genocide (AVEGA, n.d.; Stearns, 2006). 
5.1.2.2 Grassroots perspectives on reconciliation 
These experiences of healing and recuperation from the genocide demonstrate that diverging 
attitudes and perspectives exist among the Rwandan populace, and that there is no single path to 
be taken when dealing with a violent past. Quite a few research interviews, surveys, and 
observations have been conducted to examine these dynamics (Ingelaere, 2009; IJR, 2005; 
Longman, Pham, & Weinstein, 2004a, 2004b; Longman & Rutagengwa, 2004; Megwalu & 
Loizides, 2010; Mukashema & Mullet, 2010; NURC, 2003; Nolen, 2005; Smith & Meyer, 2001; 
Staub et al., 2005; Steward, 2009; Veale, 2000). Notwithstanding slight differences of evidence 
and emphases, the findings of these studies tend to concur that population groups with different 
life experiences, and individual and social conditions have distinct, and often contrasting, 
priorities and needs for personal healing and reconciliation (Longman et al., 2004a, p. 610). 
A clearly different perception about reconciliation exists between the young and old. 
Based on the findings of an interview survey by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR, 
2005), younger generations have a tendency to demonstrate more positive attitudes toward 
reconciliation and post-genocide peace. The respondents between 15 and 25 years old, whose 
ages were 4 to 14 during the genocide in 1994, tend to think of reconciliation as "living together 
and moving forward" (IJR, 2005, pp. 9-10). Conversely, for the group between 46 and 55 years, 
who had more direct experiences and vivid memories of the genocide, reconciliation meant 
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remembrance through "truth telling, truth seeking, respect for survivors and forgiveness" (IJR, 
2005, p. 10). Another divergence is found in terms of educational level. People with more 
education tend to show more skeptical attitudes towards the judicial systems, including gacaca 
courts (Longman et al., 2004a, 2004b; Megwalu & Loizides, 2010; Smith & Meyer, 2001), and 
"less openness to reconciliation" (Longman et al., 2004b, p. 223). 
Above all, justice as a reconciliation process is observed to be the most indicative and 
prevalent value to the grassroots, although ideas of how to achieve justice vary (Clark, 2009; 
Longman et al., 2004b). Whereas seeking retributive justice in holding wrongdoers accountable 
through a judicial approach is generally supported by grassroots, among both survivors and the 
accused, attitudes also show physical and psychological security and socio-economic well-being 
to be highly critical to reconciliation and peace (Lambourae, 2001, 2004; Longman et al., 2004b; 
Longman & Rutagengwa, 2004; Veale, 2000). Genocide survivors particularly emphasize the 
importance of some form of reparation, such as IBUKA's adamant insistence on "no justice 
without reparation" (Kubai, 2007, p. 64). The accused—many but not all Hutu—express their 
support for an approach of punitive justice in order to avoid collective Hutu guilt (Longman et 
al., 2004b, p. 212; Longman & Rutagengwa, 2004, pp. 173-174). The difference is apparent as: 
while a majority of Tutsi strongly agreed that trials should punish the guilty, a majority of 
Hutu merely agreed. Similarly, support for reparations was much stronger among Tutsi, 
while a much larger percentage of Hutu supported using trials to release prisoners 
(although slightly more Hutu opposed this purpose than supported it). (Longman et al., 
2004b, p. 212) 
As the bulk of community involvement injustice occurs in the gacaca courts, closer 
attention to the dynamics among the grassroots now will be presented in the context of the 
gacaca practice. 
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S. 1.2.3 Gacaca courts and Rwandan grassroots' interpretation of justice 
The current gacaca courts originate from a traditional local dispute-solving mechanism where all 
members, together with a respected person of the community acting as an arbiter, participate in a 
meeting to decide on a verdict and to find the proper method of reintegrating the wrongdoers and 
his/her family back into the community (Longman, 2006b; Reyntjens & Vandeginste, 2005). The 
name gacaca in Kinyarwanda means 'grass,' and is derived from the common practice of 
encouraging people attending to sit on the lawn during the hearings (Longman, 2006b; Sarkin, 
2001; Sosnov, 2008; Waldorf, 2006). The traditional gacaca holds great meaning in the 
community, as political authorities were not essentially involved in the process unless 
participants appealed the result by an adjudicator to their chief (Longman, 2006b, p. 210). 
Today's post-genocide gacaca system, however, contains few elements of these traditional 
practices; rather, it is an official institution established by the GoR (Reyntjens & Vandeginste, 
2005, pp. 118-119; Vandeginste, 2001, pp. 243-244), and is "intimately linked to the state 
apparatus of prosecutions and incarceration, and applying codified, rather than customary, law" 
(Waldorf, 2006, p. 425). 
Gacaca trials proceed on a weekly basis, with 15 judges44 hearing the testimonies and 
arguments of victims, the accused, and witnesses. After listening to the participants and 
deliberating, the judges conduct sentencing, applied in accordance with the gacaca laws 
(Longman, 2006a; Tiemessen, 2004), as explored in the previous section. The judges, 
inyangamugayo meaning 'people who hate dishonesty' in Kinyarwanda, are elected from each 
community (Karbo & Mutisi, 2008, p. 5; Longman, 2006a, p. 22,2006b, p. 211). To be selected 
as inyangamugayo, candidates are expected to demonstrate the highest moral and ethical 
44 The initial number of judges was 19 during the pilot period of the gacaca implementation until the Gacaca Law 
of 2004 (Sosnov, 2008, p. 135). 
95 
standards, and to have demonstrated an 'uncorrupted' record in the past (Karbo & Mutisi, 2008, 
p. 5-6). 
Today's reinvigorated gacaca courts have five goals: (1) "[t]o reveal the truth about 
what has happened;" (2) "[t]o speed up the genocide trials;" (3) "[t]o eradicate the culture of 
impunity;" (4) "[t]o reconcile the Rwandans and reinforce their unity;" and (5) "[t]o prove that 
the Rwandan society has the capacity to settle its own problems through a system of justice 
based on the Rwandan custom" (NSGJ, n.d.b). The establishment of gacaca courts enjoyed a 
high level of positive support from the Rwandan public (Daly, 2002, p. 374; Longman, 2006b, p. 
212; Longman et al., 2004a, p. 212-219; Smith & Meyer, 2001, p. 20). The expectation of the 
program served the prospect of restorative justice as "a forum in which all members of the 
community, suspects, survivors, and the general population, can debate and discuss legal and 
non-legal issues related to the genocide" (Clark, 2009, p. 316). 
Although the impact, results, and success of gacaca courts vary by region (Megwalu & 
Loizides, 2010, pp. 19-20), the level of Rwandan grassroots participation remains low (Clark, 
2009; Longman, 2006b). Just as the courts provide an opportunity to bring victims and 
perpetrators together to express themselves, it also jeopardizes these participants by 
retraumatizing them when opening up the painful memories and experiences of the past 
(Brouneus, 2008b; Clark, 2010). 
In addition, perceptions between Hutu and Tutsi citizens on how to reconcile are notably 
different. Many Hutu people perceive gacaca as just another form of victor's justice from the 
Tutsi-led government (Clark, 2010, para. 12; Sarkin, 2001, pp. 149-150). On the other hand, 
Tutsi survivors hold the argument that there would be no forgiveness without the punishment of 
genocide instigators and perpetrators, and proper compensation for physical and psychological 
96 
damages. IBUKA, for instance, emphasizes that releasing those accused of participating in the 
genocide will impede respect for the survivors, and that survivors will deem the gacaca courts 
"irrelevant" in bringing justice to Rwanda (IRIN, August 9,2005, as cited in Kirkby, 2006, p. 
114). 
These perspectives and activities reflect a wide range of actors within the grassroots. 
While the diversity evident in the various grassroots organizations should not be overlooked, 
understanding the overarching behaviour of the Rwandan grassroots community in its entirety is 
vital for this research and its attempt to situate the various actors on the Rwandan post-genocide 
stage. Building on the preceding exploration of the GoR and Rwandan grassroots, the final actor 
presented is the international community. 
5.1.3 International community 
The involvement of the international community in Rwanda has been continuous since the 
colonial period, regularly manifesting itself in different forms and through different actors. The 
interest of the international community in Rwanda remained high throughout the period before 
and after the 1994 genocide, ironically only pausing for its silence and neutrality during the 
genocide. Since those events, particular and tremendous focus is given to rebuilding the 
physically and mentally devastated society. These unprecedented aid flows and levels of 
international assistance are attributed in part to moral guilt, resulting from the inaction and 
unwillingness of the international community to engage in stopping the genocide (Kirkby, 2006, 
p. 117; Suhrke & Buckmaster, 2005, p. 743; Umutesi, 2006, p. 163). The discussion in this 
section focuses on identifying post-genocide activities by major international donors and 
organizations. Who are involved and what are their efforts and approaches? 
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5.1.3.1 Aid trends 
To start, it is important to identify the major donors to Rwanda, and to illustrate the recent 
patterns and trends of post-genocide aid inflows. As was mentioned in Chapter IV, the top 
multilateral donors to post-genocide Rwanda are the EC, UNDP, and World Bank (IDA), and 
bilateral donor countries include Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, 
the UK and the US (OECD, 1999; Samset, Petersen, & Wang, 2007; Zorbas, 2008). According 
to OECD statistics from between 1994 and 2008, official development aid (ODA) was 
explosively high during the period immediately after the 1994 genocide, with these levels 
remaining elevated for several years, particularly in case of the US (see Figure 5.1 and 5.2). 
Eventually these levels tapered off, with aid levels reaching low points in the years 1997 and 
2000. Since the turn of the millennium, however, aid levels to Rwanda have again been 
increasing for all major donors with the exception of France (see Figure 5.2). These upward and 
downward trends demonstrate that aid patterns to Rwanda are rarely consistent year after year. A 
brief overview of certain individual donor countries will provide additional insight to better 
understand the reasons for these changing levels. 
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Figure 5.1 Cumulative aid amount of donors between 1994 and 2008 
Source: OECD (n.d., accessed on March 10, 2010) 
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Figure 5.2 ODA by selected major donors to Rwanda between 1994 and 2008 
Source: OECD (n.d., accessed on March 10, 2010) 
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Belgium and France, as the largest and most influential donors to Rwanda in the pre-
genocide period, significantly reduced aid to Rwanda after the genocide ended (OECD, 1999, p. 
12; Zorbas, 2008, p. 148). Conversely, the Netherlands, Norway, the UK, and the US, have all 
increased their aid, and thereby their influence on Rwanda. The disbursements by the Canadian 
and German governments remain fairly consistent (OECD, 1999, p. 12). As a result of this 
transitioning aid landscape, the top five donors, according to Eugenia Zorbas (2008), are relative 
newcomers to the country, having emerged after the genocide. These donors tend to be more 
cooperative and flexible towards the GoR than the traditional donor governments (Zorbas, 2008, 
pp. 146-150). This tendency is partially because of 'genocide credit' (Betts, 2005, p. 749; 
Reyntjens, 2004, pp. 199-200, 210; Suhrke & Buckmaster, 2005, p. 743)—the guilt trap that they 
themselves, and in general the international community, did not intervene to either prevent or 
stop the genocide—and partially because of the lack of information on the ground and their 
relative inexperience in Rwanda, compared with that of Belgium or France (Zorbas, 2008, p. 
149). Finally, when observing aid levels to countries entering post-conflict phases, a 
phenomenon termed 'frontloading' is often evident, referring to the abnormally high levels of aid 
given to countries in the immediate aftermath of war (Suhrke & Buckmaster, 2005, p. 737). 
Rwanda, as evident in Figure 5.2, was arguably a beneficiary of such practices. 
Considering the volume of aid to Rwanda over the past decade and a half, the next 
questions to be asked are: where is this money directed and how involved are donors in the 
controlling and monitoring of aid money? By following the trail of aid money over the years 
since the genocide, the relative importance of national reconciliation and development, as 
expressed by donors, can be better understood. 
In the immediate aftermath of the genocide, much of the frontloaded aid was not closely 
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related to specific programs or priorities (Scherrer, 2002, p. 197). This aid, claim Suhrke and 
Buckmaster (2005), was largely humanitarian and for emergency relief. Eventually, however, 
this form of 'emotional' aid runs out (Suhrke & Buckmaster, 2005). For Rwanda, the year 1997 
may have marked the end of this initial aid inflow, as during that year aid returned to pre-war 
levels (UNDP, 2007). Additionally, following their invasion of the DRC and subsequent 
accusations of committing massacres during 1996 and 1997, the reputation of the GoR and its aid 
attractiveness was negatively affected (Suhrke & Buckmaster, 2005, p. 743). As aid levels again 
began to rise in the years that followed, more aid was earmarked for issues such as 
reconstruction, refugee resettlement, human rights, government improvement, and justice 
(Scherrer, 2002). While these and other foci of aid money, such as health, education, technology, 
and general infrastructure, are certainly areas of concern for most donors, the issue of aid 
spending on justice—largely due to the emphasis placed on it by the GoR itself (Peskin, 2008, 
p. 158-161)—is perhaps the most discussed and debated of all. 
Much of the focus of the major donors' aid activities in post-genocide Rwanda is centred 
on rebuilding the justice system. The donors use two channels to support and practice the priority 
of justice. The first channel is through their indirect funding and cooperation on projects in 
facilitation with the GoR. Secondly, the donors contribute directly to an externally imposed 
system of justice, by funding and operating the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR). As one example of their commitments to justice, international donors funded more than 
US$100 million towards judge training, court rebuilding, and justice-related projects (Kirkby, 
2006, p. 99; Uvin & Mironko, 2003, p. 223).45 Although justice can certainly be labelled as an 
important component of the overall aid picture for Rwanda in the years following the genocide, 
45 The UNDP is a major international organization for the promotion of justice building, coordinating the 
management, and funding many of the justice-related projects through its Justice Trust Fund with Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Belgium (OECD, 1999). 
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some donors were more willing to contribute aid to justice than others. The Netherlands, for 
example, allocated nearly 20% of their overall contributions to this area (Samset et al., 2007, p. 
13). The UK, meanwhile, only devoted a fraction—less than 2%—of their contributions in this 
manner (Samset et al., 2007, p. 13). Continuing the inquiry into the role played by the 
international community injustice for post-genocide Rwanda, the next section will discuss the 
creation and ongoing existence of the ICTR. 
5.1.3.2 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
Roper and Barria's study (2007) of donor country motivations identified three factors that 
influence the amount of aid that gets directed towards war crimes tribunals such as the ICTR; 
these factors are: GDP; democratic values; and former status as a colonial power (pp. 297-299). 
With these factors in mind, it is perhaps not surprising that one of the major initial outcomes of 
the efforts of the international community was the creation of the ICTR. 
Since the establishment of the ICTY in 1993 and the subsequent adoption by the UN 
Security Council of Resolution 955 for building the ICTR46 on November 9,1994 (Betts, 2005, 
p. 738; Uvin & Mironko, 2003, pp. 119-120; Vandeginste, 2001, p. 230), the international 
community has shown its eagerness to pursue formal justice in the wake of large-scale atrocities 
(Mokhiber, n.d.). The establishment of these two courts represented, for the first time, an actual 
implementation of the Genocide Convention of 1948, allowing for the first real application of 
international justice (Oomen, 2005, p. 891). 
The creation and workings of the ICTR, meanwhile, is not without its critics. While the 
46 The full name of the ICTR is the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda 
and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of 
Neighboring States Between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 (Kirkby, 2006, p. 94; UNSC, 1994, Annex; 
Uvin & Mironko, 2003, p. 219). 
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official aim of the ICTR is to "bring to justice the persons who are responsible for [crimes of 
genocide]" and to "contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and 
maintenance of peace" (UNSC, 1994), Uvin and Mironko (2003) claim that the international 
community views the ICTR as little more than "symbolic politics" based on the "reaffirmation of 
the international community's own morality" (p. 220). 
The ICTR has demonstrated its ability to deal with many difficult issues of international 
justice. Among the ICTR's achievements, the indictment of rape as a crime against humanity, 
acknowledgement and indictment of representatives of the media for incitement of genocide, 
trying and convicting civilians for war crimes, and an improved and refined overall definition of 
genocide are often cited as noteworthy precedents and contributions towards international justice 
(Jallow, 2009; Uvin & Mironko, 2003). One of the other functions of the court is its ability to 
focus on accused persons who were in leadership or authority positions (Akhavan, 1997, p. 339), 
in theory shifting some of the workload from the domestic court systems to the ICTR. 
These achievements, however, are primarily of concern only to the international 
community. In reality, the inefficiency and bureaucratic manners of processing cases has not 
sufficiently alleviated the Rwandan government's burden of conducting a large number of trials, 
but instead aggravates the Government's, and some Rwandans, view and attitude toward the 
court itself (Kirkby, 2006; Zorbas, 2004). This challenge, and other dynamic interactions 
between the actors will now be given consideration in the analysis portion of this chapter. 
5.2 Analysis 
The primary objective in this second section of the chapter is to scrutinize the findings of the 
previous section. What concepts of reconciliation do the actors put greater focus on, and are they 
similar, divergent, or contrasting? How do the dynamics of their rationales and approaches 
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(de)form Rwanda's reconciliation process? Can any association between Rwanda's 
reconciliation and post-genocide development be found in the three stakeholders' rationales and 
approaches? In so doing, this section ultimately attempts to demonstrate what reconciliation 

































































Table 5.1 Major goals and strategies of actors for reconciliation and reconstruction 
In an effort to illustrate the principal approaches for the post-genocide reconciliation process 
above, the research finds two common themes among the perspectives of the GoR, Rwandan 
grassroots, and international community (Table 5.1). First, a priority on justice is a clearly 
noticeable and commonly shared element of reconciliation by all three stakeholders although 
their approaches towards justice in policy and practice are at times quite divergent and 
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conflicting. Secondly, though not as apparent as justice, all the actors consider poverty reduction 
as another important aspect of reconciliation, as well as post-genocide development. This 
position is particularly emphasized by Rwandan grassroots. Grassroots organizations perceive 
physical and symbolic functions of reparation to be a fundamental aspect of healing, recovery, 
and poverty alleviation. 
Some post-genocide programs aim for both reconciliation and development more clearly 
than others. The villagization program, imidugudu, for example, seeks to reintegrate all Rwandan 
population groups together by increasing agricultural productivity while at the same time 
regrouping scattered dwellings. In a similar vein, gacaca serves a developmental purpose as well 
as a reconciliatory one in that its reparation scheme provides victims a symbolic gesture of 
restitution and a financial and physical basis for the rebuilding of livelihood. 
To this point the discussion of actors and their programs, efforts, and strategies pursued 
in post-genocide Rwanda have largely been treated separately in order to properly explore the 
theoretical basis for each approach. In practice, however, there are countless differences and gaps 
between the rationales of stakeholders and how each actor has sought to implement and achieve 
their vision. At the national and international level, for instance, justice is mainly interpreted as 
finding and punishing wrongdoers. Attitudes of Rwandan grassroots, meanwhile, have ascribed a 
broader and more encompassing interpretation of justice that includes physical and mental 
security, healing from traumatic experiences, truth about what happened in the past, restitution 
for victims and those affected by the violence, social and economic well-being, as well as 
retributive aspects. Considering these stipulations, the latter can be refined as social justice 
(Lambourne, 2001; Stover & Weinstein, 2004). 
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5.2.1 Contested perspectives on justice and judicial programs among actors 
5.2.1.1 Dynamics of rationales between the GoR and ICTR 
The GoR's firm stance towards justice necessitates its need to expedite judicial procedures and to 
bring all of the genocide perpetrators to trial sooner rather than later. As explored above, 
inducing suspects to confess and plea-bargain systems were chosen as the major methods to 
exercise this priority. Yet, the ICTR, donor community, non-Rwandan academics, and others 
regularly emphasize the importance of procedural standards and fairness for trials in which 
human rights fundamentally lie. In light of such perspectives on justice, the 1999 OECD report 
highlighted that donors tend to emphasize the symbolic meaning of justice, whereas the 
Rwandan government makes firm demands for "clear and absolute justice" (p. 20). The report 
further expands that: 
[f]or donors, [...] it seemed possible to limit judgements to only a small group of 
genocide leaders, freeing many of the ordinary people to empty the prisons and accelerate 
reconciliation. For the GoR and many others in Rwanda, this was heresy; there could be 
no reconciliation without justice, (p. 20) 
Such divergence between approaches is well proven in practice—mandates, laws, penalties, and 
procedures—between the Rwandan domestic judicial courts and the ICTR, a court that the GoR 
reproaches as being irrelevant (Longman, 2006b, pp. 208-209). The Rwandan government 
strongly disagrees with the model and mandate of the ICTR and was, in fact, the only country to 
vote against the resolution to institute the tribunal (Jones, 2010, p. 9). 
Firstly, regarding mandates, the ICTR strives to deal only with trials resulting from the 
crimes of genocide committed between January 1 and December 31 of 1994. In contrast to this 
timeline, the Organic Laws for the national courts have set the dates between October 1,1990 
and December 31,1994 (Boctor, 2009; Kirkby, 2006; Zorbas, 2004). The GoR, however, 
perceives that such a short period for prosecution would allow genocide suspects and 
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wrongdoers to escape, allowing impunity to prevail (Habimana, 2000; Uvin & Mironko, 2003). 
Secondly, the maximum penalty for those found guilty by the ICTR is a life sentence, 
while capital punishment could be applied to suspects under Category One in the domestic courts 
until 2007, when the death penalty was abolished (Betts, 2005; Boctor, 2009; Kirkby, 2006; Uvin 
& Mironko, 2003). Furthermore, the conditions of the ICTR prisons are not nearly as cramped, 
and are more comfortable and 'luxurious' for the prisoners than the conditions found in domestic 
jail cells (Lambourne, 2001; Vandeginste, 2001; Waldorf, 2006). 
Thirdly, the GoR has placed heavy criticism on the ICTR's inefficiency and the slow 
pace of its working process, particularly in light of its disproportionally high budget, in relation 
to gacaca (Vandeginste, 2001, p. 231).47 As of October 2010, 52 cases are completed, 22 are in 
progress and two are awaiting trial in the ICTR (ICTR, n.d.), meanwhile it is estimated that the 
national courts prosecuted 7,000 genocide suspects, excluding all gacaca trials, during the first 
10 years of operation (Apuuli, 2009, p. 21). The ICTR has received over half a billion dollars in 
total funding in the decade following its creation (Roper & Barria, 2007, p. 286). Reflecting on 
such vast amounts of spending, it is not surprising to see that many observers of the ICTR 
proceedings have noted how the lawyers and judges employed are often decorated in expensive 
suits and apparel, seemingly worlds away from the realities of the victims of the genocide itself 
(Vokes, 2002). 
Finally, the ICTR also faces criticism for its venue location, as the court is based in 
Arusha, Tanzania. This physical separation poses several drawbacks, particularly in that its 
activities are not well communicated to the Rwandan public (Jones, 2010, p. 185). Also resulting 
from this physical separation, the development of the Rwandan national judiciary receives 
47 According to the Kigali-based Institute for Research and Dialogue for Peace (IRDP) (2003), the ICTR's budget in 
2002 was US$177,739,400 whereas the estimated annual budget for gacaca courts is US$2.2 million (as cited in 
Zorbas, 2004, p. 34). 
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minimal benefit from the ICTR because the potential for training and skill building is limited, 
despite being part of the initial mandate of the ICTR (Jones, 2010, p. 185; Zaum, 2009, p. 372). 
In comparison, other situations of transitional justice, such as the case of Kosovo, involved 
greater participation and local ownership of the judicial institutions. These contributions led to 
the development and establishment of a stronger national legal foundation for those involved 
(Zaum, 2009, p. 372). 
Among the international community, meanwhile, critiques and views toward the GoR's 
national and local justice system are divided largely into two camps. On one hand, human rights 
advocates48 and some academics with a legal background doubt the fairness and formality of the 
domestic legal procedure—due process—and respect for human rights, all fundamental concepts 
in Western judicial institutions (Clark, 2009; Longman, 2006b; Nagy, 2009; Schabas, 2009; 
Zorbas, 2004). In particular, the competency and accountability of the guilty plea-bargaining 
mechanism is considered problematic in that the 'truth' discovery of the genocide tends to rely 
highly on confessions and guilty pleas made by suspects (Clark, 2009, p. 319). The fact that 
confessions are only accepted if they contain a detailed description and the date of the crime, 
apology to the victims, and names of co-conspirators and accomplices, is seen as a likely 
generator of false pleas and insincere apologies in order to obtain reduced sentences (Clark, 
2009; Kirkby, 2006; Zorbas, 2004). This standpoint conflicts with the GoR's approach of 
encouraging confessions, as increased confessions help facilitate one of the major goals of the 
gacaca courts: relieving the difficulties of the domestic detention facilities (Kirkby, 2006, p. 
107). 
On the other hand, many academic and journalistic commentators (Clark, 2009; Kubai, 
48 See, for instance, reports and articles from African Rights (2003), Amnesty International (1997,2002b), Human 
Rights First (1997) and Human Rights Watch (2008). 
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2007; Longman, 2006b; Nagy, 2009; OECD, 1999; Vandeginste, 2001) underline the point that 
local approaches to the trial mechanism are worthy of respect and that it is incongruous to be 
critical of the gacaca courts based purely on Western standards and perspectives. What the 
purely legal critiques mentioned above miss, however, is consideration for "the importance of 
[participants'] interpretations of gacaca" (Clark, 2009, p. 311) and Rwandans' participation and 
ownership of the process (Clark, 2009, p. 311; Longman, 2006b, p. 221; Vandeginste, 2001, p. 
245). Longman (2006b) also emphasizes that the gacaca courts' cultural aspects are based on 
customary law and local norms, and therefore better suited for understanding the uniquely 
Rwandan circumstances where perpetrators, victims, and their families share the same living 
proximity and neighbourhood, or in his words, "contextual competence" (p. 214). By providing 
victims and wrongdoers an opportunity to tell their stories and encouraging apology and 
forgiveness, the gacaca process is capable of fulfilling the restorative model of justice (Clark, 
2009; Kirkby, 2006; Kubai, 2007; Tiemessen, 2004). The USAID reports that post-genocide 
Rwanda's legal system is analyzed not simply as a process of "re-construction, but rather the 
first-time construction" (1996, p. 14, as cited in OECD, 1999, p. 23) of a very different judicial 
model from the past, pre-genocide period. What concerns this group, rather, is how the execution 
of the local approach proceeds, and whether the goals of proactive local participation and 
ownership are actually accomplished (Clark, 2009, pp. 317-318; Longman, 2006b, pp. 221-223). 
5.2.1.2 Grassroots view on gacaca courts and the ICTR 
From the grassroots viewpoint, gacaca issues that discourage support and turnout for the 
meetings are summarized as: (1) insufficient and improper measures for supporting the 
procedures; (2) oppressive demeanour of the authorities in practice; and, (3) partiality of the 
courts muting out RPF-induced crimes. First, in light of the gacaca procedures, this research 
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found that the lack of adequate safeguards for participants' physical and mental health and 
insufficient reparation to be major hindering factors. The empirical evidence found by Brouneus 
(2008b) suggests that without proper security measures, truth-telling can be counterproductive to 
healing and can jeopardize the reconciliation process, furthering the idea that truth does not 
always lead to healing in practice (pp. 72-72). In addition, Longman et al. (2004a) conclude that 
using a judicial approach to reconciliation cannot be assumed because not all Rwandans who 
experienced trauma share the same idea of justice (pp. 611-612). 
Secondly, the local authorities' top-down and coercive manner of inducing participants 
for gacaca undermines the reconciliation motive of the program (Sosnov, 2008; Tiemessen, 
2004). To some Rwandans attending a gacaca meeting is an experience similar to that of 
participating in umuganda, a civic labour duty imposed by the Government, in that time usually 
devoted to economic activities and earning household income may have to be sacrificed 
(Tiemessen, 2004, p. 69). Such a vertical relationship between authorities and locals is evident 
not only for the gacaca courts but is embedded in almost all stages of nation-building (Buckley-
Zistel, 2006a, 2006b; Ingelaere, 2010; Kubai, 2007; Longman, 2004a; Reyntjens, 2004; Stover & 
Weinstein, 2004; Veale, 2000). 
Thirdly, perhaps the most controversial judicial issue, faced at both domestic and 
international levels, lies in the fact that RPF-induced violence and crimes are excluded from the 
trials. Numerous critics (Clark, 2009,2010; Evans & Ellis, 2005; Jones, 2010; Lambourne, 2001; 
Sarkin, 2001; Tiemessen, 2004; Vandeginste, 2001; Waldorf, 2006) maintain that the judicial 
approach of Rwanda is little more than a disguised form of victor's justice, in that the post-
genocide RPF-led regime deals exclusively with the genocide crimes but not the revenge killings 
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and massacres of Hutus committed by the RPF under the Organic Law mandate.49 Vandeginste 
(2001) describes the situation as "rendering justice on behalf of the victor, that is, the militarily 
strongest party" (p. 231). Neither Rwandan national courts nor the ICTR adjudicates RPF-
involved human rights violations (Jones, 2010, p. 181). 
Efforts to capture the Rwandan grassroots' attention, made by the ICTR, have for the 
most part been failing (Betts, 2005; Lambourne, 2001; Longman et al., 2004a, 2004b; Neuffer, 
2001; Nolen, 2005; Vandeginste, 2001). Most ordinary Rwandans are not aware of the existence 
of the ICTR or the tribunal's purposes and functions, given that little information about the ICTR 
is disseminated to the public and that nearly half of the Rwandan population lacks the basic 
literacy skills necessary to seek out such information on their own (Habimana, 2000; Longman et 
al., 2004a). The physical location of the courts, based in Arusha, Tanzania, and the ongoing 
marginalization of survivor voices creates an "enormous (mental) distance" (Vandeginste, 2001, 
p. 231) between the Rwandan population and the Tribunal. Brought about by these shortcomings, 
the ICTR has received much less support than the gacaca courts from the local population (Betts, 
2005; Longman et al., 2004a, 2004b). 
5.2.2 Counterproductive effects on gacaca courts and imidugudu 
During the implementation of many post-genocide reconciliation and reconstruction programs, 
there have been indications of adversarial impact and effects. Such evidence is palpable where 
the policies of gacaca and imidugudu meet in practice (Longman, 2004a). Although the 
imidugudu aims to foment both reconciliation and development by purporting population 
reintegration and regrouping, and effective land use, the process of relocating the existing 
population within the country and returnees to newly built villages has resulted in a weakened 
49 Trials for former RPF soldiers are only conducted in closed military courts (Jones, 2010, p.181). These trials have 
been very infrequent, and the information about the trials is sparsely communicated to the Rwandan public. 
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sense of the traditional community (Karbo & Mutisi, 2008, pp. 23-24). Many of the returnees, 
particularly old case refugees, did not have direct experience or exposure to the genocide, and 
were subsequently unable to make meaningful personal connections within the community 
(Daly, 2002, pp. 378-380; Van Hoyweghen, 1999, pp. 363-365). To the existing population who 
remained in the country during the genocide, furthermore, the relocation policy broke up their 
cultural and emotional ties within the community (Karbo & Mutisi, 2008, pp. 23-24). For the 
procedures of gacaca courts, this separation makes the bringing together of witnesses and the 
accused to a trial more difficult. As the local social norm that 'everyone is known to everyone 
else' weakens, the notion of community being the fundamental unit for the gacaca practice 
becomes questionable (Daly, 2002, p. 379). 
5.2.3 Policies on reparation and poverty reduction 
As discussed earlier, reparation is strongly highlighted as an aspiration among Rwandan 
communities. Forms of restitution are sought through two channels in principle: the FARG, and 
reparation sentences in gacaca courts for Category Three offenders. It should be noted that 
although the FARG does not provide direct compensation to genocide survivors (Sosnov, 2008, 
p. 152; Waldorf, 2006, p. 430), it is meaningful to the extent that its financial support aims to 
alleviate poverty as well as to meet the needs of the grassroots. This research finds, however, that 
the implementation of such polices in practice produces vastly different results than in rhetoric, 
and largely fails to benefit the grassroots population (AI, 2004; Buckley-Zistel, 2006b; Des 
Forges, 1999; HRW, 2004; Neuffer, 2001; Waldorf, 2006). 
The proceedings of the FARG have frequently been reported as being corrupt. Politicians 
and high-level government officials receive the funding, and the FARG has shown 
discrimination towards certain Hutu survivors and their families compared to Tutsi survivors 
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(AI, 2004, p. 17; Waldrof, 2006, p. 430). Furthermore, the FARG leaves little room for many 
Rwandans other than the survivors to understand "why survivors are singled out as recipients 
when they, too, are living in abject poverty" (Buckley-Zistel, 2006b, p. 146). Moreover, some 
cases suggest that recipients are not aware of the contents of the benefit (HRW, 2004, p. 42). 
Similarly, compensation has barely been given to the victims and survivors in contrast to what 
was announced during gacaca sentencing (Des Forges, 1999, chap. 20, para. 76; Sosnov, 2008, 
p. 145). A lack of systematic guidelines for monitoring sentences under Category Three also 
hinders the enforcement of community service and effective delivery of compensation to victims 
(Sosnov, 2008, p. 145). The disconnection between the desire amongst survivors for reparations 
and, in contrast, the minimal reparations demands from gacaca continues to fuel the debates 
surrounding the appropriateness of the courts as a whole for post-genocide reconciliation (Kubai, 
2007; Longman & Rutagengwa, 2004; Neuffer, 2001; Steward, 2009; Umutesi, 2006; Waldorf, 
2006). 
Notwithstanding the importance placed upon compensation by grassroots and civil 
society, neither the Rwandan national court nor the ICTR provides reparation to victims and 
survivors (Des Forges, 1999; Reyntjens & Vandeginste, 2005; Vandeginste, 2001). While donor 
countries deem poverty reduction to be an important element of reconciliation, direct reparations 
to the victims are not included as a component of their strategy (Zorbas, 2008). Rather, according 
to Zorbas' (2008) in-depth study of the top five donors' attitudes towards Rwandan 
reconciliation, the donors tend to think "reconciliation = poverty reduction + good governance" 
(p. 140). A particular focus of their poverty reduction approach is paid to the rural sector and 
good governance frequently refers to technical assistance, service delivery, and transparency 
(Zorbas, 2008, pp. 141-146). Zorbas' analysis concludes that the donor perception of 
113 
reconciliation in the Rwandan context is concerned primarily with economic development for 
conflict prevention and social stability, which "has not translated into meaningful change in 
terms of the kinds of interventions and programmes they favour on the ground" (2008, p. 146). 
The donors' perspective and attitudes towards reconciliation in Rwanda is implicit and can be 
inferred, at best, as being a part of the country's economic development. It is difficult to grasp 
specific viewpoints of the donor community towards reconciliation per se as given the tendency 
among donors that such discussions are minimal and seldom communicated. 
5.2.4 Policies on ethnicity, ingando, and grassroots attitudes 
Perhaps the most delicate and contentious matter that challenges post-genocide Rwanda's future 
of peace and reconciliation is that of ethnicity. The unity of Rwandans is strongly promoted by 
the Kagame government through its prohibition of public discourse on ethnic distinction and by 
its version of Rwanda's history before the colonial period, specifically the origins of Hutus, 
Tutsis, and Twas, an account that opposes the message of predecessor regimes who used 
ethnicity for political division (Buckley-Zistel, 2009). 
Speaking of ethnic identity has become taboo in post-genocide Rwandan society: any 
type of public discussions on ethnic description and or views of ethnicity are silenced (Buckley-
Zistel, 2006a, 2006b; Hilker, 2009; Longman, 2006a; Veale, 2000; Zorbas, 2004). Nevertheless, 
the ethnicity of Hutu/Tutsi/Twa remains an essential determinant in grassroots' mindset when 
generating images and perceptions of relationships with people (Buckley-Zistel, 2006a; Daly, 
2002; Hilker, 2009; Longman et al., 2004b; Mamdani, 2001; Waters, 1997; Zorbas, 2008). The 
altering societal norms and atmosphere around ethnicity are analyzed here with two 
explanations. 
First, any disregard of the 'no ethnicity' rule or version of history other than the 
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Government's is subject to legal accountability. This authoritarian and oppressive approach 
taken by the GoR in handling such dissenting voices has come under heavy criticism. Cases 
report that both individual opponents of the government position, as well as entities with any 
critical opinions toward the GoR—whether local or international—are oppressed by threats, 
incarcerations, assassinations, shutdowns, visa denial to foreign nationals, deportations, and 
more (Buckley-Zistel, 2006a, pp. 111-113,2009, p. 46; Reyntjens, 2004, pp. 202-204; Uvin, 
2003, pp. 3-4). As a result, when conducting fieldwork, 'silence' is often observed during direct 
contact with community members in the field when asked about views of ethnicity, at least until 
researchers gain a certain level of trust from them (Veale, 2000, p. 238). Moreover, as the 
opportunity to exchange opinions on ethnicity is eliminated from public discourse, a gap 
continues to widen between the conceptual imagery about ethnic groups in Rwandan mindsets 
and the "concrete people around them that contradicted these stereotypes" (Hilker, 2009, p. 92, 
emphasis in the original). 
Second, a more fundamental question lies in the feasibility of the policies—whether such 
approaches by the GoR can in fact reconcile Rwandan images towards one another from ethnic 
to national identity, or whether the 'no ethnicity' agenda is simply another way to exploit and to 
concentrate Tutsi power (Longman, 2004a; Uvin, 2003). Criticism underscores the fact that the 
NURC is a very vertical tool for instilling the Tutsi-led government's political indoctrination and 
propaganda through ingando (Mgbako, 2005, pp. 209-210; Zorbas, 2004, p. 39). The GoR's 
philosophy on ethnicity in the multi-party system is, in reality, used only to the extent of "not 
publicly challenging] the [Government's hegemonic narrative" (Longman, 2006a, p. 16). 
Through its democratic political structure, such challenges have virtually disappeared (Uvin, 
2003, pp. 1-2). In fact, a field research report analyzing the grassroots perspectives on Rwandan 
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life before and after the 1994 genocide (Ingelaere, 2009) reveals that Hutu respondents generally 
think of themselves as being less significant and represented in politics since the genocide. The 
trust level amongst different ethnic groups has not improved, despite the GoR's position, and is 
actually worsening in some situations (Hilker, 2009; Ingelaere, 2009). A bipolar perception of 
Tutsi 'victims/survivors' and Hutu 'perpetrators' tends to be prevalent in grassroots, particularly 
amongst the younger generation who have a different understanding of history, civil war, and the 
genocide (Hilker, 2009). 
Numerous authors warn (Clark, 2010; Hilker, 2009; Longman, 2006a; Longman & 
Rutagengwa, 2004; Mamdani, 2001; Pottier, 2002; Reyntjens, 2004; Reyntjens & Vandeginste, 
2005; Vandeginste, 2001) about the danger of generalizing Hutu guilt. Pottier (2002) elaborates 
that: 
the challenge in Rwanda today is complicated further in that the official discourse on the 
1994 genocide maintains in practice the ethnic division which the RPF-led government 
denounces in theory: only Tutsi are victims of genocide; moderate Hutu are victims of 
politicide who died in massacres (Eltringham and Van Hoyweghen 2000: 226). The 
distinction has an implied moral hierarchy, (p. 126) 
What makes reconciliation so elusive is that it is contingent on both how and by whom, 
Rwandan history is perceived (Mamdani, 2001, p. 267). Mamdani (2001) evaluates that 
"Rwanda's key dilemma is how to build a democracy that can incorporate a guilty majority 
alongside an aggrieved and fearful minority into a single political community" (p. 266, emphasis 
in the original). Mamdani (2001) further argues that if Hutus are viewed as either perpetrators or 
passive onlookers, but not as victims just as the Tutsis were, and Tutsis are viewed only as 
survivors, this interpretation would continually exacerbate Hutu-Tutsi divisionism. 
The discourse on ethnic differences and prejudices is well-known to donors, and in some 
cases it makes their partnership with recipients—local NGOs and civil society—difficult and 
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intricate (Peter & Kibalama, 2006, p. 121). Nonetheless, the dominant standpoint of the 
international community is that peace and reconciliation in Rwanda is a specifically domestic 
issue to be resolved and practiced; that as an intermediary it could play at best a supportive role 
(OECD, 1999; Schimmel, 2010; Zorbas, 2008). One OECD report (1999) assesses that: 
[reconciliation [...] is a complex social process, involving issues such as the recognition 
of their crimes by the perpetrators; the application of justice to the leaders and organisers 
of the crimes; compensation of the victims; and a beginning of forgiveness from the 
victims. Yet, the social climate in Rwanda remains profoundly hostile to reconciliation. 
There has been little expression of recognition or remorse of the crimes either in camps, 
prisons, or refugee circles, from political leaders, intellectuals, or religious authorities. 
Denial or counter-accusation is more common. The RPF also denies its own involvement 
in human rights violations after 1994. Fundamentally, the international community 
cannot do anything about this, and it probably has under-estimated the poisoning social 
atmosphere this has caused in Rwanda, (p. 26, emphasis added) 
Such viewpoints demonstrate the lack of motivation and willingness of the donor community to 
engage in Rwanda's reconciliation process. This position of the international community ignores 
the challenges and unique circumstances faced by a post-conflict society, essentially denying the 
capacity for reconciliation among the Rwandan populace, and highlights the drastically different 
priorities driving each actor. 
5.2.5 Examining relationships between reconciliation and development 
5.2.5.1 Social healing and community development 
Healing is frequently cited as being a crucial and central component of reconciliation, 
particularly among the grassroots—it is the very starting point of recovery—and can act as a 
driver for personal and community decisions to make peace with past ordeals, either by 
forgiving, forgetting, or simply moving towards a constructive future. While certain previously 
strained individual relationships appear to be on the mend, this research finds that an aggregated 
sense of community development is still lacking in Rwanda. Longman et al. (2004a) observe 
117 
that: "respondents are willing to develop relationships at an individual level but that these 
relationships do not yet constitute a shared sense of community" (p. 610). This deficit of healing 
and community development is largely due to a lack of local empowerment and the coercive 
attitude of the GoR, including its involvement in the gacaca courts. The GoR's largely top-down 
and authoritative manner of implementing post-genocide policies is widely stated as a substantial 
hindrance to social healing and Rwanda's reconciliation process as a whole (Buckley-Zistel, 
2006a; Ingelaere, 2010; Lerhe, 2005; Longman et al., 2004b; Stover & Weinstein, 2004; Veale, 
2000). In contrast, the contributions of the ICTR hold a more symbolic role, prosecuting top 
instigators and planners of the genocide, yet possess minimal relevance for bringing about social 
healing and rehabilitation in Rwandan communities, let alone at the individual level. 
Meanwhile, gacaca courts remain a pivotal grassroots movement because the principle 
ownership of the process, participation, and operation of the trials is held by Rwandans 
themselves. By serving the people and communities that were either directly or indirectly 
involved in the violence, gacaca courts remain a meaningful vehicle for social healing. Gacaca 
is: 
intended to strengthen communities by encouraging people to work together. This is an 
admirable goal in any case; in Rwanda's situation, it is essential to long-term stability. 
Rwanda will thrive only if the communities within it function cohesively. The gacaca 
plan thus aims to link two important goals—retributive justice and community 
rebuilding—by making them interdependent. (Daly, 2002, p. 378) 
For gacaca to reach its full healing and community development potential, increased local 
empowerment—a major grassroots priority—is necessary. As indicated by the many voices of 
discontent, however, the post-genocide GoR does not fully reflect the grassroots needs and 
perspectives. The efforts of the international community, meanwhile, are not well connected to 
local people and healing. The ICTR is retributive justice with symbolic meaning, not a direct 
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mechanism for community development. 
5.2.5.2 Reparation and economic development 
The second dimension for connecting reconciliation and development is in the aspect of 
reparation. As indicated throughout this research, the meaning and magnitude of reparation is 
robustly highlighted and pursued by the genocide victims and survivors organizations. Given that 
abject living conditions and the gravity of poverty have an impact on ordinary Rwandans' 
everyday lives, survivors view reparation as an opportunity to improve their quality of life and to 
alleviate poverty, giving reparations a practical as well as symbolic meaning. 
Meanwhile, the other actors, as reflected by the policies and approaches of the GoR and 
donor community, have given very little attention to reparations. Their fundamental position 
implies that addressing poverty issues can lead to social stability and conflict prevention. 
Economic policy papers, poverty reduction plans, and donor feedback and guidelines rarely 
attempt to refine or contextualize Rwandan reconciliation, or even use the term 'reconciliation,' 
making it very difficult to conceive of how reconciliation is defined and viewed from their 
perspective. Even well intended efforts at restitution through the programs of the FARG and 
gacaca, as seen above, are insufficient and controversial when functioning in practice. The 
meaning and value attached to reparation as a reconciliation and development strategy in the 
GoR and donor community remains little more than rhetoric. 
5.2.5.3 Shared views on history and political development 
The third and final focal point of the analysis considers reconciling the past of Rwanda and its 
political development. Settling the account of ethnic identity represents an intersection of the two 
concepts. The post-genocide GoR chose national identity—Rwandans—as Rwanda's political 
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identity, detangling the thread of what represented Rwanda during predecessor governments, 
where ethnicity had been embedded in every aspect of Rwandan life. The current GoR's decisive 
effort to disseminate this new doctrine has had a significant influence on Rwandan society as a 
whole, especially on younger generations. Mentioning and discussing someone's ethnicity has 
become a strict taboo and is considered inappropriate among Rwandans (Rusesabagina, 2006, 
pp. 198-199). The intent of the GoR's approach is noteworthy, in that ethnicity in principle is no 
longer an 'official' indicator of someone's social, economic, or political status. Summarizing the 
merit of the GoR's stance, Hintjens (2009) explains: 
the government has constantly stressed the point that Rwandans should not be divided 
along racial lines. Attempting to reinvent Rwandan national identity by removing race 
labels from public political discourse is the government's way of trying to ensure 
genocide can never happen again, (p. 79) 
The compelling question, however, is whether such a policy represents true freedom from 
the legacy of ethnicity, or merely another manipulation of power by the GoR. While it is still too 
soon to measure success or failure, the GoR's implementation of the policy has come under 
criticism for facilitating the concentration and continuation of RPF power through political 
manoeuvring and manipulation. The GoR is silencing its opposition, not allowing for a diversity 
of voices. In this way, ethnicity does not matter in principle, but is still pervasive in determining 
and appointing positions of social authority or within the political arena. Those of Hutu-descent 
continue to be implicitly marginalized and discriminated (Buckley-Zistel, 2006a; Longman, 
2004a; Reyntjens, 2004). 
This reality does not necessarily have a positive influence on the perspectives of 
Rwandan grassroots toward ethnicity, nor is it helpful or constructive in building a reconciliatory 
mode for the society. Two layers now exist. In public and official discourse, ethnicity is 
discouraged and disappearing on the surface. In practice, however, ethnicity still remains 
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significant and contributes to Rwandans' perceptions of one another (Longman et al., 2004a, 
2004b; USAID, 2000). 
Concerning the GoR's policy towards ethnicity and history, the role of the donor 
community and external parties involved in Rwanda's post-genocide exercise typically fall into 
one of two categories: silence or acquiescence. Donors are often reluctant to act on such 
domestic issues given their inability or unwillingness to understand Rwandan history and local 
conditions (Zorbas, 2008, pp. 144-154). Rather, they feel that the best they can do is to support 
the GoR through "a 'backseat' strategy where their most substantial contribution to 
reconciliation is their public commitment to support the government, financially and 
diplomatically" (Zorbas, 2008, p. 152). 
Synthesizing the above discussions, the connections between post-genocide Rwanda's 
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Table 5.2 Perspectives of the actors toward the relationships between post-genocide Rwanda's 
reconciliation and development 
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5.3 Conclusion 
Building on the assessments of the major actors in post-genocide Rwanda presented in this 
chapter, the cross-actor analysis of an association between reconciliation and development yields 
the following primary findings. 
Firstly, the majority of all policies for reconciliation and those for development are stated 
and treated in a separate and distinct manner. Even in cases where the actors acknowledge the 
relationships between reconciliation and development, the relationships are not necessarily 
discussed explicitly or clearly. The GoR, in particular, makes it difficult to recognize what 
reconciliation means and how it is defined. There is virtually no direct clarification of the notions 
and definitions of reconciliation provided by the Government, despite its post-genocide vision of 
national unity and reconciliation in order to "strive for a peaceful, united and prosperous nation" 
(NURC, n.d.). In most official documents, rather, the methodology of reconciliation—how to 
reconcile victims and perpetrators, people with different ethnic backgrounds, the rich and poor, 
and the old and young—is emphasized without any specific conceptualization of what 
reconciliation means in the Rwandan context. The GoR, by positioning reconciliation as a vague 
'moving target,' dilutes the structure of lasting relationships between reconciliation and 
development on their part. 
Secondly, different priorities and strategies for reconciliation are apparent by different 
actor depending on the actors' rationale and position. This means a certain amount of friction or 
disagreement is experienced. Grassroots attempts at reconciliation are often impeded by 
overbearing GoR policy, or in the case of reparations, lack thereof. The international community, 
meanwhile, views reconciliation as an ultimately domestic issue and thereby a problem to be 
solved by Rwandan society itself. 
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The final finding of this analysis is that the meaning of reconciliation is highly divergent 
by actor. Each actor places their own meaning upon the concept of reconciliation, drawing from 
the pool of 'reconciliation resources' (e.g., justice, truth, reparations, healing, unified perspective 
on history, etc.), to meet their unique needs. With three different and often conflicting 
approaches to reconciliation being incorporated into the post-genocide development of Rwanda, 
a substantial multi-actor association between reconciliation and development remains elusive. 
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CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSION 
As the number of societies that have undergone mass violence continues to rise, an increased 
level of importance and interest is being paid to the discourse of post-conflict peace-building and 
reconstruction, both in theory and practice. When the characteristic of conflict is primarily 
intrastate rather than interstate in nature, geographical separation among adversarial groups is not 
always a viable solution. In such circumstances, consequently, reconciliation presents a way to 
recuperate and rebuild broken relationships amongst former conflicting parties. Reconciliation 
can promote lasting peace and conflict prevention. This research stems from the notion that 
reconciliation is an integral part of development in post-conflict societies. 
Societies have different ways to deal with their violent pasts. Despite the difficulty of 
applying the discourse of reconciliation to unique situations, efforts to conceptualize the vast and 
vague 'realm of reconciliation' are in fact expanding. In situations where a culture of impunity 
has prevailed, justice often holds the key to conflict resolution (Kubai, 2007; Ngoga, 2009). 
Embodying another approach to reconciliation, formal truth commissions have been instituted in 
over 20 countries where the search for historical clarity and incident verification is paramount 
(Hayner, 1996; Ross, 2006). While the balance between justice and truth tends to dominate 
discussions concerning the meaning of reconciliation (Brouneus, 2007; Gloppen, 2005; Hayner, 
2001; Kritz, 2002; Minow, 1998; Rigby, 2001; Rotberg & Thompson, 2000), this dichotomy 
should not overlook the practical value of reparations as an additional component of 
reconciliation. 
The case of Rwanda is evidence of this phenomenon, where a complex history and 
divergent actors' perspectives necessitate a multi-faceted approach to reconciliation. Such an 
approach, moreover, underscores the possibilities for reconciliation and development to intersect. 
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In the context of a post-conflict setting, this thesis attempted to search for the meanings of 
reconciliation and development and to explore the possible connections and bridging points 
between these two themes in post-genocide Rwanda. 
The history of Rwanda demonstrates the combustible outcome of ethnic division when 
political instability and numerous other factors converge. Dating back to precolonial Rwanda, 
ethnicity has followed a contentious path. Physical, socio-economic, and political differences 
have regularly been exploited for political power and gains, initially by colonizers and then by 
Rwandans themselves after independence. As colonial powers leveraged ethnicity in order to 
control Rwanda through indirect rule, first siding with the ruling Tutsi, and later backing the 
ruled Hutu, ethnic difference became rigidified in Rwandans through an identity that determines 
his/her social, political, and economic status in society. 
After the era of independence, the tactics of ethnic divisionism took on a renewed 
position as a means for competing and eliminating any opposition and to seize political power. 
With this approach, Hutu politicians obtained control during almost the latter half of the 
twentieth century. Tensions among the ethnic groups grew and perceptions on ethnicity 
polarized. Throughout these transitions it was Rwandans at the bottom rung, regardless of their 
ethnicity, who suffered the greatest burden of mass violence, exile, loss of life, and such. As 
many (Des Forges, 1995,1999; IPEP, 2000; Longman 1997,2006a; Mamdani, 2001; Newbury, 
1998; C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 1995; Pottier, 2002; Prunier, 1995) view, the 1994 genocide 
is not an isolated and unexpected tragedy but is understood as an extended period of violence 
stemming from oppressive political dictatorship, pressure for democratic reform, a faltering 
economy, RPF invasion, and civil war. 
The genocide that eliminated 800,000 lives left with it a number of challenges, most 
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importantly the rebuilding and recovery of a devastated society. More than 15 years have now 
passed since the conflict, and studies conducted about post-genocide Rwanda are indeed vast. 
Accordingly, the main objective of this research has been to seek out the meanings of 
reconciliation and development in Rwanda, two concepts that are frequently mentioned, but 
seldom combined in the literature or in practice. To enable this undertaking, the goals and 
strategies of three prominent actors—the GoR, Rwandan grassroots, and the international 
community—were examined in order to find the meanings they hold for reconciliation and 
development, and to consider the relationship between these concepts. This research 
hypothesized three associations between reconciliation and development—social healing and 
community development, reparations and economic development, and shared views on history 
and political development; and then, it examined them against the meanings of reconciliation and 
development of major actors in post-genocide Rwanda. 
6.1 Post-Genocide Rwanda's Reconciliation at the Crossroads of Development: The 
Findings 
Perspectives and approaches by Rwandan grassroots, the Government, and non-Rwandan 
stakeholders involved in Rwanda's post-genocide peace-building and development exercises 
were subject to examination and study as the major actors in this post-conflict scenario. 
There is a clear cohesiveness among all three actors that emphasizes punishment of the 
guilty as the first and most meaningful step towards reconciliation and development. Beyond this 
concurrence, however, there exists a divergence among these actors when it comes down to the 
specific notions of justice and the perceived magnitudes of the concept and its delivery. The GoR 
subscribes to a model of widespread retributive justice. The international community sought out 
a more nuanced and symbolic form of justice by putting top genocide leaders, planners, and 
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inciters on trial. At the grassroots, meanwhile, participation in gacaca courts was the preferred 
approach to justice, aiming for both retributive and restorative outcomes. Grassroots justice 
emphasizes the importance of open discussion, truth-telling, forgiveness, and above all, local 
empowerment. In practice, however, local participation is low, and issues of security, revenge 
attacks, threats, and enforced participation are common. 
Even when reconciliation is pared down to a single concept such as justice, consensus 
and agreement among actors does not necessarily occur. To grassroots, who were the most 
affected by the experiences of violence, reconciliation means many different things and cannot 
be simplified to a single statement or concept. Unlike the donor community, who tends to follow 
the guidelines, principles, and rhetoric of transitional justice and post-conflict reconstruction and 
peace-building, reconciliation for the grassroots occurs in real time and among the dynamics of 
real people. 
Similarly, the meaning of development does not translate well amongst the actors, as 
different metrics and results are employed by each actor. On one hand, grassroots priorities 
include tangible improvements in areas such as security, property rights, job protection, 
education, and health. For grassroots, practical utility takes precedent over rhetoric. The GoR, on 
the other, places priority on the achievement of economic growth, in order to reduce poverty 
through more efficient usage of natural resources and knowledge-based capital. To the 
international community, Rwanda's development is primarily economically driven, with GDP 
growth and aid inflows dictating the bottom line. Taking these three perspectives into 
consideration, tackling the issue of poverty emerges as a shared meaning, though poverty 
reduction alone does not satisfy the development goals of each actor. At the same time, the 
meaning of development, as highlighted by both the GoR and international community, appears 
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to be infused with rhetoric, often stating lofty goals or impressive strategies, but rarely 
incorporating these words into practice. 
In examining for relationships between reconciliation and development, no simple 
answers or obvious trends were observed. Instead, the analysis revealed numerous missed 
opportunities and cross-actor discrepancies. Gacaca courts, for example, while seemingly 
designed to embrace both social healing and community development, are plagued by top-down 
implementation, thus limiting their crossover potential. Even policy documents, particularly from 
the GoR and international community, fail to make explicit the relationship between 
reconciliation and development, often due to imprecise concepts or definitions of what 
reconciliation means in the Rwandan context. The meanings of reconciliation and development 
in Rwanda, as evidenced through this analysis, are unique for each actor, with conflicting 
agendas and competing strategies in place. 
When the agendas of each actor do collide, reconciliation and development endeavours 
often become fragile and ineffective. Limited success, GoR opposition, and the low grassroots 
appeal of the ICTR serve as examples. This reality is particularly concerning at the grassroots 
level, where viewpoints and priorities such as reparations are being ignored or not being 
implemented. By testing relationships between reconciliation and development, these 
disconnections and limitations of post-conflict initiatives in a multi-actor environment were 
made apparent. 
6.2 Implications of the Research 
6.2.1 Implications for Rwanda's post-genocide reconciliation and development 
In Rwanda, considerable focus is given to the issue of justice, often at the expense of alternative 
concepts of reconciliation that look beyond the judicial dimension. As discussed earlier, there are 
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alternative approaches to reconciliation that have been tested in other post-conflict societies, but 
these concepts, such as truth-telling and reparations, tend to be overshadowed or marginalized in 
Rwanda. One avenue of reconciliation that has been discussed and holds potential for Rwanda is 
a truth commission (Lambourne, 2001; Sarkin, 1999; Vandeginste, 2001). As Vandeginste 
(2001) succinctly observes: "dealing with the past in such a context cannot solely be a judicial 
issue; it is a political challenge and a challenge for society as a whole" (p. 223). 
In part, the solution lies in grassroots empowerment and the embracement of bottom-up 
approaches by the GoR (Moyo, 2009; van Hoyweghen, 1999). By encouraging local ownership 
of key processes, the main driving force of reconciliation can be realized. 
For reconciliation to occur and thrive in Rwanda, wider concerns relating to post-conflict 
development, such as personal security, social healing, poverty alleviation, reparation, equality, 
historical clarification and a systemic reparation scheme, remain unresolved (IPEP, 2000; 
Kirkby, 2006; Mamdani, 2001; Minow, 1998). In light of these and other preconditions, it is still 
too soon to analyse the outcomes of Rwanda's recovery from genocide, nor was it the intent of 
this research to produce such findings. Additional data, evaluation, and long-term research is still 
necessary in order to assess the full achievements and potential of Rwanda's reconciliation and 
development process. With each discovery and exploration of post-genocide Rwanda, new 
stones are uncovered and more constructive analysis is made possible. 
6.2.2 Prospects on future research 
The discourse of reconciliation is relatively new, and is still developing and attracting new 
research. Discourse that treats reconciliation and development as a joined concept, however, is 
neither common nor emergent. Almost all dialogue speaks of the two concepts as separate 
entities. After experiencing such a paucity of discourse, this research hopes to lend itself not only 
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to further conceptualization about concrete relationships between reconciliation and development 
but also to the impact of the discourse in practice both in Rwanda and other post-conflict 
situations. 
At present, the discourse of reconciliation tends to be subsumed within the blueprint of 
post-conflict development, rather than being treated with an equal depth and weight of 
importance. Given the impact that reconciliation has upon development initiatives in post-
conflict societies, this discrepancy needs to be balanced, or to borrow from the theme of this 
thesis, it deserves to be 'reconciled.' Notwithstanding the enhanced emphasis on development 
and conflict prevention, documentation of any in depth and specific efforts to find an interactive 
relationship between both agendas is quite minimal. The interrelation of reconciliation and 
development is not being specifically discussed in depth, and the respective discourses of each 
study are incompatible with the other—they do not speak the same language. This essential 
obstacle demands immediate attention, with respect to how closely related and intertwined the 
two topics are. When development is strategized without fully reflecting ongoing or potential 
social and/or cultural factors—such as ethnicity in the case of Rwanda—critical synergies are 
bypassed, certain socio-economic conditions can be aggravated, and a vicious cycle of violence 
may prevail. 
Additionally, the question of whether or not reconciliation is purely a domestic issue 
needs to be addressed. Numerous development programs aim to strengthen the civil society of 
war-torn countries through funding and development aid for capacity-building. This begs the 
question; if the donors are really committed to making their money work for the improvement of 
society, why leave reconciliation out of the picture, given the tremendous potential that 
development, particularly at the local level, can have on reconciliation? 
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This research underscores that in a post-conflict society such as Rwanda, reconciliation 
and development are not stand-alone entities that operate in isolation from each other. These two 
concepts, when well-conceived, can enable and accelerate one another. The meaning of 
development in a post-conflict society, thus, is contingent on reconciliation. Likewise, 
reconciliation can be given meaning through development. Rebuilding post-conflict societies is 
both an exercise in development and reconciliation. Development builds a house, reconciliation 
allows neighbours to populate nearby dwellings with confidence, but only when reconciliation 
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